Many datasets used in the social sciences have a hierarchical structure, where lower units of aggregation are ‘nested’ in higher units. In many disciplines, such data are analyzed using multilevel modeling (MLM, also known as hierarchical linear modeling). However, MLM as a framework is relatively unknown in economics. Instead, economists use a range of separate econometric methods, including cluster-robust standard errors, fixed effects models, models with cross-level interactions, and estimated dependent variable models. Relying on an extensive literature review, this paper describes this methodological divide and provides a detailed comparison between MLM and ‘economic methods’ in their abilities to deal with three methodological challenges inherent in multilevel data ‒ clustering, omitted variables, and coefficients' heterogeneity across groups. We unfold the comparative advantages of these two methodological approaches and provide practical recommendations about which of them should be used, why, and in what settings.

How are candidates without official party affiliation able to succeed in authoritarian elections? We analyzed 1,101 independents who took part in city council elections in Russia’s regional capitals between 2014 and 2018. We found that independent candidates’ electoral fortunes depended both on their personal resources enabling them to attract voters’ support and pre-electoral deals with the regime. We also discovered that the chances of being elected were higher for those formally independent candidates who were the regime’s hidden representatives. For the latter group, the chances to win the race were boosted mostly by pre-electoral deals, rather than their personal resources.

The article explores the relationship between Orthodox religiosity and voting in Russia in 2011–2018. Using the theoretical framework of desecularization from above, which claims that church structures play a key role in the religious renaissance policy, we argue that the rise of the political influence of the ROC (Russian Orthodox Church) may be explained by its capacity for dissemination of traditional values that ultimately results in votes for United Russia and President Vladimir Putin in national elections. This study reveals the emergence of a new area on Russia’s political map—the belt – into Belt, which combines higher levels of Orthodox religiosity and pro-Kremlin voting in national elections. Using multiple empirical strategies we construct an index of religiosity on the regional level and identify the Orthodox Belt regions, test the relationship between Orthodox religiosity and voting in the national elections in 2011–2018, and test the differences in value orientations and electoral support between the Orthodox Belt regions and other ones. Finally, two model regions of the Orthodox Belt—Tambov and Lipetsk—are explored. We conclude that non-Orthodox Belt regions in Russia with higher Orthodox religiosity, conservatism, and loyalty are an emerging trend in Russian political geography. 

Emotions are linked to wide sets of action tendencies, and it can be difficult to predict which specific action tendency will be motivated or indulged in response to individual experiences of emotion. Building on a functional perspective of emotion, we investigate whether anger and shame connect to different behavioral intentions in dignity, face, and honor cultures. Using simple animations that showed perpetrators taking resources from victims, we conducted two studies across eleven countries investigating the extent to which participants expected victims to feel anger and shame, how they thought victims should respond to such violations, and how expectations of emotions were affected by enacted behavior. Across cultures, anger was associated with desires to reclaim resources or alert others to the violation. In face and honor cultures, but not dignity cultures, shame was associated with the desire for aggressive retaliation. However, we found that when victims indulged motivationally-relevant behavior, expected anger and shame were reduced, and satisfaction increased, in similar ways across cultures. Results suggest similarities and differences in expectations of how emotions functionally elicit behavioral responses across cultures.

A backlash against liberal gender and sexuality attitudes has been an issue in many societies, especially post-Communist. However, it takes a different shape in each socio–cultural context. This article contributes to academic debates about neo-traditionalism in the post-Soviet space and focuses specifically on Armenia. It points at some possible mechanisms that make these societies look more neo-traditionalist than they actually are. From the previous research of gender aspects of nationalism, we argue that the neo-traditionalist public discourses in Armenia might be a by-product of the national identity construction. We conclude that the individual-choice attitudes in the post-Soviet space may reflect the respondents’ acceptance of a national ideology promoted by the post-Soviet elites rather than their private practices. Our aim is to reveal the complexities of neo-traditionalism in the post-Soviet space where everyday practices are at odds with neo-traditionalist narratives, which we argue might be a result of the Soviet legacy of unwritten rules and open secrets.

Russian politics is often described as having taken a “conservative turn” since the start of Putin’s third term. This refers to the rise in the political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the ideological shift to traditional values, and the growth of authoritarianism. This study aims to explore ordinary Russians’ commitment to this conservatism using data from European Social Survey, 2010–2018. I suggest a four-factor model for measuring popular conservatism in Russia: Loyalism, Conformity, Religiosity, and Traditionalism/Security. The study reveals a surge
in conservative attitudes in 2014–2016 and a steady decline thereafter.

Etic psychometric tools work less well in non-Western than in Western cultures, whereas data collected online in the former societies tend to be of superior quality to those from face-to-face interviews. This represents a challenge to the study of the universality of models of personality and other constructs. If one wishes to uncover the true structure of personality in a non-Western nation, should one study only highly educated, cognitively sophisticated Internet users, and exclude the rest? We used a different approach. We adapted a short Big Five tool, previously tested successfully in 19 countries on all continents, to Mongolian culture. EFA and CFA analyses across a nationally representative sample of 1,500 adult Mongolians recovered the Big Five satisfactorily. A Big Two (plasticity and stability) model was also recovered reasonably well. Correlations between personality traits and age, as well as gender differences, were not different from those reported for Western samples. Respondents with higher education, or higher-than-average socioeconomic status, or urban dwellers, or Internet users, did not yield a clearer Big Five than the whole sample. Our method (tool adaptation to a local cultural context) may be preferable to exclusion of specific demographic groups in Big Five studies of non-Western populations.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of work values and socio-demographic characteristics upon the link between life satisfaction and job satisfaction.

Design/methodology/approach

The European Values Study (EVS) 2008–2009 is used as the dataset. The sample is limited to those who have paid jobs (28,653 cases).

Findings

Socio-demographic characteristics matter more than work values in explaining the effect of job satisfaction on life satisfaction. The association between life satisfaction and job satisfaction is stronger for higher educated individuals and those who are self-employed and weaker for women, married individuals, religious individuals and those who are younger. Extrinsic and intrinsic work values significantly influence life satisfaction independent of the level of job satisfaction.

Practical implications

It is important to pay attention to the working conditions and well-being of the core of the labour force, in other words, of those who are ready to invest more in their jobs. Also, special attention should be given to self-employment.

Originality/value

The paper compares the roles of work values and of socio-demographic characteristics as predictors of the association between job satisfaction and life satisfaction. It shows that the role of job in person's life depends largely on demographic factors, religiosity and socio-economic factors.