The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of work values and socio-demographic characteristics upon the link between life satisfaction and job satisfaction.
The European Values Study (EVS) 2008–2009 is used as the dataset. The sample is limited to those who have paid jobs (28,653 cases).
Socio-demographic characteristics matter more than work values in explaining the effect of job satisfaction on life satisfaction. The association between life satisfaction and job satisfaction is stronger for higher educated individuals and those who are self-employed and weaker for women, married individuals, religious individuals and those who are younger. Extrinsic and intrinsic work values significantly influence life satisfaction independent of the level of job satisfaction.
It is important to pay attention to the working conditions and well-being of the core of the labour force, in other words, of those who are ready to invest more in their jobs. Also, special attention should be given to self-employment.
The paper compares the roles of work values and of socio-demographic characteristics as predictors of the association between job satisfaction and life satisfaction. It shows that the role of job in person's life depends largely on demographic factors, religiosity and socio-economic factors.
The series of recent crises (EURO, refugees, backsliding, Brexit) challenge the self-portrayal of the European Union (EU) as a community of shared values. Against this backdrop, we analyse European Values Study data from 1990 till 2020 to assess the level and change in publics’ acceptance of the EU’s officially propagated values: personal freedom, individual autonomy, social solidarity, ethnic tolerance, civic honesty, gender equality and liberal democracy. We find that EU publics support these values strongly and increasingly over time. The EU-member publics are also remarkably distinct culturally from Eastern European non-EU-nations, especially concerning individual freedoms and gender equality. Simultaneously, however, member nations internalize EU-values at different speeds – alongside traditional religious fault lines that continue to differentiate Europe – in the following order from fastest to slowest: (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Ex-communist and (4) Orthodox countries. In conclusion, the EU writ large evolves into a distinct value-sharing community at different speeds.
Various models of subjective culture (measures of self-reports) have been proposed since Hofstede’s original work but none of them have been validated by showing that they have analogs in objective culture (measures of societal practices). Inspired by Bardi and Schwartz’s discovery that Schwartz’s individual-level circumplex values model has an exact equivalent in a model of behaviors, we develop a test for the purpose of validating models of culture. We apply this test to Minkov’s revised two-dimensional variant of Hofstede’s subjective-culture model, consisting of individualism-collectivism (IDV-COLL) and flexibility-monumentalism (FLX-MON) (formerly “long-term orientation”), as Fog recently found that an analog to this model incorporates and summarizes all major validated models and dimensions of national culture. We analyze national measures of important social practices associated empirically and theoretically with IDV-COLL and FLX-MON: transparency-corruption, gender equality, political freedom, road death tolls, homicide rates, family structures, innovation rates, and educational effort and achievement. These yielded close analogs to IDV-COLL and FLX-MON, with similar factor structures across nations and across the 50 US states, explicable in terms of IDV-COLL, FLX-MON, and life-history strategy (LHS) theories. Thus, subjective culture structures have mirror images in objective culture structures. This provides validation for our test, for the Minkov-Hofstede two-dimensional model of culture, for the use of nations and some sub-national political entities as units of cultural analysis, as well as for IDV-COLL, FLX-MON, and LHS theories.
Are investors in electoral authoritarian regimes discriminated against for political activism? In this paper, we implement a simple experiment to test whether affiliation with the ruling party or the political opposition affects the probability that investors receive advice from investment promotion agencies in Russian regions. Between December 2016 and June 2017, we sent 1504 emails with a short question and a number of randomized treatments to 188 investment promotion agencies in 70 Russian regions. Although investment promotion agencies are nominally depoliticized in Russia, we find that switching the political affiliation of a potential investor from the opposition party “Yabloko” to the government party “United Russia” on average increases the chances to receive a reply by 30%. The effect strongly depends on regional levels of political competition, with higher levels of discrimination in regions that are less politically competitive.
This chapter summarizes the main findings presented in the volume. The volume investigates similarity of social capital and well-being trends in different geographical locations and test stability of associations between social capital, well-being and their determinants across time-points, countries and regions. Overall, the book further contributes in the field in several directions. First, it allows to trace the impact of communist legacy on social capital in the long run. Second, it discovers the role of exogenous shocks and turbulent times on erosion and reviving of social capital and well-being. Third, it reveals how country conditions change the roots of social capital and shape relations between social capital and well-being.
Co-playing, or playing video games together, is a social practice that enriches relationships and game experience by providing the players with informational and social support. This study explores how co-playing integrates into friendship in two small (6–7 people), male communities of adolescent and adult friends. Both communities are local and school-based; both focus on co-playing Dota 2. The study focuses on the leadership in these small networks, compares their co-playing patterns, and the ways in which co-playing affects the relationships in both communities, enhancing their bonding social capital. We apply network analysis and personal interviews to compare and contrast how the co-playing communities emerged, are maintained and evolve along with the friendship. The main conclusion is that such co-playing communities emerge around a single Dota 2 enthusiast in the early secondary school as a common pastime, but co-playing video games increases bonding social capital among the community members. Network analysis demonstrates the differences in leadership in the teen and adult communities. The research shows how video games are embedded in collective everyday friendship and how co-playing communities function in support of such a relationship. The findings could be further tested against female and mixed co-playing communities.
We present the reaction of the EU and eight member states to the refugee crisis 2015/16 as a case of ‘defensive integration’. In the absence of a joint EU solution, the member states were left to their own devices and took a series of national measures that varied from one country to the other, depending on their policy heritage, and the combination of problem pressure and political pressure which they were facing. As a result, debordering responses prevailed at first. Only in a second stage a set of national and EU measures aiming at internal and external re-bordering were introduced. At this stage, destination states proved to be the most important drivers of a joint solution, with Germany taking the lead. The overall outcome is an example of ‘defensive integration’, aiming squarely at joint solutions to stop the refugee flow outside the EU but not to manage it inside the EU.
Recent accounts of democratic backsliding are negligent about the cultural foundations of autocracy-vs-democracy. To bring culture back in, I demonstrate that (1) the countries’ membership in culture zones explains some 70% of the global variation in autocracy-vs-democracy and (2) that this culture-bound variation has remained astoundingly constant over time – in spite of all the trending patterns in the global distribution of regime types over the last 120 years. Furthermore, the explanatory power of culture zones over autocracy-vs-democracy roots in the cultures’ differentiation on “authoritarian-vs-emancipative values.” Against this backdrop, lasting regime turnovers happen as a corrective response to glacially accruing regime-culture misfits – driven by generational value shifts into a pre-dominantly emancipatory direction. Consequently, the backsliding of democracies into authoritarianism is limited to societies in which emancipative values remain under-developed. Contrary to the widely cited deconsolidation-thesis, the prevalent generational profile in people’s moral orientations exhibits an almost ubiquitous ascension of emancipative values that will lend more, not less, legitimacy to democracy in the future.
The nation-building literature of the early 1960s argued that decolonized countries need to overcome pre-colonial ethnic identities and generate national cultures. Africa is the most critical test case of this aspect of modernization theory as it has by far the largest ethnolinguistic fractionalization. We use data from the Afrobarometer to compare the cultures of 85 ethnolinguistic groups, each represented by at least 100 respondents, from 25 African countries. We compared these groups and their nations on items that address cultural modernization and emancipation: ideologies concerning inclusive-exclusive society (gender egalitarianism, homophobia, and xenophobia), submissiveness to authority, and the societal role of religion. Previous research has shown that these are some of the most important markers of cultural differences in the modern world. Hierarchical cluster analysis yielded very homogeneous national clusters and not a single ethnolinguistic cluster cutting across national borders (such as Yoruba of Benin and Yoruba of Nigeria, Ewe of Ghana, and Ewe of Togo, etc.). Only three ethnolinguistic groups (3.5%) remained unattached to their national cluster, regardless of the clustering method. The variation between nations (F values) was often considerably greater than the variation between ethnolinguistic groups. Medial distances between the groups of each country correlated highly with GDP per person (r = −.54), percentage men employed in agriculture (r = .64), percentage men employed in services (r = −.63), and phone subscriptions per person (r = −.61). In conclusion, economic development and modernization diminish cultural differences between ethnolinguistic groups within nations, highlighting those between them.
How are candidates without official party affiliation able to succeed in authoritarian elections? We analyzed 1,101 independents who took part in city council elections in Russia’s regional capitals between 2014 and 2018. We found that independent candidates’ electoral fortunes depended both on their personal resources enabling them to attract voters’ support and pre-electoral deals with the regime. We also discovered that the chances of being elected were higher for those formally independent candidates who were the regime’s hidden representatives. For the latter group, the chances to win the race were boosted mostly by pre-electoral deals, rather than their personal resources.
This article describes the normative system that attempts to regulate online behaviour in the sphere of premarital romantic relationships of the second-generation migrants whose parents came to Russia from societies of the South Caucasus which regulate female behaviour more strictly. Based on a mixed-method study, which included a survey, a series of semi-structured interviews and digital ethnography, we describe the norms as well as the means by which they are enforced. We show that this normative system is rooted in the cultural concept of namus, which regulates the behaviour of females, while the control function is imposed mainly on their male relatives. We argue however, that these norms are widely circumvented and e-namus (manifestation of namus on the web) can barely prevent second-generation migrant females from having online romance. This brings about a radical change in gender relations altogether. The article contributes to the literature related to offline-online normative transfer, online dating, second-generation migrants’ romantic relationships and intergenerational value change.
Contributing to literature on composition of social ties of migrants, this article argues that “co-ethnic” ties, often included into analysis as a homogeneous entity, are either the ones obtained in the sending society, thus connecting a migrant to his relatives and neighbors from the community of origin, or the ones acquired in the receiving society and connecting people from different parts of the sending country. Basing on results of a survey of Kyrgyz migrants in Moscow, the authors show that this distinction is associated with difference in patterns, such as economic advancement, attitude toward ethnic category of belonging, and remitting behavior, which together comprise specific modes of integration for migrants. The explanations of these differences are suggested. Also, the mechanism of change of prevalent type of co-ethnic ties in migrants’ ego-networks from “homeland-rooted” to acquired in the receiving society is described.
This study investigates the interactive effect of female entrepreneurs’ experience of work–life imbalance and gender-egalitarian macro-level conditions on their job satisfaction, with the prediction that the negative linear relationship between work–life imbalance and job satisfaction may be buffered by the presence of women-friendly action resources, emancipative values, and civic entitlements. Data pertaining to 7392 female entrepreneurs from 44 countries offer empirical support for these predictions. Female entrepreneurs who are preoccupied with their ability to fulfill both work and life responsibilities are more likely to maintain a certain level of job satisfaction, even if they experience significant work–life imbalances, to the extent that they operate in supportive macro-level environments.
This article offers a gentle introduction to the measurement invariance (MI) literature with a focus on its relevance to comparative political research. It reviews 1) the conceptual foundations of MI; 2) standard procedures of testing for MI in practical applications within the multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) paradigm; and 3) two novel approaches to MI, Bayesian approximate measurement invariance, and MGCFA alignment optimization, which are especially suitable for dealing with extremely heterogeneous data from large-scale comparative surveys typical for modern political science. It then provides an empirical illustration of the key concepts and methods from the MGCFA-MI literature by applying them to testing for MI of two recently introduced measures of democracy attitudes, so-called liberal and authoritarian notions of democracy, across 60 countries in the sixth round of the World Values Survey. These analyses show that both measures can be considered reliable comparative measures of democratic attitudes, although for different reasons. Finally, this study emphasizes that some survey-based constructs, e.g., authoritarian notions of democracy, do not follow the reflective (correlation-based) logic of construct development. These alternative measures, known as formative measures, do not assume strong correlations between their indicators, for which reason it is inappropriate to test their comparability using the reflective MGCFA approach. Instead, their comparability can be tied to their correlations with theoretically relevant external variables.
Scholars study representative international surveys to understand cross-cultural differences in mentality patterns, which are measured via complex multi-item constructs. Methodologists in this field insist with increasing vigor that detecting “non-invariance” in how a construct’s items associate with each other in different national samples is an infallible sign of encultured in-equivalences in how respondents understand the items. Questioning this claim, we demonstrate that a main source of non-invariance is the arithmetic of closed-ended scales in the presence of sample mean disparity. Since arithmetic principles are culture-unspecific, the non-invariance that these principles enforce in statistical terms is inconclusive of encultured in-equivalences in semantic terms. Because of this inconclusiveness, our evidence reveals furthermore that non-invariance is inconsequential for the cross-cultural functioning of multi-item constructs as concerns their nomological linkages to other variables of interest. We discuss the implications of these insights for measurement validation in cross-cultural settings with large sample mean disparity.
Nations have been questioned as meaningful units for analyzing culture due to their allegedly limited variance-capturing power and large internal heterogeneity. Against this skepticism, we argue that culture is by definition a collective phenomenon and focusing on individual differences contradicts the very concept of culture. Through the “miracle of aggregation,” we can eliminate random noise and arbitrary variation at the individual level in order to distill the central cultural tendencies of nations. Accordingly, we depict national culture as a gravitational field that socializes individuals into the orbit of a nation’s central cultural tendency. Even though individuals are also exposed to other gravitational forces, subcultures in turn gravitate within the limited orbit of their national culture. Using data from the World Values Survey, we show that individual values cluster in concentric circles around their nation’s cultural gravity center. We reveal the miracle of aggregation by demonstrating that nations capture the bulk of the variation in the individuals’ cultural values once they are aggregated into lower-level territorial units such as towns and sub-national regions. We visualize the gravitational force of national cultures by plotting various intra-national groups from five large countries that form distinct national clusters. Contrary to many scholars’ intuitions, alternative social aggregates, such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, as well as diverse socio-demographic categories, add negligible explained variance to that already captured by nations.
This paper investigates the paradox of research productivity of higher-education institutions in the Arab Gulf Countries. Exploring the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) the article fills the gap in the literature on the Gulf higher education research efficiency. Despite the considerable investment into higher education, UAE universities showed rather slow growth in research output. This puzzle was tackled to present possible policy outcomes relevant for research productivity in higher education institutions located in the emerging economies. The study highlights the research productivity indicators dynamics for GCC countries and brings detailed analysis on the research output and input for the UAE universities. We argue that to succeed in academic efficiency the county needs to increase its research investments and diversify research-boosting policies and practices. The policies should focus on work-attractive long-term conditions for the faculty/researchers, home-based doctoral education system and home-trained human resources.
This book presents a cross-cultural investigation into the interplay between social capital and subjective well-being. Based on a quantitative analysis of the latest largeN cross-cultural datasets, including the World Value Survey, European Social Survey, LAPOP, etc., and covering various countries, it offers a comparative perspective on and new insights into the determinants of social capital and well-being. By identifying both universal and culture-specific patterns, the authors shed new light on the spatial and temporal differentiation of social capital and subjective well-being. The book is divided into two main parts, the first of which discusses mutual trust, religious and cultural tolerance, and pro-civic human values as essential dimensions of social capital. In turn, the second part studies social capital as a source of subjective well-being and life satisfaction. Given its scope, the book will appeal to scholars of sociology, social psychology, political science, and economics seeking a deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of social capital and well-being.