Following a normative approach that suggests international norms and standards for elections apply universally, regardless of regime type or cultural context, this book examines the challenges to electoral integrity, the actors involved, and the consequences of electoral malpractice and poor electoral integrity that vary by regime type. It bridges the literature on electoral integrity with that of political regime types.
Looking specifically at questions of innovation and learning, corruption and organized crime, political efficacy and turnout, the threat of electoral violence and protest, and finally, the possibility of regime change, it seeks to expand the scholarly understanding of electoral integrity and diverse regimes by exploring the diversity of challenges to electoral integrity, the diversity of actors that are involved and the diversity of consequences that can result.
This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of electoral studies, and more broadly of relevance to comparative politics, international development, political behaviour and democracy, democratization, and autocracy.
This article reports evidence of misspecification of the measurement model for the index of emancipative values, a value construct used as a key explanatory variable in many important contributions to political science. It shows that the scale on which the index is measured is noninvariant across cultural zones and countries in the World Values Survey. In addition, it demonstrates that the current index composition mixes different value dimensions and their actual associations with various political outcomes, in particular the index of effective democracy. However, an analysis using a novel approximate Bayesian approach shows that at least one specific subdimension of emancipative values, known as pro-choice values, truly exists and may be validly measured and compared cross-nationally. The article also contributes to the recent discussion on whether emancipative values are a reflective or a formative construct by providing thought experiments and empirical evidence supporting the former interpretation.
This article reveals the specifics of social and cultural deformations in the life world of Russian people in general, compared to similar deformations among the population of several eastern regions of the country. These are territories representative of the Ural (Tyumen Province), Western (Tomsk Province) and Eastern Siberia (Krasnoyarsk Region). Social fears recorded within the “Regional socio-cultural portrait” method (Center for the Study of Social and Cultural Change, the Institute of Philosophy of the RAS) are considered to be factors of life world deformation. This study was carried out in the entire country of Russia in 2015, in Tyumen and Tomsk Provinces in 2016, in the Krasnoyarsk Region – in 2014. Three essential characteristics of life world – which have not been previously evaluated within this particular context – were highlighted for analysis: control locus, temporal stability (degree of pessimism/optimism) and life satisfaction as one of the key parameters of its harmony. The differences between the life world of Russians in general and that of those who inhabit the country’s eastern regions are determined within the context of the aforementioned characteristics. It is revealed that fears in the face of social dangers have a considerable deforming effect on the population’s life world. Determined are two types of deformations: nationwide and regional. The first type includes fears while facing ecologic threats and oppression due to age and gender. The latter’s level is generally much higher than the equivalent values obtained in the country’s three eastern regions. Fears while facing other sorts of threats and dangers, which are highlighted in the study, are considered to be specific regional deforming factors. The following conclusion is made: social fears deform the control locus, the harmony and temporal stability of the life world of the entire country’s population to a considerably greater degree compared to respondents from Tyumen and Tomsk Provinces, as well as the Krasnoyarsk Region. Revealed is a certain distinctive “Ural-Siberian” regional specificity of life world deformation, namely the sense that superiors in the workplace represent one of the social institutions of government. It is assumed that such specifics can be explained by regional frontier peculiarities.
Brym’s article in the current issue of this journal is an interesting and well-written discussion of an important topic and it presents a substantial body of evidence, addressing a theoretically significant question. Unfortunately, Brym misinterprets the theory he seeks to refute. He implies that Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational value change predicts that a trend toward Postmaterialist values and Self-expression values will always occur, regardless of economic and social conditions— interpreting evidence of any move in the opposite direction as refuting the theory. In fact, Inglehart has, from the start, argued that the intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values and Self-expression values is driven by rising levels of existential security. If younger birth cohorts grow up under substantially higher levels of economic and physical security than their elders, this will produce a trend toward new values; and declining levels of existential security will have the opposite effect.
From 2005 to 2011, the Bulgarian police force collected donations exceeding $90 million from a host of individuals, corporations, foreign governments, persons undergoing criminal investigations, and convicts. After condemnation both domestically and internationally, the practice became completely illegal in 2013. Nevertheless, in 2015, the government lifted the donation prohibition, allowing foreign governments and international and state organizations to donate to the Interior Ministry. Differentiating between utilitarian and moral models of corporate social responsibility is important, since genuine donors create higher value through their prosocial deeds than self-interested ones. Given Bulgaria’s excessive spending on public order and the ambiguous nature of donations to public servants, we seek to understand the corporate motivations for donating to the police. To address this question, we draw upon theories of corporate philanthropy, social exchange, and entrepreneurial orientation and use unique face-to-face interview data from 2011 to 2013 with police officers and businesspeople. Our qualitative findings point to multifaceted drivers of philanthropy beyond those considered in the dominant strategic-instrumental perspective. We argue that donations to the police can be an expression of business executives’ altruistic values, a desire to forge strategic alliances, enhance status in social hierarchies, a form of political reconciliation, or a protection payment. Lastly, we present descriptive statistics of money donated to the Interior Ministry, discuss the potential socioeconomic consequences, and propose policies to reduce police reliance on private financing.
This article builds on research demonstrating that high levels of economic and physical security are conducive to a shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values---and that this shift tends to make people more favorable to important social changes. This article updates this research, demonstrating that:
(1) These value changes occur with exceptionally large time-lags between the onset of the conditions conducive to them, and the societal changes they produce---as previous work implies but does not demonstrate. The evidence suggests that there was a time-lag of 40 to 50 years between when Western societies first attained of high levels of economic and physical security after World War II, and related societal changes such as legalization of same-sex marriage. (2) A distinctive set of “Individual-choice norms,” dealing with acceptance of gender equality, divorce, abortion and homosexuality, is moving on a different trajectory from other cultural changes. These norms are closely linked with human fertility rates and require severe self-repression. (3) Although basic values normally change at the pace of intergenerational population replacement, the shift from Pro-fertility norms to Individual-choice norms is now moving much faster, having reached a tipping-point where conformist pressures have reversed polarity and are now accelerating changes they once resisted. We test these claims against data from 80 countries containing most of the world’s population, surveyed from 1981 to 2014.
This study investigates the effect of country-level emancipative forces on corporate gender diversity around the world. Based on Welzel’s (Freedom rising: human empowerment and the quest for emancipation. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013) theory of emancipation, we develop an emancipatory framework of board gender diversity that explains how action resources, emancipative values and civic entitlements enable, motivate and encourage women to take leadership roles on corporate boards. Using a sample of 6390 firms operating in 30 countries around the world, our results show positive single and combined effects of the framework components on board gender diversity. Our research adds to the existing literature in a twofold manner. First, our integrated framework offers a more encompassing, complete and theoretically richer picture of the key drivers of board gender diversity. Second, by testing the framework empirically, we extend the evidence on national drivers of board gender diversity.
While grids or matrix questions are a widely used format in PC web surveys, there is no agreement on the format in mobile web surveys. We conducted a two-wave experiment in an opt in panel in Russia, varying the question format (grid format and item-by-item format) and device respondents used for survey completion (smartphone and PC). The 1,678 respondents completed the survey in the assigned conditions in the first wave and 1,079 in the second wave. Overall, we found somewhat higher measurement error in the grid format in both mobile and PC web conditions. We found almost no significant effect of the question format on test–retest correlations between the latent scores in two waves and no differences in breakoff rates between the question formats. The multigroup comparison showed some measurement equivalence between the question formats. However, the difference varied depending on the length of a scale with a longer scale producing some differences in the measurement equivalence between the conditions. The levels of straightlining were higher in the grid than in the item-by-item format. In addition, concurrent validity was lower in the grid format in both PC and mobile web conditions. Finally, subjective indicators of respondent burden showed that the grid format increased reported technical difficulties and decreased subjective evaluation of the survey.
Since three decades, scholars focus on generalized interpersonal trust as the key component of social capital and there is wide consensus that trust in strangers is the prime indicator of how general people’s trust in others is. However, little work with a specific focus on trust in strangers has been conducted in a comparative, multilevel framework. The few existing studies are inconclusive because of deficiencies in both conceptualization and test strategy. Filling this gap, this article examines the determinants of trust in strangers on the broadest country base ever used in the study of trust, drawing on global cross-cultural evidence from the fifth and sixth rounds of the World Values Surveys--the first international surveys to include a direct question on trust in strangers. Reaching beyond conventional wisdom about the sources of generalized trust, we demonstrate that human empowerment at the country level is a forceful moderator of well-known individual-level determinants of trust. Specifically, in countries with lagging human empowerment, institutional trust, trust in known people and material satisfaction are the only individual-level characteristics that enhance trust in strangers. We also detect an unexpected negative effect of education where human empowerment is lagging. In sharp contrast, in countries with advanced human empowerment, a much broader set of individual-level characteristics increases trust in strangers. This set includes ethnic tolerance, membership in voluntary associations, social movement activity, emancipative values, subjective well-being, age and education. These insights inform a multilevel theory of trust, showing that human empowerment operates as a contextual activator of individual trust promoters.
A number of studies have shown that immigrants are more willing to take risks than native-born populations. In this paper, we measure if the willingness to take risks is contagious and if this effect is different for immigrants and native-born individuals in the United States. We suggest that the willingness to take risks may be contagious, like emotions and generosity, i.e., an individual may be more willing to take risks if others make risky decisions. We measure if contagion has a stronger effect on willingness to take risks among immigrants than native populations using a variety of vignettes, specifically in the domains of career, financial investment, and health. Respondents were randomly assigned either to a control or experimental condition. In the experimental condition we attempted to induce risk taking by suggesting that other individuals made risky decisions in the lottery-choice tasks (a “risk shift condition”). Contrary to expectations, the risk shift condition had a positive effect on willingness to take risks among native-born, while a negative effect or no effect was found among immigrants (conservative shift). Native-born found the situations more beneficial in the risk shift condition than in the control condition, while immigrants found them less beneficial in the risk shift condition. The conservative shift was found among immigrants, as well as males and self-employed. Risk shift condition reduced the sense of power among power motivated individuals (males and immigrants), which produced a less optimistic evaluation of risky situations. While taking into consideration that others make risky decisions immigrants and males perceived situations as less beneficial for them. The results of the experiment have some implications for our understanding of the link between a sense of power and the willingness to take risks.
By permitting early resignations of the governors of Russia's regions, followed by their participation in premature elections, the federal center seeks to facilitate their long-term political survival. This study uses the data from 2013-2015 gubernatorial elections in order to reveal the Kremlin's motivations for this strategy. The analysis demonstrates that in contrast to the previous periods of Russia's political development when the federal center tended to reward the governors for electoral deference the current strategy is aimed primarily at long-term risk-aversion. This signifies a shift in the order of priorities of the Kremlin's policy toward the regions.
The paper aims to compare the perceptions of gender equality of individuals more or less affected by economic crisis in Europe. Crisis touched the economy of most European countries but to a different extent. Special focus is given to the perceptions of gender equality of vulnerable groups (female, lesser-educated, one-adult households with children). The data is Eurobarometer 2011. The sample is limited to respondents aged 18-65. According to the results of multilevel regression analysis, those who have suffered from crisis assess lower the current level of gender equality whereas perceptions of gender equality do not differ depending on the effect of crisis upon the country. Women assess gender equality more positively compared to men. Those who live in one-adult households with children have higher perceptions of gender equality compared to those who live in other types of households. The discrepancy between lesser-educated and higher educated is larger in countries that suffered less from crisis. However, when the change in GDP per capita is taken as a measure of crisis the effects for family structure and education are not robust.
Can a society’s overall level of happiness change? Until recently, it was widely held that happiness fluctuates around set-points, so that neither individuals nor societies can lastingly increase their happiness. However, data from surveys carried out in Russia from 1982 to 2011 show that happiness fell substantially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has begun to rise again only recently. Additional data sources, including suicide rates and indices of negative affect expression, confirm these shifts. Contrary to set-point theory, we find that the recent increase has been driven as much by generational replacement as by mean reversion among individuals. The collapse of communism led to a permanent drop in subjective wellbeing among mid-life cohorts that was subsequently never fully recovered. Happiness can be substantially and permanently impacted by life-events, including those affecting society as a whole, and societal-level happiness can rise or fall over time as a result.
Since decades, cross-cultural psychology examines moral values using data from standardized surveys, assuming that values guide human behavior. We add to this literature by studying the link between moral values and various forms of prosocial behavior, using data from respondents of the sixth World Values Survey in Germany who participated in an online behavioral experiment. The experiment consists of a series of incentivized tasks and allows us to elaborate the association between survey-measured values and three facets of observed prosocial behavior. The evidence boils down to three findings. While (a) emancipative values relate to higher common pool contributions and (b) higher donations to charitable organizations, (c) secular values are linked with more productive and less protective investments. As these results conform to key theories and reach empirical significance in a major postindustrial nation, we conclude that we have important evidence at hand highlighting the potential of combined survey-experiment methods to establish value–behavior links that are otherwise inexplorable.
If the Soviet nationalities policy was one of the most popular topics among students of Soviet history and politics, Russian nationalities policy became one of the least explored topics in Russian politics. Some scholars even claimed about the absence of Russian nationalities policy. The paper explores Russian nationalities policy and argues that certain trends can be traced from the Soviet period. To show the difference between Soviet and Russian perspectives, the distinction between structural and actor levels of nationalities policy is suggested. It is argued that in the Soviet period the structural level (formal status in the administrative hierarchy, recruitment policy, and cultural-language policy) was the priority; in contemporary Russia the policy focuses mostly on the actor level. The structural level should not be neglected. The evaluation of the potential of structural changes for the rise of latent nationalism is based on quantitative assessment of structural elements using a structural equation modeling approach. We construct indices of political and cultural nationalism for 21 Russian republics and use conventional statistical methods to show that accumulation of latent cultural nationalism might be observed in Russian ethnic republics.
Using World Values Survey data from several dozen countries around the world, this article analyzes the relationship between postmaterialist values and bribery (dis)approval in a multilevel framework. We find that people, who place stronger emphasis on postmaterialist values, tend to justify bribery more. However, the “ecological” effect of postmaterialism operates in the exactly opposite direction: A higher prevalence of postmaterialist values induces more bribery disapproval, and especially among postmaterialists themselves. In our view, this happens because the large number of people who internalized postmaterialist values generate positive social externalities which strengthen negative attitudes toward corruption. We outline a theoretical framework that explains why and how these externalities may emerge. Our results contribute to the literature on the sociocultural factors of corruption, provide a better understanding of the complex nature of postmaterialism, and also might be interesting in the light of ongoing discussions on whether moral attitudes are culturally universal or culturally specific.
This project aims to explain the alternation of phases in the Soviet nationalities policy by developments in foreign policy. First, we explore the history of the Soviet nationalities policy and revealed the alteration of “soft” and “hard” waves. Second, using the theoretical framework of the Randall Collins’ geopolitical theory we assume the effect of geopolitical tensions/ geopolitical stability on the patterns of nationalism and nationalities policy. Collins argues that geopolitical stability positively affects the cosmopolitan/ multicultural pattern in nationalities policy, while the periods of geopolitical tension are associated with the pattern of assimilation. We composed the dataset on all geopolitical conflicts with the Soviet involvement since 1926 and correlated with the waves of nationalities policy. Our study supports the Collins’ theory: both “hard” waves coincide with periods of geopolitical tensions in 1930-50-s and 1970-80-s. In the Conclusion we extrapolate our finding to the post-Soviet nationalities policy.