LCSR Associate Researcher
My main research interest is in understanding why people in some countries are more civic citizens than in others. Why for example Germans are more honest taxpayers than Greeks and why North Americans are more respectful of the public spaces than Indians? Are they fundamentally different people or do they simply respond to different country rules? More formally, is it deep-routed historical differences in social cultures that give rise to different civic and social behaviours or is it different contemporary institutions differently motivating civic behaviour?
I am trying to answer these question using data, mainly survey and experimental data. Part of my research is dedicated on the way we can elicit preferences using laboratory experiments and economic games.
Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Neyse, L. (2016). Heterogeneous Motives in the Trust Game: a Tale of Two Roles. Frontiers in psychology, 7. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00214.
Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., Herrmann, B., & Brañas-Garza, P. (2015). Short- and Long-Run Goals in Ultimatum Bargaining: Impatience Predicts Spite-Based Behavior. Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, 9, 214. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025.
Brañas-Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Herrmann, B. (2014). Fair and Unfair Punishers Coexist in the Ultimatum Game. Scientific reports, 4, 6025. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092844.
Artinger, F., Exadaktylos, F., Koppel, H., & Sääksvuori, L. (2014). In Others' Shoes: Do Individual Differences in Empathy and Theory of Mind Shape Social Preferences? PloS ONE, 9(4), e92844. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092844.
Staffiero, G., Exadaktylos, F., & Espín, A. M. (2013). Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game Does Not Reflect Selfish Preferences. Economics Letters, 121(2), 236-238. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.021.
Proestakis, A., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., Cortés Aguilar, A., Oyediran, O. A., & Palacio, L. A. (2013). The separate effects of self-estimated and actual alcohol intoxication on risk taking: A field experiment. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 6(2), 115. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/npe0000004.
Exadaktylos, F., Espín, A. M., & Branas-Garza, P. (2013). Experimental subjects are not different. Scientific reports, 3. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep01213.
Social Capital (SC) should not be considered a synonym to civic norms of cooperation. Under “institutional deficit”, SC and civic norms work indeed in the opposite direction. Using the latest wave of the WVS, this paper reports that Institutions – measured by the Quality of Governance Index (QGI) – meditate the relationship between SC and civic norms. Using multilevel analysis, we find that in countries scoring high in QGI, SC is positively correlated with civic norms at the individual level. In countries scoring low the opposite holds: the higher the SC of citizens, the lower their perceived strength of the civic norms. What is more interesting is that such differential relation only holds for civic norms that need the state to be realized as cooperative (for example refrain from tax evasion, bribery, public transportation freeride). It is not the case however with other informal forms of civic cooperation (such as participation in protests, petitions, etc). Using an endogenous pairwise regression technique, it is demonstrated that such a relationship holds in a country level as well: the quality of governance predicts the level and most importantly the form of SC, as either pro- or against the state). The same results are found using the European Values Survey, as well as employing different SC specifications (self-reported trust, organisations membership and a multi-component Index). The paper contributes in the discussion regarding the relationship between SC and Institutions as complements/substitutes. It also points to the differences between the concepts of SC and civic norms of cooperation.
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