The Eurasian Migration System in Comparative Perspective: Opportunities, Progress, and Agenda

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Outline

- Migration optimism, pessimism, and reality
- The rapid rise of the Eurasian migration system
- Overview of the empirical literature on labor migration to Russia
- Russian labor migration and migration theory
- Some recent studies (including work in progress)
- Moving forward: agenda

Migration optimism

- Solution to population pressure in sending countries, means of labor market equilibration
- Advances well-being of migrants, their families, and communities
- Diasporas and remittances
- Freedom of movement is freedom-enhancing
- Fostering diversity and multiculturalism in host societies
- Social remittances and transnationalism
- Solving labor shortages and population imbalance (dependency ratios) in host societies

Migration pessimism

- Brain drain: poor countries subsidize rich ones and lose human capital
 Health drain
- Localized population decline and social breakdown
- Costs of separation for left-behind children and household members
- Remittances: potential moral hazard and relative deprivation
- Mistreatment of migrants
- Exacerbation of xenophobia and fuel for right-wing movements in both sending and receiving countries
- Forced migration: problems of integration, social conflict

Migration in today's world (2019 UN data)

- <u>https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/international-migrant-stock-2019.html</u>
- The number of international migrants globally reached an estimated 272 million in 2019, an increase of 51
 million since 2010. Currently, international migrants comprise 3.5 per cent of the global population, compared
 to 2.8 per cent in the year 2000, according to new estimates released by the United Nations today.
- In 2019, regionally, Europe hosts the largest number of international migrants (82 million), followed by Northern America (59 million) and Northern Africa and Western Asia (49 million).
- At the country level, about half of all international migrants reside in just 10 countries, with the United States
 of America hosting the largest number of international migrants (51 million), equal to about 19 per cent of the
 world's total. Germany and Saudi Arabia host the second and third largest numbers of migrants (13 million
 each), followed by the Russian Federation (12 million), the United Kingdom (10 million), the United Arab
 Emirates (9 million), France, Canada and Australia (around 8 million each) and Italy (6 million).
- Concerning their place of birth, one-third of all international migrants originate from only ten countries, with India as the lead country of origin, accounting for about 18 million persons living abroad. Migrants from Mexico constituted the second largest "diaspora" (12 million), followed by China (11 million), the Russian Federation (10 million) and the Syrian Arab Republic (8 million)
- When remittances are viewed as a percentage of gross domestic product, however, the top five remittance-receiving countries in 2018 were Tonga (at 35.2%), followed by Kyrgyzstan (33.6%), Tajikistan (31%), Haiti (30.7%) and Nepal (28%).

Complexity of migration

- Every positive and every negative aspect of migration in general can be observed in formerly Communist countries of Eurasia
 - Pointless to ask is migration good or bad: it is both, though often in unequal measure for different stakeholders at international, national, regional, local, and household scales
- Labor migration to Russia is particularly important to understand
 - And we don't
- Migration to Russia (like emigration from the USSR) was rare and heavily regulated during the Soviet period
- The Soviet collapse quickly transformed Russia into a major sending and receiving country
 - Unprecedented opportunity to study a compressed version of a massive migration system
 - Also a transit country for Asian migrants seeking access to Western Europe

The Eurasian migration system after the collapse of Communism

Key trends and developments:

- Out-migration from ECE countries to Western Europe, the US, and elsewhere
 - Return migration
- Accelerated rural-to-urban migration (after early 1990s)
- Syrian refugee crisis and ECE
- Massive migration to Russia from CIS countries, especially Central Asia
 - 1990s: ethnic Russians
 - 2000s onward: labor migration
 - No let-up after 2014
- Internal migration within Russia

Figure 3. Top 20 destinations (left) and origins (right) of international migrants in 2019 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2019a (accessed 18 September 2019).

Top countries sending remittances									
2005		2010		2015 201		2017ª	7 ª		
United States	47.25	United States	50.78	United States 61.86		United States	67.96		
Saudi Arabia	14.30	Saudi Arabia	27.07	United Arab Emirates	40.33	United Arab Emirates	44.37		
Germany	12.71	Russian Federation	21.45	Saudi Arabia	38.79	Saudi Arabia	36.12		
Switzerland	10.52	Switzerland	17.76	Switzerland	25.40	Switzerland	26.60		
United Kingdom	9.64	Germany	14.68	China	20.42	Germany	22.09		
France	9.48	Italy	12.89	Russian Federation	19.69	Russian Federation	20.61		
Republic of Korea	6.9	France	12.03	Germany	18.03	China	16.18		
Russian Federation	6.83	Kuwait	11.86	Kuwait	15.20	Kuwait	13.76		
Luxembourg	6.70	Luxembourg	10.65	France	12.79	France	13.50		
Malaysia	5.68	United Arab Emirates	10.57	Qatar	12.19	Republic of Korea	12.89		

Source: World Bank, n.d.b. (accessed July 2019).

Note: All numbers are in current (nominal) USD billion.

a The latest available data at the time of writing was for 2017. Breakdowns for countries sending remittances in 2018 were unavailable.

Figure 10. Top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, 2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.





Source: FSGS 2015, 2017, 2018.

Intraregional migration in Central Asia

• "Intraregional migration is a key feature in the subregion and is underpinned by geographic, cultural, economic, political and social links that are historical in nature. Central Asia is home to millions of international migrants, mainly from within the subregion, but also from further afield. Migrants primarily originate from countries of the former Soviet Union, many of which are current members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2019, Kazakhstan, for example, had a substantial foreign-born population (3.7 million), of whom 2.4 million were born in the Russian Federation.184 Kazakhstan is now predominantly a country of transit and of immigration, attracting skilled workers from various countries and, increasingly, becoming a destination for low-skilled migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan."

--2020 UN Migration Report, p.82.

Russian labor migration

- Government's dilemma:
 - Russia needs migrants
 - Low unemployment, low labor productivity
 - Shrinking labor force and growing dependency ratio
 - Geopolitical considerations (regional influence and great power status)
 - Migration provokes xenophobic responses in the Russian population
 - Russian politicians scapegoat immigrants for problems endemic to Russian's system of governance
 - Security concerns
 - Inflaming social tensions

Russia's shrinking workforce (Levin 2015)

Figure 6. Change in the Russian Labor Force under Different Scenarios, by Age Group, 2010– 50



Source: Methodology from Koettl 2008.

Key strands of empirical literature

- Anti-migrant sentiment in the native-born Russian population (Gorodzeisky, Glikman, and Maskileyson 2015; Bahry 2016; Bessudnov 2016; Gorodzeisky 2019)
- Russian government's migration policies (Yudina 2005; Kubal 2016; Light 2016; Ryazantsev 2016; Schenk 2018)
- Migrant experiences in Russia
 - Academic studies (Amirkhanian et al. 2011; Reeves 2012, 2013, 2015; Agadjanian et al. 2014; Agadjanian et al. 2017; Nikoforova and Brednikova 2018)
 - Investigative journalists and advocacy groups (Human Rights Watch 2009; Balmforth 2013; Kurachova and Chizhova 2013)

Russian labor migration in the eyes of a sociologist

- Three things we have gotten wrong about labor migration in Russia:
 - Exoticizing of Russia: not so different from other migrant receiving countries
 - Migrant experiences in Russia: exaggerated and simplistic negative portrayals
 - Xenophobia in Russia: exaggerated and simplistic negative portrayals

Russian labor migration

- Migration theories developed in other contexts: all relevant for Russia
 - Neo-classical economic theory
 - Wage differentials between Russia and Central Asian countries
 - NELM
 - Insurance market failures, labor migration, remittances, relative deprivation in sending communities
 - Dual labor market (demand side) theory
 - Russia's need for migrants
 - World systems theory
 - Legacy of Soviet-era linguistic, cultural, and economic ties
 - Migrant social networks
 - Role of networks in driving migrations from Ukraine and elsewhere
 - Cumulative causation
 - Culture of migration in rural Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan

Russian labor migration

- Other theoretical perspectives
 - Transnationalism (Nikiforova and Brednikova 2018)
 - Sociological theories of group threat
 - Securitization of migration
 - Refugees and other forced migrants
 - Regional variations in destination country (e.g. US)
 - Cultural remittances?
 - Internal vs. international migration
 - Ethnic enclaves
 - Migration policy research

Russian labor migration: Potential New Directions

- US/Russia comparisons
 - Multiethnic societies
 - Large land border(s) with poorer countries
 - Shifting policies
 - Political controversy and manipulation of xenophobia
 - Regional aspects due to size of host society
- Migration and geopolitics: soft power implications
- Economic impact of migration in Russia: regional studies, rigorous design
- Race, religion and migrant reception in Russia
- Assimilation theories: relevant for Russia?
 - "Segmented assimilation" (Portes and Zhou)
 - Neo-assimilation (Alba and Nee)
 - Context of reception (Portes and Rumbaut)
 - New models of immigrant adaptation/assimilation?
- Migration and corruption

Some recent work (including in progress...)

- Migrant experiences in Russia
- Correlates of xenophobic attitudes
- Impact of economic remittances
- Impact on gender division of labor in the household

Migrant experiences in Russia



Experiences in Russia of Kyrgyz and Ukrainian labor migrants: ethnic hierarchies, geopolitical remittances, and the relevance of migration theory

Theodore P. Gerber & Jane Zavisca

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Migrant experiences in Russia

- Conventional wisdom: Victim imagery
 - Exploited or enslaved by employers, hounded and extorted by police, despised, harassed and murdered by ignorant natives, impoverished, desperate living conditions
 - Journalists, advocacy groups, anthropological studies ("interesting bias?")
- Focus groups with return migrants in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine
 - Diversity of experiences
 - Relevance of migration theories
 - Role of ethnic hierarchies, conditions of migration decision, and networks in shaping experiences
 - Geopolitical remittances: positive impressions of Russia and soft power
- 2017 survey in Bishkek and Chuy oblast with oversample of return migrants

Views of Russia, Kyrgyzstan

- Russia migrants have consistently more positive views than nonmigrants of Russia's social protections, freedom of speech, equality before the law, and foreign policy
 - No difference for non-Russia migrants
- Some tendency for Russia migrants to also view Kyrgyzstan's institutions in more negative light
- Selection vs. effect of experiences in Russia
- "Geopolitical remittances:" a role for migration in soft power

		Non-Russia	
	Russia migrant	migrant	Non-migrant
Ν	381	105	2,133
Percent	15%	4%	81%
Please tell me how you assess			
The system of social protection in Russia	Pearson chi2(12) =	26.8543 Pr =	0.008
very positiv	e 30%	22%	24%
somewhat positiv	re 38%	28%	33%
neutra	al 9%	11%	9%
somewhat negativ	e 0%	3%	2%
very negativ	e 1%	1%	1%
no ide	a 18%	29%	27%
DI	R 4%	7%	5%
Freedom of speech in Russia	Pearson $chi2(12) =$	21.2615 Pr =	0.047
very positiv	e 24%	19%	20%
somewhat positiv	e 36%	26%	30%
neutra	al 14%	16%	13%
somewhat negativ	e 2%	3%	3%
very negativ	e 2%	1%	1%
no ide	a 18%	28%	27%
DI	R 5%	8%	6%
Equality before the law in Russia	Pearson $chi2(12) =$	21.0900 Pr =	0.049
very positiv	e 25%	20%	19%
somewhat positiv	ve 30%	22%	26%
neutra	al 14%	14%	14%
somewhat negativ	e 4%	5%	5%
very negativ	e 2%	4%	2%
no ide	a 19%	29%	27%
DI	R 6%	7%	7%
Foreign policy of Russia	Pearson $chi2(12) =$	27.6089 Pr =	0.006
very positiv	e 26%	24%	23%
somewhat positiv	ye 34%	24%	26%
neutra	al 11%	12%	13%
somewhat negativ	re 1%	3%	2%
very negativ		2%	1%
no ide	a 19%	29%	28%
DI	R 8%	7%	7%

Table 1. Views of Russia, migrant and non-migrant samples

Table 10. Views of Kyrgyzstan, migrant and non-migrant samples						
	Russia	Non-Russi				
	migrant	migrant	Non-migrant			
N	381	105	2,133			
Percent	15%	4%	81%			
Please tell me how you assess						
The system of social protection in Kyrgyzstai	Pearson chi2(12	(2) = 36.6285	Pr = 0.000			
very positive	2%	1%	4%			
somewhat positive	10%	9%	16%			
neutral	19%	28%	23%			
somewhat negative	29%	25%	24%			
very negative	24%	22%	21%			
no idea	12%	11%	8%			
DR	5%	5%	3%			
Freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan	Pearson chi2(12	2) = 24.7539	Pr = 0.016			
very positive	6%	7%	10%			
somewhat positive	26%	23%	29%			
neutral	21%	31%	26%			
somewhat negative	15%	13%	12%			
very negative	16%	11%	12%			
no idea	9%	10%	7%			
DR	6%	4%	5%			
Equality before the law in Kyrgyzstan	Pearson chi2(12	2) = 20.8826	Pr = 0.052			
very positive	3%	1%	5%			
somewhat positive	11%	15%	15%			
neutral	19%	25%	22%			
somewhat negative	24%	15%	22%			
very negative	28%	28%	24%			
no idea	10%	10%	7%			
DR	6%	6%	6%			
Foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan	Pearson chi2(12	(2) = 19.5084	Pr = 0.077			
very positive		1%	5%			
somewhat positive	15%	19%	20%			
neutral	24%	30%	28%			
somewhat negative	16%	13%	13%			
very negative	17%	14%	13%			
no idea	13%	14%	10%			
DR	12%	9%	11%			

Table 10 Views of Kyrayzstan migrant and non-migrant samples

Xenophobia and anti-immigrant politics

- Comparative survey studies (e.g. using the ESS) indicate higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in Russia than in West Europe
- Political analyses focus on how Russian political elites scapegoat and oppress immigrants
- Anti-immigrant and anti-minority views are indeed widespread among ethnic Russians
 - However, immigration is not a particularly salient political issue for most
 - Cultural threat stronger than economic fears
 - Evidence of widespread ambivalence
 - Policies have moved in the direction of rationalization
 - A manufactured immigration crisis?







FIG 4. Percent expressing hostility or fear toward specific ethnic groups, by locality (weighted DIRES data, ethnic Russians; differences by locality are statistically significant)



■ Moscow ■ St. Petersburg ■ Elsewhere □ Total

FIG 5. Which of the following problems in our country are the most urgent? Name up to 5 or 6. (weighted DIRES data, ethnic Russians)



TABLE 1. How important on a scale of 1 to 7 were each of the following issues for youwhen you decided which presidential candidate to vote for?

(Post-presidential election survey only; ethnic Russian respondents. "Hard to say" responses are excluded.)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Ν	Mean Z
The need for stability	6.27	1.16	1	7	1159	0.59
Economic policy	6.08	1.21	1	7	1154	0.39
Legality and rule of law	5.94	1.24	1	7	1141	0.24
Corruption among bureaucrats	5.87	1.35	1	7	1140	0.18
Social support programs	5.82	1.39	1	7	1153	0.15
The strength of the army	5.73	1.38	1	7	1146	0.07
Foreign policy	5.39	1.43	1	7	1139	-0.28
Political reforms	5.10	1.52	1	7	1120	-0.51
Immigration to Russia	4.73	1.68	1	7	1105	-0.89

8	8					
	Immigrants	harm	Keep immig	rants	Evict immig	rants
	Russic	a	out of Rus	ssia	from Rus	sia
	В	SE(B)	В	SE(B)	В	SE(B)
Age (40 to 49)						
Age (centered at 18)	.004 *	.002	001	.001	003 **	.001
Education (secondary)						
University	047	.066	041	.038	018	.037
Less than Secondary	.184 **	.090	.119 **	.049	.141 **	.042
Locality (small/medium cities)						
Moscow	.814 **	.156	.559 **	.081	.487 **	.086
St. Petersburg	.122	.355	331	.226	036	.153
Other large city	.577 **	.163	.273 **	.097	.441 **	.076
Rural village	004	.144	.020	.072	.089	.063
Woman	.030	.054	004	.032	028	.029
Survey (pre-Duma, November 20	11)					
Post-Duma (December 2011)	.075	.088	.010	.051	.007	.041
Pre-Presidential (Feb. 2012)	058	.120	.081	.061	099 *	.053
Post-Presidential (March 2012)	.070	.119	.143 **	.061		
Income quintile (second through f	ourth)					
Lowest	.221 **	.111	.128 **	.058	.016	.054
Highest	245 **	.114	.005	.062	054	.057
Missing	.168 *	.101	.026	.054	040	.050
Orthodox Christian	.013	.082	.039	.046	.023	.039
Foreign born	465 **	.181	208 **	.093	086	.095
Constant	5.670 **	.124	2.990 **	.068	3.136 **	.062
Ν	4482		4482		3271	
R-squared	.031		.046		.051	

TABLE 3. Regression results: anti-immigrant sentiment

TABLE 4. Associations of anti-immigrant views with political attitudes among ethnic Russians Age, education, gender, locality, income, survey wave, Orthodox faith, and foreign birthplace are controlled using regression techniques.

Russiaimmigrants outTopics related to minorities/nationalism:+Agree: "Russia for Russians"+Agree: "Stop feeding Caucasus"+Should evict immigrants+Scale: suspicion of foreign influence+Scale: Russia has a unique path+Xenophobia toward "southern" groups+Xenophobia toward "western" groups+
Agree: "Russia for Russians"++Agree: "Stop feeding Caucasus"++Should evict immigrants++Scale: suspicion of foreign influence++Scale: Russia has a unique path+-Xenophobia toward "southern" groups++
Agree: "Stop feeding Caucasus"++Should evict immigrants++Scale: suspicion of foreign influence++Scale: Russia has a unique path+-Xenophobia toward "southern" groups++
Should evict immigrants++Scale: suspicion of foreign influence++Scale: Russia has a unique path+-Xenophobia toward "southern" groups++
Scale: suspicion of foreign influence++Scale: Russia has a unique path+-Xenophobia toward "southern" groups++
Scale: Russia has a unique path+-Xenophobia toward "southern" groups++
Xenophobia toward "southern" groups + +
Xenophobia toward "western" groups + +
USA is enemy or rival $+$ 0
Immigration one of top 5-6 problems in the country $+$ 0
Confidence in political and social institutions
The Duma (parliament) - 0
Police - 0
The Army
Putin
Local government - 0
Courts - 0
Political parties - 0
President Medvedev
Mass media - 0

Support for political parties and organizations:

United Russia ("ruling" party)	-	0
KPRF (Communists)	0	0
LDPR (Right-wing nationalist)	0	0
Yabloko (Liberal)	0	0
Right Forces (Liberal)	0	0
National Bolshevik Party (Extremist Nationalist)	0	0
Patriots of Russia (Extreme Nationalist)	+	-
Other political topics:		
Agree that the collapse of USSR was a catastrophe	+	-
Pro-Stalin scale	0	0
Russia on the right course	-	0
Russia on wrong course	+	0
Support civil rights	0	-
Scale: support for protests	0	0
Would join protest in your town	+	0

+ significant positive effect; 0 no statistically significant effect; - significant negative effect.

Immigration to Russia: Impact back home

- Two survey-based studies of Georgia
 - Remittances and social capital
 - Migration and gender division of labor in the household

Remittances in the Republic of Georgia: Correlates, Economic Impact, and Social Capital Formation

Theodore P. Gerber · Karine Torosyan

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Abstract The economic impact of remittances on migrant-sending countries has been a subject of debate in the scholarly literature on migration. We consider the topic using a household-level approach. We use a new survey, "Georgia on the Move," to examine migrant-level, household-level, and contextual variables associated with the probability that a household in the Republic of Georgia receives remittances. We then apply propensity score matching to estimate how remittances affect particular types of household expenditures, savings, labor supply, health, and other measures of well-being. Separate analysis of the subsample of households with a migrant currently abroad distinguishes the effects of remittances from the effects of migration as such. In Georgia, remittances improve household economic well-being without, for the most part, producing the negative consequences often suggested in the literature. We find evidence for an important aspect that has not been widely discussed in prior studies: remittances foster the formation of social capital by increasing the amount of money that households give as gifts to other households.

Keywords International migration · Remittances · Economic well-being · Social capital

	•							
	All Households				Absent-Migrant Households			
	Diff. ^a	t	ATT	t	Diff. ^a	t	ATT	t
Spending ^b								
Consumption								
Religious activity	7.45 [‡]	1.95 [‡]	11.08*	2.76*	12.44*	2.17*	10.28	1.49
Personal services	9.06 [‡]	1.75‡	16.12*	2.83*	14.88	1.61	17.80^{\ddagger}	1.93 [‡]
Vehicle	20.75	1.64	35.39*	2.76*	29.68	1.62	27.77	1.56
Rent	17.91	0.60	58.86*	2.25*	45.86	1.20	37.22	1.00
Leisure/holidays	14.03	1.44	5.68	0.39	-0.53	-0.03	-4.27	-0.20
Housing needs	52.12*	2.51*	46.19	1.49	6.70	0.19	-81.39	-1.26
Household goods	159.78*	3.39*	204.97*	2.47*	185.71‡	1.68^{\ddagger}	249.62*	3.83*
Investments								
Medical care	147.90*	2.91*	194.99*	3.76*	181.01*	2.01*	143.20‡	1.80^{\ddagger}
School expenses	26.63	1.23	48.50 [‡]	1.66‡	59.74	1.53	71.59*	2.52*
Savings	90.55*	2.97*	137.56*	3.62*	135.83*	2.33*	151.72*	3.56*
Debt payments	50.97*	3.73*	54.93*	2.78*	54.67	1.63	49.09 [‡]	1.93 [‡]
Gifts to others	49.37*	2.39*	61.56*	2.44*	75.60*	2.18*	94.36	4.06*
Totals								
Total spending (excluding savings, gifts, and debt payments)	372.62*	4.04*	508.01*	4.42*	412.25*	2.32*	385.46*	2.25*
Total budget	500.08*	4.76*	682.14*	5.69*	587.54*	2.85*	579.60*	3.20*
Other Outcomes ^c								
Anyone unemployed	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.18	0.05	1.08	0.00	0.03
17- to 25-year-olds in school	0.02	0.39	0.09	1.05	0.06	0.60	0.07	0.36
Anyone poor/very poor health	-0.07*	-2.55*	-0.12*	-3.21*	-0.15*	-2.90*	-0.20^{\ddagger}	-1.89 [‡]
Log adjusted earnings	-0.33*	-2.81*	-0.16	-0.80	-0.54*	-2.45*	-0.47	-1.10
Own business in prior year	-0.02	-0.85	0.02	0.82	-0.01	0.29	0.05*	1.75 [‡]
Land owned	-0.07*	-2.46*	-0.01	-0.16	0.02	0.57	-0.07	-1.07
Number of rooms	0.24*	2.03*	0.62*	3.50*	0.63*	3.09*	0.45	1.01
Internet access	0.03	1.65	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.17	0.01	0.29

 Table 6
 Unconditional and matching estimates of remittance effects (in Georgian lari)



Migration, Household Tasks, and Gender: Evidence from the Republic of Georgia¹

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> We examine whether migration affects the gender division of household tasks and participation in leisure within origin-country households using survey data from the Republic of Georgia. Our theoretical framework identifies two sets of mechanisms whereby migration might influence gender differences in home activities: migrant experience effects and migrant absence effects. We test for both types of effects on the probability that men and women perform gender atypical household tasks and engage in leisure activities by comparing households with and without currently absent and return migrants using probit regressions. We find evidence for both migration absence and migration experience effects on gender differences in housework and leisure. However, these effects are complex and contradictory: generally, male migration tends to exacerbate gender differences in the sending household while female migration tends to ameliorate them.

		Men ($N = 1685$)					Women ($N = 2027$)			
	Gender atypical tasks		Leisure		Gender atypical tasks		Leisure			
Variables	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE		
Migration status										
Partner is AM	0.741	0.206	-0.93 7	0.222	0.543	0.142	-0.424	0.143		
Local member	0.197	0.122	-0.269	0.127	0.221	0.081	-0.286	0.082		
of AM HH										
RM from Russia	-0.692	0.264	0.028	0.187	0.065	0.196	0.009	0.194		
RM from other	-0.278	0.187	-0.023	0.183	0.153	0.171	-0.031	0.169		
destinations										
Partner is RM	0.453	0.254	-0.065	0.285	0.020	0.136	-0.355	0.137		
Local member of RM HH	-0.053	0.157	-0.034	0.160	-0.054	0.100	-0.039	0.099		

TABLE 4PROBIT MODELS FOR GENDER-ATYPICAL TASKS AND LEISURE, BY GENDER

Moving forward...

- Labor migration to Russia is unlikely to abate
- It is likely to transform Russian society in unpredictable ways
- It has potential geopolitical implications that should lend a new perspective on migration policies in the United States and Europe
- It should be a major topic of study for students of Russian domestic politics and economics, international relations, and migration scholars.
- Growing empirical literature, but needs more engagement with theories
- Political challenges of doing research on the topic in Russia

Moving forward: major needs

- Nationally-representative survey of Russia's foreign born population
 - Ethnic Russian "returnees"
 - High-skill immigrants ("expats")
 - Labor migrants: legal and irregular
 - Chain migrants
 - Naturalized migrants
 - Regionally representative
- Research on Russian diaspora
- Drivers and impact of migration in sending countries/communities
- Research on intra-regional migration (especially to Kazakhstan)