Trust and Reciprocity among Urban Slum Dwellers: Experimental Findings from a Trust Game in Hyderabad

Bibhu P. Nayak Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) Hyderabad

Introduction

- The economic payoff of social capital
- Defining social capital as 'the propensities of individuals to trust and cooperate' to 'community level networks'
- Defining trust:
 - "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party" (Mayer et al., 1995)
 - "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms" (Fukuyama, 1995)
 - "concerns the question whether an individual is willing to cooperate having the expectation that the 'other will reciprocate" (Ostrom, 1998)





Does Trust Matter?

- In higher trust environment the cost of economic activities that require some agent to rely on the future action of others is less
- Trusting societies have stronger incentive to innovate and to accumulate physical capital and also likely to have higher returns to accumulation of human capital
- Several indirect effects on economic outcomes through political channel





Trust and Cooperation: Review of Indian Studies

- Studies have found low level of trust and argued that Indian society lack a 'common code of generalised morality' (Platteau, 1994; Saberwal, 1996).
- Selective trust' amongst business family, an anthropological perspective (Harris, 2003)
- Collective action (protests) on environmental issues in coastal Odisha linked to stronger sense of communalities (higher trust level) in comparison to inland region (Blomkvist and Swain ,2001)



Trust and Cooperation: Review of Indian Studies

- Group lending is successful in achieving low rates of default because it harnesses existing social capital and creates new social capital through repeated interactions (Feigenberg, Field and Pande,2009)
- Higher level of trusts in rural areas (highest where SHG exists) than in cities (Mitra and Gupta, 2009)
- Participation in community resource management is higher with the households exhibiting higher level of trust (Bouma et al, 2008)





Measuring the Trust

- Survey based methods vs experimental methods (field and lab)
- 'Trust game' designed by Berg et al, (1995) as a standard experimental method to measure trust
 - first mover is randomly and anonymously paired with second mover
 - both are given a monetary endowment
 - first mover transfer some or all her endowment to the second mover
 - the transferred amount is tripled by the experimenter
 - the second mover may return none or some or all the received transfer or even more (part of her endowment)
 - bne shot game



The Trust Game

- Trust game conducted in 8 randomly selected slums in Hyderabad
- Game was played with 'real' money and 'real' people
- Group size for the game was 30 to 36, both men and women together (N=270)
- More women than men (64 %)
- 5 of the 8 slums had SHG experience
- The initial endowment consists of four Rs. 50 currency notes (total Rs. 200)
- Pre and Post Game surveys



Trust Game Procedure



Trust Game Results

Players generated 71.5 % of maximum possible income
Second movers earned more (55.25 %)

Trust

- Average amount sent by sender group is Rs. 85.82
- Only 5 % of players sent whole initial endowment
- None sent no money (y≥0)
- 88 % sent half or less of the initial endowment

Reciprocation

- Average amount returned is Rs. 138.89 (30 %)
- 26 % sent only 50, 33%
 100, 8 % more than 200
- 44% received 150, 44% received 300
- None returned no money (z≥0)

Risk

Cooperation

Trust and Trustworthiness



Trust and Cooperation Experience







Trust and Gender



Amount Sent in Rs.

Cooperation Experience and Reciprocation

Distribution of Return Ratio by slums





Gender and Reciprocation

Amount Returned by Gender



Determinants of Trust

| Model | (TG1) | | (TG2) | | (TG3) | | (TG4) | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------|----------------------|--------|-----------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| Variables | Coeff. | S.E. | Coeff. | S.E. | Coeff. | S.E. | Coeff. | S.E. |
| Socio-economic | | | | | | | | |
| Age | -0.713* | 0.410 | -0.631* | 0.375 | -0.007 | 0.005 | | |
| Male | 24.552*** | 8.562 | 18.143** | 7.715 | 0.309*** | 0.091 | 0.235*** | 0.081 |
| Education (No. of | 0.252 | 0.701 | | | 0.006 | 0.008 | | |
| years) | | | | | | | | |
| HH head | -11.120 | 6.762 | | | -0.124 | 0.076 | | |
| Married | 7.975 | 6.697 | | | 0.072 | 0.070 | | |
| HH size | 0.269 | 1.312 | | | 0.004 | 0.015 | | |
| Years living in slum | 0.846** | 0.371 | 0.603* | 0.355 | 0.008** | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Religiosity | -0.361 | 0.576 | | | -0.004 | 0.006 | | |
| Relative deprivation | -1.202 | 5.981 | | | -0.016 | 0.069 | | |
| feeling | | | | | | | | |
| Trust perception | 1.548 | 7.189 | | | 0.027 | 0.079 | | |
| Collective Action | | | | | | | | |
| Member of | -8.224 | 8.313 | | | -0.087 | 0.102 | | |
| community org. | | | | | | | | |
| Responsibility | -6.080 | 12.660 | | | -0.064 | 0.166 | | |
| Time spent for | -1.412** | 0.677 | -1.006 | 0.658 | -0.016** | 0.008 | -0.012 | 0.009 |
| collective action | | | | | | | | |
| Lending | 9.525 | 7.525 | | | 0.128 | 0.087 | | |
| Experimental | | | | | | | | |
| Understanding | 6.280 | 12.826 | | | 0.028 | 0.148 | | |
| Real life appl. | -4.088 | 8.531 | | | -0.015 | 0.093 | | |
| SHG Slums | 28.880** | 13.006 | 27.271*** | 6.515 | 0.330** | 0.148 | 0.296*** | 0.074 |
| Controls | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 52.552** | 21.527 | 67.624*** | (0.484 | 3.944*** | 0.248 | 3.987*** | 0.074 |
| Session dummies | 7 sessions (1 session | | 1 session (1 session | | / sessions (1 session | | 1 session (1 session | |
| | significant) | | significant) | | significant) | | significant) | |
| No. of observations | 133 | | 133 | | 133 | | 133 | |
| R-squared | 0.317 | | 0.241 | | 0.338 | | 0.256 | |

Determinants of Trust

- Age (-)
- Male player (+)
- Living duration (+)
- Time spent of collective activities (+)
- SHG membership (+)



Determinants of Reciprocation

| Model | (TG5) | | (TG6) | | (TG7) | | (TG8) | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--|
| Variables | Coeff. | S.E. | Coeff. | S.E. | Coeff. | S.E. | Coeff. | S.E. | |
| Amount received | 1.185*** | 0.216 | 1.154*** | 0.229 | 0.007*** | 0.001 | 0.006*** | 0.001 | |
| Socio-economic | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 0.042 | 0.769 | | | 0.000 | 0.005 | | | |
| Male | 37.672** | 17.741 | 12.663 | 13.986 | 0.287** | 0.118 | 0.212** | 0.098 | |
| Education (No. of | -1.133 | 1.553 | | | 0.001 | 0.011 | | | |
| years) | | | | | | | | | |
| HH head | -6.946 | 16.026 | | | -0.124 | 0.110 | -0.227** | 0.096 | |
| Married | -5.094 | 13.069 | | | -0.002 | 0.095 | | | |
| HH size | -5.770** | 2.555 | -7.234*** | 2.294 | -0.048*** | 0.018 | -0.057*** | 0.016 | |
| Years living in slum | -0.244 | 0.652 | | | 0.001 | 0.004 | | | |
| Religiosity | -0.425 | 1.136 | | | -0.003 | 0.007 | | | |
| Relative deprivation | -11.019 | 14.865 | | | -0.101 | 0.097 | | | |
| feeling | | | | | | | | | |
| Trust perception | -13.886 | 13.626 | | | -0.039 | 0.095 | | | |
| Collective Action | | | | | | | | | |
| Member of | 4.167 | 18.384 | | | 0.048 | 0.130 | | | |
| community org. | | | | | | | | | |
| Responsibility | -4.362 | 20.992 | | | 0.051 | 0.151 | | | |
| Time spent for | -12.788*** | 4.050 | -10.119*** | 3.355 | -0.091*** | 0.029 | -0.077** | 0.028 | |
| collective action | | | | | | | | | |
| Lending | -12.334 | 16.616 | | | -0.130 | 0.117 | | | |
| Experimental | | | | | | | | | |
| Understanding | -102.14*** | 28.294 | -89.070*** | 19.957 | -0.559*** | 0.195 | -0.537*** | 0.130 | |
| Real life appl. | 26.991 | 18.194 | | | 0.165 | 0.131 | | | |
| SHG Slums | 58.009** | 25.714 | 50.067*** | 13.743 | 0.622*** | 0.186 | 0.574*** | 0.116 | |
| Controls | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 153.886*** | 40.854 | 132.620*** | 28.671 | 4.59*** | 0.276 | 4.680*** | 0.190 | |
| Session dummies | 7 sessions (2 sessions | | 2 sessions (2 sessions | | 7 sessions (2 sessions | | 2 sessions (2 session | | |
| | significant) | ignificant) | | significant) | | significant***) | | significant***) | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| No. of observations | 135 | | 135 | | 135 | | 135 | | |
| R-squared | 0.504 | | 0.415 | | 0.531 | | 0.448 | | |

Determinants of Reciprocation

- Amount received (+)
- Male (+)
- HH size (-)
- Time spent on collection action (-)
- Understanding of the game (-)
- Real life application (+)



Conclusions

- Trust and reciprocation are found to be higher in slums having active SHGs
- The level of trustworthiness or reciprocation is very less for all the slums, though it is marginally higher in case of SHG slums
- Male players are found to send more as well as return more than their female counterparts
- Different socio-economic factors influence the trust as well as the reciprocation
 - The factors like age, gender, years of living in slums, participation in other collective action are determining the level of trust

In case of reciprocation- the amount received, household size, collective action experience and relating the game to real life experience are the determining factors.

THANK YOU

Email: bibhuprasadnayak@gmail.com



This report was presented at the 6th LCSR International Workshop "Trust, Social Capital and Values in a Comparative Perspective", which held within the XVII April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development.

April 18 – April 22, 2016 - Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

https://lcsr.hse.ru/en/seminar2016

Настоящий доклад был представлен на VI международном рабочем семинаре ЛССИ «Доверие, социальный капитал и ценности в сравнительной перспективе», прошедшего в рамках XVII Апрельской международной научной конференции НИУ ВШЭ «Модернизация экономики и общества».

18 – 22 апреля, 2016 – НИУ ВШЭ, Москва.

https://lcsr.hse.ru/seminar2016