

Ethnicity, Trust, and Democracy: A Majority-Minority Approach




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Theories of trust



- “Most people can be trusted”
- Debate: is this about culture or about institutions?



Cultural theories of trust:


- socialization, personality
 - fixed
 - + experiences = trust
 - -experiences = distrust
-
- optimists, age
 - divorce, poverty, racial minorities



Institutional theories of trust:



- performance, responsive
- climate of fairness and equality
- democracy and corruption



One approach:



- Immigrants from non-democratic societies who move to democratic societies
- Trust where came from = culture
- Corruption where arrives = institutions




What these kinds of studies find:



The gap:



- What about other ways of thinking about ethnicity such as race and nation?
- What about other types of political systems?



Why look at ethnicity?

- Ethnicity:

- Ethnicity is culture

Ethnicity and Race

- Ethnicity is based on cultural similarities and differences in a society or nation.
- *What is an ethnic group and what is ethnicity?*

Members of an ethnic group share certain beliefs, values, habits, customs and norms because of their common background.

BUT there is a problem...



- no data on individual ethnicity
- Well not NO data but here is the problem....

Incommensurable cases:




RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2006)

- Russian
- Tatar
- Armenian
- Ukrainian
- Belorussian
- Asian
- Georgian
- Tadjic
- Other

CANADA (2006)

- White/Caucasian
- White
- Asian
- Black
- Other



ETHNIC GROUPS

SLAVIC PEOPLES

- Russians
- Ukrainians
- Belorussians

OTHER INDO-EUROPEAN PEOPLES

- Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians, Moldavians, Tadjiks, Ossetians
- Germans
- Jews

TURKIC PEOPLES

- Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz
- Uzbeks
- Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani
- Other Turkic peoples

OTHER URALIC AND ALTAIC PEOPLES

- Estonians, Karelians, Mari, Komi, Mordvins, Udmurts, Mansi, Khanty, Nentsy, Buryats, Kalmyks, Evenki, Eveny, Nganasany

CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

- Georgians, Chechens, Ingush, peoples of Dagestan

PALEO-SIBERIAN PEOPLES

- Chukchi, Koryaks, Nivkhi

- ESKIMOS
- KETS

- Uninhabited or sparsely settled

Incommensurable cases:



UZBEKISTAN (2011)

- Tajic
- Russian
- Karakalpak
- Kazah

NIGERIA (2011)

- Hausa
- Yoruba
- Igbo
- Fulani

Therefore what we can do:


Micro-level

- Immigration



Macro-level


- Ethnic fractionalization



Solution: Majority-minority framework



- Ethnic markers – race, religion, nation- don't matter in and of themselves
- Reflect majority minority status and power differentials



But who will have more power and in what contexts?



- 1) who will it favour? Majority or minority?
(culture)
- 2) how will it change under different political systems? Democracy vs. non-democracy?
(institutions)

Hypotheses:



FIGURE 1-3. Illustration of Potential Relationships Between Ethnicity, Democracy and Trust

Fig 1. Hypothesis 1




Fig. 2 Hypothesis 2





Fig 3. Hypothesis 3



Data:



- Majority-Minority:
group size, language, and immigrant
how? Aggregate then individual

Data:



- Democracy: full, flawed, hybrid, authoritarian

Trust Gap:



Negative

- Minority group more trusting
- Nigeria: -8



Positive

- Majority group more trusting
- Sweden: 22



Two Countries:



- Russian: 0
- Russian language: - 4
- Non-immigrant: 1
- Non-minority group: 5


- Mixed

- White: 18
- English: 22
- Non-immigrant: 17

Majority group

Results: The gap in trust:

FIGURE 4-6. Ethnic Differences in Trust across Regime Type



Note: Data for Gap 1, Gap 2, and Gap 3 comes from World Values Survey (2005-2009 & 2010-2014); data for Gap 4 from European Social Study (2012).

TABLE 3. Random-effects Logistic Regression of Democracy, Majority-Minority status, and Trust (WVS, 2005-2009 & 2010-2014) (odds ratios)

	Minority = Group percentage	Minority = Language at home	Minority = Immigrant	Minority = Group percentage	Minority = Language at home	Minority = Immigrant
<i>Majority-minority</i>						
Belong to ethnic minority group	0.881*** (-5.39)	0.962 (-1.58)	0.942 (-1.21)	1.207** (3.21)	1.086 (1.56)	1.049 (0.49)
<i>Regime type (ref. authoritarian)</i>						
Hybrid	1.174 (0.45)	0.925 (-0.26)	0.992 (-0.02)	1.300 (0.72)	0.962 (-0.13)	0.968 (-0.07)
Flawed	0.631 (-1.53)	0.932 (-0.25)	0.708 (-0.74)	0.642 (-1.44)	0.920 (-0.30)	0.723 (-0.69)
Full	2.919** (3.23)	2.938*** (3.66)	3.148** (2.58)	3.434*** (3.66)	3.125*** (3.86)	3.273** (2.67)
<i>Interaction effect (ref. ethnic group in authoritarian states)</i>						
Minority group in hybrid states				0.688*** (-4.82)	0.849* (-2.29)	1.390* (2.34)
Minority group in flawed democracies				0.905 (-1.43)	1.035 (0.52)	0.750 (-1.73)
Minority group in full democracies				0.468*** (-10.13)	0.509*** (-7.78)	0.706** (-2.80)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Level 2: Random Effect</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	72,220	87,600	29,304	72,220	87,600	29,304
Number of country-years	58	71	22	58	71	22

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses

* n<0.05 ** n<0.01 *** n<0.001

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Conclusion 1/3: Theoretical



- New majority minority framework – cultural vs. institutional comparison



Conclusion 2/3: methodological




- new measure of ethnicity at the individual level



Conclusion 3/3: empirical



- Democracy increases trust
- BUT Democracy also leads to greater trust gaps



Thank you!



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<http://lcsr.hse.ru/en/conf2015>

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