Local Self-Government in Russia: Endangered Mayors

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LCSR, HSE, Saint-Petersburg
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Петрозаводск

отмена прямых выборов мэра -
отмена демократических прав!

City manager
Administration
+
Directly elected mayor
Chairman of the local legislature

City manager
Administration
+
Mayor appointed by the local legislature from its deputies
Chairman of the local legislature

Directly elected mayor
Administration
Chairman of the local legislature

Model’s choice – local legislature
City manager + Directly elected mayor
Yekaterinburg

City manager + Mayor appointed by the local legislature from its deputies
Volgograd; Nizhny Novgorod

Directly elected mayor
Voronezh; Novosibirsk
CITY MANAGER

- Hired by the local legislature under the fixed-term contract
- Contract is signed by the mayor
- 2/3 of the competition commission’s members are appointed by the local legislature
- 1/3 – by the regional legislature at the proposal of the governor
- Is accountable to the local legislature
- Contract’s early termination is initiated by the mayor / local legislature / regional governor
CITY MANAGER

- ½ of the competition commission’s members are appointed by the local legislature
- ½ – by the regional legislature at the proposal of the governor
- Local Executive Model’s choice – regional legislature
Waves of city managers’ appointments in the regional capitals

2004 – 2006
22

2009 – 2011
19

2014 – 2015
20

No city manager (by 1st September, 2015)
9 regional capitals (Voronezh, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Tomsk, Kemerovo, Yakutsk, Abakan, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Birobidzhan)
What are the underlying causal factors of the regional and local resistance to the city managers’ introduction?

**Sample:** 79 regional capitals (except for Saint-Petersburg, Moscow, Leningrad oblast’, Moscow oblast’, Crimea Republic, Sevastopol)

**Methods:** t-test; multiple regression
What are the underlying causal factors of the regional and local resistance to the city managers’ introduction?

Hypothesis rejected – “economy matters”
## Economy matters?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (no city manager)</th>
<th>Mean (city manager)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita 2002</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>10.54</td>
<td>0.0179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita 2004</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>0.0081</td>
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<td>GDP per capita 2008</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidated budget 2002</td>
<td>16.47</td>
<td>16.42</td>
<td>0.7687</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidated budget 2004</td>
<td>16.87</td>
<td>16.81</td>
<td>0.7241</td>
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<td>Consolidated budget 2008</td>
<td>17.51</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>0.56107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct revenues 2002</td>
<td>15.85</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>0.9307</td>
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<td>Direct revenues 2004</td>
<td>16.26</td>
<td>16.24</td>
<td>0.8948</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct revenues 2008</td>
<td>17.34</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>0.9413</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Welch two samples t-test, two-sided. Significance at the 0.05 level
## Economy matters?

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (no city manager)</th>
<th>Mean (city manager)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities’ revenues 2002</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>14.53</td>
<td>0.8404</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cities’ revenues 2004</td>
<td>14.83</td>
<td>14.79</td>
<td>0.8692</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cities’ revenues 2008</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.54</td>
<td>0.7432</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Welch two samples t-test, two-sided. Significance at the 0.05 level.
Politics matters?

Research Design

Dependent variable:

The number of months passed since the adoption of the federal law in October 6th, 2003 before the relevant local (regional) law’s adoption
Independent variables (I):

1. Distance from the federal center:
   
   1) Geographical - \textit{in km (log) between Moscow and regional capital};
   
   2) Geo-Political - federal districts (1- Central; 2 – Northwestern, Volga, Southern; 3 – Ural, North Caucasian; 4 – Siberian; 5 – Far Eastern)
Independent variables (II):

2. Loyalty:

1. Political - federal parliamentary elections 2003, 2007, 2011 both on the regional and local levels:
   1) % for UR;
   2) % for KPRF;
   3) % “against all”

2. Political-economical:
   1) Federal unconditional transfers in thousand of rubles;
   2) Subsidy dependence – share of the federal unconditional transfers in the regions’ consolidated budgets
Independent variables (III):

3. Elite’s fragmentation:

1) Effective number of parties (Golosov, 2010) in electorate on the federal parliamentary elections 2003, 2007, 2011 both on the regional and local levels; 

2) Effective number of parties (Golosov, 2010) on the regional parliamentary elections - convocation concurrent to the city managers’ introduction;

3) Number of mayors / governors in power from 2000 until city manager’s appointment
### Correlation matrix of coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>N mayors</th>
<th>N governors</th>
<th>ENP 2007</th>
<th>ENP regional parliament</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>N mayors</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>N governors</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP 2007</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
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<td>ENP regional parliament</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
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<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-95.434</td>
<td>0.0487 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>11.288</td>
<td>0.0196 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties on federal parliamentary elections 2007</td>
<td>51.491</td>
<td>0.0063 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties on regional parliamentary elections</td>
<td>-11.620</td>
<td>0.0207 *</td>
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<td>Number of governors in power</td>
<td>8.520</td>
<td>0.0748</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of mayors in power</td>
<td>6.193</td>
<td>0.0499 *</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Multiple regression, n=79

R^2= 0.4304, adjusted R^2= 0.3891


Thank you for your attention!
DV, histogram