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Does culture of origin matter? Approaching redistribution preferences of immigrants

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Overview

- Research question and its rationality
- Theoretical background
- Resent findings
- Some issues for criticism
- Hypotheses
- Research design
- Data
- Main findings
- Conclusion

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Research question

Do migrants adapt their redistribution preferences to a new institutional context or do they hold on to attitudes shaped in their country of origin?

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Theoretical framework

1. Theory of acculturation
2. Electoral and political consequences of resistance to cultural patterns in the host country

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Theoretical framework

Acculturation is the **adoption of the cultural norms and behavioral patterns** of the "core culture" (Gordon 1964). Gordon differentiated between acculturation and structural assimilation (incorporation into primary relations). Changes in external individual traits (language, clothing) take less time while intrinsic (values, norms, believes) take longer.

Acculturation is "**progressive adoption of elements of a foreign culture** (ideas, words, values, norms, behavior, institutions) by persons, groups or classes of a given culture" (the International organization for migration, 2004)

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Theoretical framework

Four outcomes of acculturation process (Berry 2003)

		Attitude Toward Keeping Heritage Culture and Identity	
		Positive	**Negative**
Attitude Toward Learning and Interacting With New Culture	**Positive**	Integration	Assimilation
	Negative	Separation	Marginalization

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Theoretical framework

Electoral and political consequences

1. McCormick (1974) associated migrants' attitudes to the US government in 19th century with the attitudes in the country of origin.
2. Benson (1966) studies voting behavior of Dutch immigrants in the US and came to the conclusion that they reproduce the same patterns as citizens of Netherlands.
3. Lipset and Marks (2000) traced the rise of American socialist movements during the first third of 20th century towards massive immigration from Germany, where socialist movements were very strong at the time.

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Previous findings

Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) assessed **adaptation of East Germans** to new institutional arrangements after the reunification and proposed that this process would take about 20-40 years (one or two generations).

Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) identified an **effect of environment on behavioral patterns of eastern and western Germans**. In contrast to expectations, eastern Germans, who had shaped their values and attitudes during Communism, demonstrated more selfish behavior compared to western Germans.

The **effects of culture** were traced by Luttmer and Singhal (2011). They suggested associating migrants' preferences for redistribution with averaged preferences for redistribution in their country of origin. They ascertained that migrants from countries where the preferences for redistribution are more explicit tend to express more pro-redistribution preferences.

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Luttmer, E. F. P., and M. Singhal. 2011. "Culture, Context, and the Taste for Redistribution." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 3 (1): 157–79.

There is a strong effect of culture of origin on the redistribution preferences of individual immigrants.



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Luttmer and Singhal (2011).

However, there are some issues

1. the sensitivity of data to temporal changes and sample
2. the problem of self-selection into migration
3. a large proportion of European migration takes place within similar cultural, language or welfare areas
4. what stands behind culture measured as redistribution preferences in countries of origin?

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Luttmer and Singhal (2011): critical remarks and new hypothesis

There is a question whether migrants in the subsample are **randomly distributed** to this group.

In this concern I'm going first to discuss the **problem of self-selection into migration** and then **self-selection into a country** of migration and compare preferences for redistribution of European and Non-European migrants.

The other matter is the question about the key finding of Lutmer and Singhal: "**culture**" of country of birth has an effect on individual redistribution preferences.

Self-selection into migration: self-interest explanations

Migrants are not a random sample (Borjas 1988; Bianchi 2013)

A long discussion about incentives for migration was traced by Kauppinen and Poutvaara (2012):

- economic advantages (Hicks 1932),
- increase in social capital (Sjaastad 1962) and
- amount of public goods (Tiebout 1956)

Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980, 841): migrants "seek to maximize the present value of net gains resulting from locational change". Particularly income differentials and net of mobility costs are identified as the key incentives for migration.

Self-selection into migration: other explanations

The long list of utilitarian reasons for migration may be supplemented by individual peculiarities: abilities, a readiness to take risks and search for new experience (Fouarge and Ester 2007).

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Reasons for immigration

(cited on the report of The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions "Factors determining international and regional migration in Europe" (Fouarge and Ester 2007))



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Hypothesis 1

H1. Control for individual openness to change values maximizes the effect of average redistribution preferences in the country of birth on migrant redistribution preferences.

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Self-selection into a country of immigration

Immigration "often involves a **loss of established social networks of family and friends**, and the challenge of integration into a **new job**, a different **social security system** and a new social environment, often with the need to learn a new **language**" (Krieger 2006, 2).

Self-selection into a country of immigration
Obstacles for immigration

(cited on the report of The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions "Long distance mobility within the EU: considering the Lisbon Agenda and Transitional Arrangements" (Krieger 2006, 8))



Self-selection into a country of immigration

Yet when opting for immigration Europeans can **minimize these costs** by

- choosing **nearby countries** (it makes distance from family and friends shorter),
- countries where people speak the same or similar **language** (it equalizes migrants with natives in terms of employment and makes adaptation easier) and
- maybe even countries with alike **social security system** (it allows to have more predictable environment).

In many cases these factors overlap each other.

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Migration flows in Europe

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of emigrants



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Migration flows in Europe

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of immigrants



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Migration flows in Europe

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of immigrants. N>30



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Migration flows of Sweden

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of immigrants. N>30



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Migration flows of Russia

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of immigrants. N>30



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Migration flows of France

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of immigrants. N>30



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Migration flows of Germany

The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of immigrants. N>20



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Demand for redistribution across Europe.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country



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Migration flows between countries with different demand for redistribution. The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country



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Migration flows between countries with different demand for redistribution. The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N<400



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Migration flows of Sweden.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N



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Migration flows of the UK.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N<400



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Migration flows of the UK.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N<400



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Migration flows of Germany.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N<400



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Migration flows of Austria.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N<400



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Migration flows of Russia.

The size of the nodes is proportional to the average demand in the country. 30<N<400



Self-selection into a country of immigration

European migration flows are **geographically clustered**: a great share of migrants have moved to neighboring countries, where they meet no or little complications in terms of language or to a similar welfare regime.

The possible solution to this issue is to **include non-European migrants** to the sample. Tendency to migrate to the countries where official language is similar to the official language of sending countries still remains. But other biases like distance from family, labour market or welfare regime will be minimized.

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Hypothesis 2

H2. An extension of the migrant subsample to include non-European migrants increases the effect of average redistribution preferences.

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What is “culture”?

Inglehart and Welzel considered cultural change of societies through change of **dominant values** (2005). I will follow this approximation and try to answer a question “do values stand behind the “culture” of redistribution?”. As they have shown redistribution preferences (“Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”) have strong negative association with self-expression and positive correlation with survival values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 55). It gives us a reason to think that redistribution preferences in a country may be a product of dominant values.

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Hypothesis 3

H3. The effect of aggregate preferences for redistribution in the country of origin vanishes if aggregate values are considered.

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Research design

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Data

- European Social Survey cumulative data set, N=278756.
- Six rounds: ESS'1 (2002-2003), ESS'2 (2004-2005), ESS'3 (2006-2007), ESS'4 (2008-2009), ESS'5 (2010-2011), ESS'6 (2012-2013).
- 32 countries which participated at least in two rounds of the survey.
- Observations with missing values for redistribution preferences, country of birth, country of residence, gender and age, and if age was under 18 y.o. were dropped.
- Final sample size is 273909: 250071 natives, 12924 migrants from the countries included into ESS cumulative data set, 10914 other migrants.

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4 stages of the research

- **Stage 1**: Replication of LS model on **extended ESS data** set
- **Stage 2**: Replication LS model on subsamples of both **European and non-European immigrants**
- **Stage 3**: Control for self-selection into migration by means of **human values**
- **Stage 4**: Approaching the question: “What is “culture”?”

Demand for redistribution

The **demand for redistribution** is measured by means of the question:

"Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels".

A five-point scale was suggested to give an answer: 1 "agree strongly", 2 "agree", 3 "neither agree nor disagree", 4 "disagree", 5 "disagree strongly". I have reversed the scale for my analysis to simplify interpretation of the results.

Stage 1

I will replicate the LS model at first and then add observations collected during the subsequent three rounds of ESS (ESS04-ESS06).

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

RP_i –is immigrant i's redistribution preferences

$\overline{RP_o}$ – is the average redistribution preferences among natives in the country of origin of immigrant i

X_i - is a vector of individual characteristics. The LS model assumes several specifications with different variations of the vector components.

θ_d – is a fixed effect for the country of destination of immigrant i, encompassing both institutional and cultural characteristics in the country of destination.

ε_i – is the error term

Stage 1
Specifications for X_i:

- **Baseline model with fewer controls**: logged GDP per capita averaged for 2002-2013 for the country of birth, age, gender, education (broad classification: low, secondary, higher), partner's education (broad classification), marital status, feeling about household income, main sources of income, logged household size, paid work during last 7 days, children in household, experience of long-term unemployment, living in a metropolitan area, dummies for ESS rounds, dummies for missing repressors.
- **Baseline model**: specification 1 plus squared age divided for 100, ever had a paid job, partner has paid work, a dummy for linguistic minority (respondent's primary language spoken at home is spoken by less than 30 percent of the native population), tenure in country, religion. Another two measures of linguistic minority were also tested: respondent's primary language spoken at home is spoken by less than 10 and 50 percent of the native population.
- **Baseline model with more controls**: specification 2 plus dummy for R is a citizen of a country, R voted in last national elections, a dummy for attending religious services at least once a month.
- **Comprehensive controls**: specification 3 plus dummies for regions in all the countries, GINI in a country of birth (for the last available year), main activity for the last 7 days, membership of a trade union or similar, mother's educational attainment, father's educational attainment, industry of R's employment, R's occupation.

Stage 2

I substitute average demand for redistribution in the country of origin with average demand for redistribution calculated on ISSP data to include non-European migrants in the subsample.

There is a discrepancy in the sets of countries participating in both surveys.

We **lose** migrants from **7 countries**: **Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Luxemburg, Turkey and Ukraine**.

We do **get** data on migrants from **13 non-European** countries: **Australia, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela**.

This substitution makes the sample more heterogeneous and allows **partial correction for self-selection into the country of migration** because of territorial proximity.

Here, I run the same analysis as in stage 1.

Stage 3

I introduce to the LS model individual values to control for self-selection into migration and then run all the specifications described above.

The critical assumption here is that values are shaped during the formative age and do not substantially change afterwards (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2 OC_i + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

OC_i – R's i openness to change values

Stage 4

One by one, I will include in the LS model a list of values averaged for countries of birth and then will run these models using all the specifications indicated in stage 1.

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{OC_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{OC_o}$ – average scores for openness to change values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{CO_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{CO_o}$ – average scores for conservation values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{SE_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{SE_o}$ – average scores for self-enhancement values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{ST_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{ST_o}$ – average scores for self-transcendence values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{SEx_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{SEx_o}$ – average scores for self-expression values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{PM_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{PM_o}$ – average scores for post-materialist values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{Ema_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{Ema_o}$ – average scores for emancipative values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{Aut_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{Aut_o}$ – average scores for autonomy values in i's country of birth

$$RP_i = \beta_1 (\overline{RP_o}) + \beta_2(\overline{Vo_o}) + \beta_3 X_i + \theta_d + \varepsilon_i$$

$\overline{Vo_o}$ – average scores for voice index in i's country of birth

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Main results

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Stage 1

Replication of LS model on extended ESS data set

Immigrant preferences for redistribution by preferences in country of birth, extended ESS data set (ESS'1-ESS'6)



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Immigrant preferences for redistribution by preferences in country of birth (ESS'1-ESS'3) (Luttmer and Singhal 2011, 159)



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Predictors of preference for redistribution. Baseline model with fewer controls (Source: ESS 2002-2013, cumulative data set)

VARIABLES	1 Immigrants	2 Immigrants—controls only	3 Natives—controls only
Birth country redistribution preferences	0.357***		
	(0.0613)		
Birth country log GDP per capita	0.228***		
	(0.0326)		
Age	0.00428***	0.00433***	0.00375***
	(0.0009)	(0.00105)	(0.000601)
Female	0.0891***	0.0875***	0.113***
	(0.0208)	(0.0221)	(0.0145)
Own low education	0.0562*	0.0738**	0.0100
	(0.0301)	(0.0347)	(0.0128)
Own high education	-0.0707***	-0.0737***	-0.148***
	(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.0144)
Missing dummy	-0.0649	-0.0743	-0.0976***
	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.0342)
Partner low education	-0.0174	-0.00654	0.00834
	(0.0279)	(0.0299)	(0.0112)
Partner high education	-0.0695***	-0.0683***	-0.108***
	(0.0180)	(0.0173)	(0.0149)
Missing dummy	-0.0226	-0.0201	-0.0404***
	(0.0254)	(0.0253)	(0.0114)
Divorced or separated	0.0187	0.0194	0.0590***
	(0.0537)	(0.0523)	(0.0113)
Widowed	0.00385	0.00371	-0.0132
	(0.0380)	(0.0377)	(0.0170)
Never married	0.0846**	0.0897***	0.0255**
	(0.0318)	(0.0308)	(0.0109)
Marital status - missing	0.0168	0.0174	-0.0429*
	(0.0368)	(0.0379)	(0.0242)
Feeling about household's income (coping is a reference category)			
Living comfortably on present income	-0.205***	-0.212***	-0.202***
	(0.0283)	(0.0298)	(0.0151)
Difficult on present income	0.131***	0.134***	0.128***

	(0.0156)	(0.0168)	(0.0196)
Very difficult on present income	0.232***	0.232***	0.235***
	(0.0390)	(0.0387)	(0.0312)
Feeling about household's income - missing	0.0267	0.0315	-0.0636**
	(0.0871)	(0.0848)	(0.0260)
Primary income source (wages is a reference category):			
Self-employed	-0.180***	-0.178***	-0.162***
	(0.0425)	(0.0440)	(0.0252)
Pension	0.0626**	0.0626**	0.000217
	(0.0271)	(0.0264)	(0.0138)
Unemployment benefits	-0.0128	-0.0164	0.0189
	(0.0551)	(0.0546)	(0.0291)
Social benefits	0.0868**	0.0773*	0.0518
	(0.0413)	(0.0421)	(0.0330)
Investment	-0.322***	-0.309**	-0.343***
	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.0527)
Other	-0.161**	-0.153**	-0.114***
	(0.0619)	(0.0648)	(0.0243)
Primary income source - missing	-0.0926*	-0.0908*	-0.0499**
	(0.0498)	(0.0481)	(0.0195)
Log household size	0.0568*	0.0536*	0.0134
	(0.0283)	(0.0287)	(0.00844)
Paid work last week	0.0236	0.0285	0.00296
	(0.0195)	(0.0198)	(0.00743)
Paid work - missing	-0.0680	-0.0537	-0.116***
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.0368)
Has a child in the household	-0.0533	-0.0495	-0.0221**
	(0.0361)	(0.0369)	(0.00965)
Has a child in the household - missing	-0.00517	-0.0147	-0.0648*
	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.0336)
Ever unemployed for more than 12 months	0.0786**	0.0757**	0.118***
	(0.0325)	(0.0315)	(0.0186)
Ever unemployed - missing	-0.0191	-0.0247	0.0161
	(0.0632)	(0.0599)	(0.0164)
Lives in metropolitan area	-0.0176	-0.0128	-0.0429***
	(0.0215)	(0.0224)	(0.0139)
Lives in metropolitan area - missing	0.0975	0.109	0.0362
	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.0496)
ESS round dummies (ESS'01 is a reference category)			
Residence country dummies (31, Germany –reference category)			
Constant	-0.312	3.365***	3.490***
	(-0.622)	(0.0844)	(0.0314)
Observations	12914	12914	249971
R-squared	0.112	0.107	0.137

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Stage 2

Replication LS model on subsamples of both European and non-European immigrants

Wording of the questions

- **Redistribution preferences** is a key measure used by Luttmer and Singhal and as well in my previous analysis: ““Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” (ESS’1-ESS’06, 5 point reversed scale).
- **Government responsibility** is measured by agreement with statement “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (**WVS’2-WVS’6**, 10 point reversed scale, where 1 means “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”). I have calculated weighted country means for natives using design weights to correct for possible misbalance in the design of the sample (under or over representation of different social groups).
- **Reduce differences between rich and poor** is measured by the question “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor” (**ISSP**, four point reversed scale: 1=definitely should not be, 4= definitely should be).
- **Reduce income differences**. The wording is “What is your opinion of the following statement: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes ”. (**ISSP**, five point reversed scale: 1= “Agree strongly”, 5= “Disagree strongly”).

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Correlation between average demands for redistribution in birth country calculated for immigrants from ESS countries and other measures of redistribution preferences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1). A mean redistribution preferences by birth country (ESS 1-6, weighted)	1			
(2). A mean demand for government responsibility by birth country (WVS 2-6, weighted)	0,60	1		
(3). Government should reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP, QoG)	0,84*	0,55	0,42	1
(4). Government should reduce income differences (ISSP, QoG)	0,8*	0,58	0,45	0,84*

Immigrant preferences for redistribution by preferences in country of birth measured by ISSP proxies (“Reduce difference between rich and poor”)



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Immigrant preferences for redistribution by preferences in country of birth measured by ISSP proxies (“Reduce income differences”)



Immigrant preferences for redistribution by preferences in country of birth measured by "government responsibility" (WVS)



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Predictors of preference for redistribution for ESS country migrants and other migrants. Baseline model with fewer controls (Source: ESS 2002-2013, cumulative data set)

VARIABLES	(1) ESS RP	(2) ISSP reduce differences between rich and poor	(3) ISSP reduce income differences	(4) WVS government responsibility
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0,357***			
	(0,0613)			
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)		0,213***		
		(0,0714)		
Reduce income differences (ISSP)			0,185***	
			(0,0651)	
Government responsibility (WVS)				0,00205
				(0,0245)
Birth country log GDP per	0,228***	0,0065	0,00682	-0,00187
	(0,0326)	(0,004)	(0,00508)	(0,00302)
Age	0,00428***	0,004***	0,00422***	0,00343***
	(0,000952)	(0,001)	(0,000933)	(0,000746)
Female	0,0891***	0,0767***	0,0740***	0,0728***
	(0,0208)	(0,0212)	(0,0217)	(0,0163)
Own low education	0,0562*	0,0702**	0,0711*	0,0348
	(0,0301)	(0,033)	(0,0355)	(0,0221)
.....				
ESS round dummies (ESS'01 is a reference category)				
Residence country dummies (31, Germany is a reference category)				
Constant	-0,312	2,646***	2,587***	3,430***
	(0,502)	(0,249)	(0,244)	(0,176)
Observations	12914	12075	11509	20220
R-squared	0,112	0,123	0,123	0,108

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Robustness check
(Source: ESS 2002-2013, cumulative data set)

	Coefficient on birth country redistribution preferences	S.E.	R2	N
1. Country dummies as only controls				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.247***	(0.0738)	0.069	12924
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.356***	(0.0990)	0.083	12083
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.322***	(0.0791)	0.083	11517
Government responsibility (WVS)	0.036	(0.0270)	0.077	20237
2. Baseline, but fewer controls				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.357***	(0.0613)	0.112	12914
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.213***	(0.0714)	0.123	12075
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.185***	(0.0651)	0.123	11509
Government responsibility (WVS)	0.00205	(0.0245)	0.108	20220

3. Baseline				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.344***	(0.0612)	0.115	12914
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.235***	(0.0694)	0.128	12075
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.205***	(0.0622)	0.128	11509
Government responsibility (WVS)	0.00581	(0.0239)	0.113	20220
3.1. Other two measures of linguistic minority: cut-off = 10%				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.392***	(0.0681)	0.104	12914
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.297***	(0.0745)	0.116	12075
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.259***	(0.0678)	0.116	11509
Government responsibility (WVS)	0.0150	(0.0246)	0.103	20220
3.2. Other two measures of linguistic minority: cut-off = 50%				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.393***	(0.0692)	0.104	12869
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.290***	(0.0729)	0.116	12032
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.253***	(0.0674)	0.116	11471
Government responsibility (WVS)	0.0116	(0.0242)	0.104	20120
4. Baseline, but more controls				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.340***	(0.0596)	0.116	12914
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.236***	(0.0681)	0.129	12075
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.209***	(0.0611)	0.129	11509
Government responsibility (WVS)	0.00608	(0.0239)	0.114	20220
5. Comprehensive controls				
Birth country redistribution preferences (ESS)	0.288***	(0.0662)	0.138	12024
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0.215***	(0.0656)	0.152	11313
Reduce income differences (ISSP)	0.167***	(0.0603)	0.152	10783
Government responsibility (WVS)	-0.00488	(0.0195)	0.133	18471

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Stage 3

Control for self-selection into migration by means of human values

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Effect of birth country culture on immigrants' preferences for redistribution in residence country. Controls for self-selection into migration by means of individual values

	RP (ESS)	R2	N	RDPR (ISSP)	R2	N
1. Country dummies as only controls	0.247***(0.074)	0.07	12924	0.356***(0.099)	0.08	12083
RP	0.180**(0.07)			0.303***(0.097)		
+ Openness to change	-0.155***(0.023)	0.08	12229	-0.139***(0.023)	0.09	11450
RP	0.176**(0.069)			0.297***(0.098)		
+ Conservation	0.154***(0.023)	0.08	12235	0.134***(0.024)	0.09	11454
RP	0.235***(0.069)			0.345***(0.097)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.141***(0.020)	0.08	12229	-0.128***(0.020)	0.09	11449
RP	0.243***(0.07)			0.356***(0.096)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.194***(0.018)	0.08	12233	0.173***(0.019)	0.09	11454
RP	0.231***(0.077)			0.353***(0.105)		
+Self-Expression	-0.028*(0.016)	0.07	12179	-0.024(0.017)	0.08	11446
2. Baseline, but fewer controls	0.357***(0.061)	0.11	12914	0.213***(0.071)	0.12	12075
RP	0.314***(0.0599)			0.171**(0.071)		
+ Openness to change	-0.096***(0.0248)	0.12	12222	-0.079***(0.024)	0.13	11443
RP	0.311***(0.06)			0.170**(0.071)		
+ Conservation	0.077***(0.024)	0.11	12228	0.058**(0.025)	0.13	11447
RP	0.321***(0.063)			0.192***(0.069)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.096***(0.02)	0.12	12222	-0.093***(0.019)	0.13	11442
RP	0.327***(0.064)			0.207***(0.067)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.163***(0.017)	0.12	12226	0.152***(0.017)	0.13	11447
RP	0.362***(0.063)			0.235***(0.075)		
+Self-Expression	0.017(0.02)	0.12	12169	0.029(0.022)	0.12	11438
3. Baseline	0.344***(0.061)	0.12	12914	0.235***(0.069)	0.13	12075
RP	0.307***(0.062)			0.200***(0.071)		
+ Openness to change	-0.101***(0.024)	0.12	12222	-0.086***(0.024)	0.13	11443
RP	0.305***(0.062)			0.199***(0.072)		
+ Conservation	0.077***(0.025)	0.12	12228	0.061**(0.025)	0.13	11447
RP	0.309***(0.064)			0.213***(0.071)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.092***(0.019)	0.12	12222	-0.087***(0.019)	0.13	11442
RP	0.313***(0.065)			0.224***(0.07)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.163***(0.016)	0.12	12226	0.149***(0.017)	0.14	11447
RP	0.347***(0.063)			0.253***(0.072)		
+Self-Expression	0.0148(0.02)	0.12	12169	0.0258(0.022)	0.13	11438

3.1. other two measures of linguistic minority: cut-off = 10%	0.392***(0.068)	0.10	12914	0.297***(0.075)	0.12	12075
RP	0.351***(0.069)			0.257***(0.076)		
+ Openness to change	-0.114***(0.025)	0.11	12222	-0.10***(0.025)	0.12	11443
RP	0.350***(0.069)			0.256***(0.0768)		
+ Conservation	0.09***(0.027)	0.11	12228	0.074**(0.028)	0.12	11447
RP	0.356***(0.072)			0.273***(0.076)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.095***(0.019)	0.11	12222	-0.09***(0.019)	0.12	11442
RP	0.361***(0.072)			0.286***(0.075)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.168***(0.017)	0.11	12226	0.154***(0.017)	0.12	11447
RP	0.391***(0.069)			0.309***(0.077)		
+Self-Expression	-0.004(0.02)	0.11	12169	0.005(0.022)	0.12	11438
3.2. other two measures of linguistic minority: cut-off = 50%	0.392***(0.068)	0.10	12914	0.292***(0.075)	0.12	12075
RP	0.353***(0.07)			0.252***(0.077)		
+ Openness to change	-0.113***(0.025	0.11	12222	-0.099***(0.025)	0.12	11443
RP	0.351***(0.07)			0.252***(0.077)		
+ Conservation	0.0893***(0.027)	0.11	12228	0.073**(0.028)	0.12	11447
RP	0.356***(0.072)			0.268***(0.077)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.095***(0.019)	0.11	12222	-0.09***(0.019)	0.12	11442
RP	0.360***(0.073)			0.281***(0.076)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.168***(0.016)	0.11	12226	0.154***(0.017)	0.12	11447
RP	0.392***(0.069)			0.303***(0.078)		
+Self-Expression	-0.004(0.02)	0.11	12169	0.006(0.02)	0.12	11438
4. Baseline, but more controls	0.340***(0.06)	0.12	12914	0.236***(0.068)	0.13	12075
RP	0.303***(0.061)			0.201***(0.07)		
+ Openness to change	-0.100***(0.025)	0.12	12222	-0.085***(0.024)	0.13	11443
RP	0.301***(0.061)			0.200***(0.070)		
+ Conservation	0.077***(0.025)	0.12	12228	0.061**(0.025)	0.13	11447
RP	0.305***(0.063)			0.213***(0.07)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.093***(0.019)	0.12	12222	-0.087***(0.019)	0.134	11442
RP	0.310***(0.064)			0.225***(0.069)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.162***(0.016)	0.12	12226	0.148***(0.017)	0.14	11447
RP	0.342***(0.061)			0.254***(0.071)		
+Self-Expression	0.016(0.02)	0.12	12169	0.028(0.02)	0.13	11438
5. Comprehensive controls	0.148**(0.061)	0.11	12031	0.247***(0.064)	0.13	11319
RP	**0.111 (0.066)**			**0.213***(0.063)**		
+ Openness to change	**-0.085***(0.029)**	0.12	11417	-0.073**(0.03)	0.13	10746
RP	0.113*(0.065)			0.214***(0.063)		
+ Conservation	0.069**(0.029)	0.11	11422	0.053*(0.03)	0.13	10749
RP	0.137**(0.062)			0.237***(0.062)		
+ Self-Enhancement	-0.107***(0.017)	0.12	11418	-0.095***(0.018)	0.13	10746
RP	0.145**(0.063)			0.244***(0.058)		
+ Self-Transcendence	0.175***(0.015)	0.12	11422	0.159***(0.017)	0.14	10751
RP	0.146**(0.064)			0.266***(0.068)		

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Stage 4

Approaching the question: “What is “culture”?”

Correlation between two measures of redistribution preferences and different measures of values on country level

	RP (ESS)	RDRP (ISSP)
Redistribution preferences (ESS)	1	
Reduce differences between rich and poor (ISSP)	0,86*	1,00
Conservation (ESS)	0,61*	0,53*
Openness to change (ESS)	-0,61*	-0,57*
Self-Enhancement (ESS)	0,47*	0,40*
Self-Transcendence (ESS)	-0,54*	-0,41*
Self-Expression (ESS)	-0,75*	-0,61*
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0,62*	-0,42*
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0,52*	-0,58*
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	-0,58*	-0,49*
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	-0,55*	-0,38*

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Effect of birth country culture on immigrants' preferences for redistribution in residence country. Controls for averaged Schwartz's values in the country of birth

VARIABLES	1 Immigrants	2 Conservation	3 Openness to change	4 Self-enhancement	5 Self-transcend.	6 Self-expression
Birth country redistribution preferences	0.357***	0.331***	0.340***	0.359***	0.374***	0.434***
	(5.814)	(0.0648)	(0.0620)	(0.0634)	(0.0670)	(0.0685)
Conservation		0.162				
		(0.109)				
Openness to change			-0.146			
			(0.0876)			
Self-Enhancement				-0.0391		
				(0.0661)		
Self-Transcendence					0.131	
					(0.0987)	
Self-Expression						0.0994***
						(0.0340)
Birth country log GDP per capita	0.228***	0.256***	0.266***	0.216***	0.204***	0.143***
	(6.981)	(0.0385)	(0.0371)	(0.0348)	(0.0342)	(0.0455)
Age	0.00428***	0.00425***	0.00426***	0.00426***	0.00426***	0.00418***
	(4.496)	(0.000956)	(0.000950)	(0.000959)	(0.000957)	(0.000970)
Female	0.0891***	0.0899***	0.0900***	0.0888***	0.0885***	0.0878***
	(4.282)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0207)	(0.0208)	(0.0208)
Own low education	-0.0174	-0.0175	-0.0178	-0.0165	-0.0156	-0.0146
	(-0.624)	(0.0278)	(0.0278)	(0.0277)	(0.0275)	(0.0276)
Own high education	-0.0695***	-0.0689***	-0.0684***	-0.0701***	-0.0705***	-0.0722***

Effect of culture in a country of birth and values on immigrants' preferences for redistribution in residence country. Inglehart and Welzel's set of values

	RP (ESS)	R2	N	RDPR (ISSP)	R2	N
1. Country dummies as only controls	0.247***(0.074)	0.07	12924	0.356***(0.099)	0.08	12083
RP	0.494***(0.086)			0.420***(0.135)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.154***(0.029)	0.07	12924	0.091(0.0677)	0.07	10898
RP	0.264***(0.059)			0.315***(0.0968)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.068**(0.028)	0.07	11508	-0.009(0.0308)	0.09	11097
RP	0.290***(0.075)			0.433***(0.105)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	0.230(0.295)	0.07	12924	0.362(0.320)	0.08	12083
RP	0.386***(0.073)			0.451***(0.0994)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.772***(0.229)	0.07	12924	0.614**(0.297)	0.08	12083
RP	0.380***(0.0812)			0.411***(0.114)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.720***(0.185)	0.07	12924	0.483*(0.246)	0.08	12083
2. Baseline, but fewer controls	0.357***(0.061)	0.11	12914	0.213***(0.071)	0.12	12075
RP	0.434***(0.069)			0.372***(0.102)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.0994***(0.034)	0.11	12914	0.0724(0.112)	0.12	10890
RP	0.376***(0.049)			0.220**(0.087)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.014(0.025)	0.12	11499	-0.031(0.029)	0.13	11090
RP	0.348***(0.067)			0.292***(0.077)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0.065(0.237)	0.11	12914	0.357(0.312)	0.12	12075
RP	0.389***(0.068)			0.348***(0.08)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.454*(0.227)	0.11	12914	0.800***(0.280)	0.12	12075
RP	0.385***(0.073)			0.279***(0.098)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.352*(0.185)	0.11	12914	0.485*(0.266)	0.12	12075
3. Baseline	0.344***(0.061)	0.12	12914	0.235***(0.069)	0.13	12075
RP	0.420***(0.063)			0.352***(0.097)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.101***(0.031)	0.12	12914	0.063(0.099)	0.12	10890
RP	0.367***(0.049)			0.252***(0.092)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.006(0.023)	0.12	11499	-0.023(0.026)	0.13	11090

RP	0.334***(0.067)				0.309***(0.076)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0.073(0.219)	0.12	12914		0.344(0.286)	0.13	12075
RP	0.374***(0.066)				0.347***(0.082)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.461*(0.228)	0.12	12914		0.693***(0.251)	0.13	12075
RP	0.366***(0.0706)				0.286***(0.094)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.279(0.184)	0.12	12914		0.385(0.247)	0.13	12075
3.1. other two measures of linguistic minority: cut-off = 10%	0.392***(0.0681)	0.10	12914		0.297***(0.0745)	0.12	12075
RP	0.458***(0.068)				0.405***(0.105)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.089***(0.03)	0.10	12914		0.0327(0.102)	0.11	10890
RP	0.405***(0.055)				0.295***(0.098)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.0036(0.023)	0.11	11499		-0.0180(0.028)	0.12	11090
RP	0.373***(0.073)				0.351***(0.084)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0.142(0.228)	0.10	12914		0.253(0.288)	0.12	12075
RP	0.417***(0.07)				0.395***(0.088)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.384(0.243)	0.10	12914		0.613**(0.255)	0.12	12075
RP	0.412***(0.0744)				0.340***(0.101)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.255(0.188)	0.10	12914		0.337(0.251)	0.12	12075
3.2. other two measures of linguistic minority: cut-off = 50%	0.392***(0.0684)	0.10	12914		0.292***(0.075)	0.12	12075
RP	0.460***(0.0683)				0.401***(0.105)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.09***(0.03)	0.10	12914		0.034(0.101)	0.11	10890
RP	0.406***(0.0558)				0.291***(0.100)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.005(0.023)	0.11	11499		-0.019(0.028)	0.12	11090
RP	0.374***(0.0733)				0.348***(0.082)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0.148(0.231)	0.10	12914		0.262(0.287)	0. 12	12075
RP	0.418***(0.0708)				0.392***(0.088)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.388(0.243)	0.10	12914		0.618**(0.255)	0. 12	12075
RP	0.413***(0.0751)				0.337***(0.101)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.257(0.188)	0.10	12914		0.341(0.251)	0. 12	12075

4. Baseline, but more controls	0.340***(0.0596)	0.12	12914	0.236***(0.068)	0.13	12075
RP	0.414***(0.062)			0.341***(0.094)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.099***(0.031)	0.12	12914	0.059(0.097)	0. 12	11499
RP	0.366***(0.049)			0.253***(0.092)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.007(0.022)	0. 12	12914	-0.022(0.027)	0.14	11090
RP	0.330***(0.066)			0.307***(0.078)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0.076(0.213)	0. 12	12914	0.333(0.283)	0.13	12075
RP	0.370***(0.065)			0.345***(0.081)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.453**(0.222)	0. 12	12914	0.676***(0.247)	0.13	12075
RP	0.362***(0.068)			0.285***(0.093)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.272(0.180)	0. 12	10890	0.377(0.241)	0.13	12075
5. Comprehensive controls	0.288***(0.066)	0.14	12024	0.215***(0.066)	0.15	11313
RP	0.369***(0.056)			0.328***(0.085)		
Self-Expression (ESS)	0.179***(0.053)	0. 14	12024	0.139(0.083)	0. 15	10202
RP	0.334***(0.067)			0.253**(0.100)		
Post-materialist index (WVS, QoG)	-0.0173(0.022)	0. 14	10706	-0.034(0.026)	0.16	10380
RP	0.273***(0.067)			0.262***(0.07)		
Autonomy Index (WVS, QoG)	-0.151(0.211)	0. 14	12024	0.251(0.300)	0. 15	11313
RP	0.303***(0.06)			0.328***(0.074)		
Emancipative values index (WVS, QoG)	0.730**(0.273)	0. 14	12024	0.795***(0.213)	0. 15	11313
RP	0.301***(0.069)			0.257***(0.088)		
Voice Index (WVS, QoG)	0.273(0.178)	0. 14	12024	0.369*(0.216)	0. 15	11313

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Conclusion

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Conclusion

- Relationship between individual preferences and average preferences in countries of birth are positive, strong and robust to rich controls of economic factors.
- Contrary to expectations, the effect of culture did not become stronger when non-European migrants were introduced into the sample, rather it decreased slightly to 0.21. However, it remained strong and significant.
- Again, the effect did not become stronger, but was still robust in terms of most of the specifications.
- However, the effect of culture vanished (became insignificant) when comprehensive controls were applied together with openness to change values.
- In the final stage of my research, I made an attempt to extract aggregated values from the "culture" in the country of birth. Nonetheless, the "culture" appeared to be robust to all the controls.

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Thank you!

Why people ask for redistribution?

- From Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981): individual's economic interest in redistribution
- Corneo (2001): “homo oeconomicus effect”
- Lipset (1963) discussed effect of believes, achievement and equality in particular, on political redistribution.
- M. Jæger (2013) analyzed macroeconomic predictors of the demand for redistribution : unemployment levels and total social expenditures positively correlate to the demand for redistribution while economic growth (measured in the change of GDP) as well as income inequality (GINI) – negatively.

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http://lcsr.hse.ru/en/summer2015

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