Institutional factors for the radical parties rise. Evidence from EU parliamentary elections

(Progress report)

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Outline

- Main Argument

- Problem and Research Question

- Literature Overview (Discussion) and Topicality

- Theoretical Framework

- Variables Description

- Future steps

Assumptions and main argument

1. Party system institutionalization = stable inter-party electoral distance over time

2. Party institutionalization = a complex thing BUT we can measure it by measuring the stability of electoral support over time

3. Instant rise in support for the radical parties = more than 15% rise of the previous support (to be defined more precisely)

An institutionalized party

Elections t   **Elections t+1**   **Elections t+2**

Almost the same electoral result

An non-institutionalized **party**

Elections t   **Elections t+1**   **Elections t+2**

Volatile (highly changeable) electoral support

Example I. Institutionalized party **system**

Election t

Election t+1

Almost the same:
1) results of the most effective parties (Laakso&Taagepera)
2) inter-party electoral distance

Example II. Non- institutionalized party **system**

Election t
Election t+1

Argument: Voting stability = Institutionalization. Why?

«Technically»

- 1) indicates stable voting preferences
- 2) decreases the share of floating voters, which destabilize inter-parties distance
- 3) constrains the system so that newcomers work hard to enter

«Conceptually»: Why people support the same parties?

- 1) indicates stable voting preferences
- 2) people are satisfied with representation and vice versa parties perform well

Literature Overview and Theoretical Framework
How it fits the «institutionalization theory» 1.

Huntington: valuable, rooted in the society, adaptive to external challenges

...that means

| They are voted for by the group of people who find them valuable | Long time existence, long history of representation | Challenges arise – parties hold their voters (if not – they deinstitutionalize) |

How it fits the «institutionalization theory» 2.

- Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Randall and Sväsand 2002:

  - Electorally volatile political systems are less likely to produce sustainable political systems

By nature, radical parties built their rhetoric on criticism of the system

If the system performs poorly – the radical parties rise

Problem and Research Question

Does the stability or instability in a parties support determine:

i)   The overall stability of party systems

ii)   Parties' resistance to external challenges/threats

Common challenge: immigration

RQ: Does the level of party system institutionalization determine the possibility of high rise in voting for the radical parties?

Operationalization of the Dependent Variable

DP: "Sharp jump" in electoral support for the radical party (1 or 0)

To be defined:
1) Certain percentage of the previous average support (after 3 elections??)

Independent variables

DV: Sharp jump in electoral support for the radical party (1 or 0)

IV Main: level of party system institutionalization

IV: Electoral formula

IV: PNS

IV: ENCP

IV: ESOP

IV: Index Tightness

IV: Assembly size

IV: The effect of district magnitude

IV: The effect of parties' magnitude

Controls: socio-economic controls, ethnicity, the rise in share of immigrants etc.

Level of party system institutionalization

The Pedersen index is a measure of electoral volatility in party systems

The net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers

$$\text{Pedersen index} = \frac{1}{2} * \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| \Delta p_{i,t} \right| \right\}$$

Electoral formula.
(1- majority rule; 2 - proportional representation; 3 – mixed)

A well-known Duverger's law
1) strategy of parties toward coalition building before the voting
2) level of quality of democracy
3) determine seats allocation in the parliament
4) winner-take-all systems provide winners with more incentives to misconduct their pre-electoral duties
5) proportional representation provides scope for more frequent government turnover by the opposition

Party Nationalization Score (PNS)

- indicates the level of electoral heterogeneity of a territory

- the idea of capturing variance across states, provinces, departments, etc. in parties' electoral performance

$\boldsymbol{PNS = 1 -}$ **Gini coefficient** (measuring a system level score)

$$G = \frac{2\sum_{i=1}^{n} iY_i}{n\sum_{i=1}^{n} Y_i} - \frac{n+1}{n}$$

Effective Number of Competing Parties (ENCP)

- Laakso and Taagepera (1979) index measures the number of effective parties within a party system

- Effective = high electoral results and big advantage over other parties = influential

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2}$$ (Laakso and Taagepera Index)

$$NP = 1 + N \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^{n} P^2_{i}) - P_1^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2}$$ (Molinar's Index) – for systems with dominant parties, will not be used

ESOP (Effective Strength of Opposition Parties)

- The index complements ENCP to measure the number of strong opposition parties within one party system and shows where opposition is stronger

- Proposes a measure of opposition parties' electoral potential

- Proposes a measure of contra-leading party voting

$$\textbf{ESOP} = \frac{\sum \textbf{v}_{\textbf{op}}^2}{\sum \textbf{v}_{\textbf{i}}^2}$$

Tightness

- maximum electoral intensity equals (50/50)

- the distribution of votes between the ruling party and the opposition parties – that is maximum 50% for each.

- the closer the opposition parties and the leading party to 50% result the higher the tightness.

$$\boldsymbol{Index\ tightness = v_{inc} - 50\%}$$

Assembly size + The effect of district magnitude + The effect of parties' magnitude

AS determines how electoral scores transform into real power

AS is measured by the share of party members in the state parliament

DM determines the number of seats allocated by the district in a parliament and logically limits the number of contesters

DM has a crucial importance for the quality of voters' representation in the parliament in the PR systems

The best representation is provided in the larger district.

PM: the larger the district and the lesser the number of competitors, the higher a party's magnitude

Ethnicity factors

- Parties representing conflicting groups are unlikely to merge in pre-electoral blocks and coalitions and will not consider cooperation as a strategically profitable step

- Interaction between social heterogeneity and electoral structure

Hypotheses (1)

1. Higher institutionalized party systems are more resistant to instant rise in the radical parties support

2. PR systems will positively influence the radical parties to gain sudden high electoral support

3. The higher index of party system nationalization in a state, the lesser the possibility of radical parties gain high electoral support

4. The higher the number of the effective parties in a party system, the higher the probability of the radical parties to gain high electoral results

5. The higher the ESOP index (the higher the tension between rivalries) the higher the probability for a radical party to see instant rise in its support

Hypotheses (2)

6. There is no causal relationship between the tightness of the competition and rise in the radical party electoral support

7. The larger the assembly, the higher the chances of the radical parties to gain high electoral results

8. The larger the district the higher the chances for the radicals to increase the electoral support

9. Parties' magnitude negatively related to the probability of instant high support for the radicals

10. There will be no effect of ethnicity factors to the radical parties' high support, since the institutional design will have a greater impact on the probability of the radicals to increase their support

Methods and data

Logistic regression

Electoral data. Source: European Election Database (35 countries • 25 years • More than 400 elections and referendums) http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ The database publishes regional election results according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), level 1 to 3.

Future steps

- Collecting electoral data

- Calculating indexes

- Performing logistic regression model analysis

- Estimating the results

- Correcting the model

Thank you for Your Attention!

Questions and comments ?

This report was presented at the training methodological workshop
"Economic and Social Changes: values effects across Eurasia".

March 31 - April 6, 2015 – Turkey.

http://lcsr.hse.ru/en/seminar_m2015

Настоящий доклад был представлен на методологическом учебном семинаре
«Экономические и социальные изменения: оценка эффектов по всей Евразии».

31 марта – 6 апреля 2015 года – Турция.

http://lcsr.hse.ru/seminar_m2015