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## Petty Corruption In Russia: Non-Specialized Surveys Evidences

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4th LCSR International Conference "Cultural and Economic Changes in Cross-National Perspective" November 10–14, 2014 Saint Petersburg, Russia

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1 Introduction

2 Data





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1 Introduction

2 Data

3 Empirical results



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Motivation				

- Road police in Russia...
- Is it possible to struggle against the grand corruption when petty corruption is a norm of daily behaviour?

trust concerned...

• What do you think about unknown city when the first person that you meet cheat you? (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005)

Introduction O●	Data o	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
Questions				

- Where petty corruptions is most frequent?
- Do perceptions depend on personal experience?
- What do we expect?

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1 Introduction









- Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE)
  - 2001, 2006

Robustness check...

- World Values Survey (WVS)
- Life in Transition Survey (LITS)
- Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> some questions about corruption

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1 Introduction









Tell me, please, based on your experience, do people now have to give bribes to officials and law-enforcement officers? (1 - Yes, 0 - No)





Tell me, please, based on your experience, do people now have to give bribes to officials and law-enforcement officers?





Do you agree or disagree that it is not necessary to obey a law if you consider it to be unfair?

(1 — Agree completely, ..., 5 — Disagree completely)





## WVS (95% confidence interval is gray)

## Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe

(1 — Always justifiable, ..., 10 — Never justifiable)





#### Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)

The court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted (1 — Strongly disagree, ..., 4 — Strongly agree)



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RLMS-HSE, 200	)6			

... how often have you personally had to pay in cash or gifts immediately to the staff of these organizations, but not officially in the cashier or bank?

(0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)



Introduc 00	tion Data o	Emp 000	irical results	00000000	Conclusi	on	Reference
Spiri	man's coefficients of ra	ang corr	elation,	RLMS-	HSE 20	06	
	To what extent do you	trust	(1 — Coi	mpletely t	rust, …,	5 — Not ı	referred)
	Bribes Distrust	(1)	Court	Hous. registr.	Police	Suppl. of mu- nicip.se	Road police rv.
	Government of Rus- sian Federation	0.084**	*0.118**	0.056	0.115**	0.042*	0.198***
	State Duma	0.066**	0.129**	0.002	0.116***	*0.052**	0.186***
	Courts	0.054*	0.269***	*0.070**	0.146***	*0.082***	0.176***
	Army	0.056**	0.179***	°0.061*	-0.010	0.020	0.121***
	Police	0.048*	0.186***	0.011	0.164**	*0.047**	0.205***
	Russian banks	0.033	0.170***	0.026	0.103**	0.028	0.037
	Foreign banks	0.068**	0.171***	<sup>•</sup> 0.016	0.093*	0.037	-0.003
	Insurance compa- nies	0.073**	0.050	0.041	0.063	0.009	0.054
	Small and middle private business	-0.002	-0.022	-0.014	-0.040	-0.040*	-0.031
	Political parties	0.068**	0.036	0.017	0.067	-0.030	0.148***

(1) — Passport and passport and visa services, registry offices



Tell me, please, based on your experience, do people now have to give bribes to officials and law-enforcement officers?

y = 1 if Yes, 0 — No

$$\Pr(y_i = 1 | x'_i, \beta) = L(x'_i\beta) \equiv \frac{\exp(x'_i\beta)}{1 + \exp(x'_i\beta)},$$
(1)

 $x_i$  is vector of explanatory & control variables  $\beta$  — vector of parameters

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	Reference
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## Binary logit (RLMS-HSE 2001) (continued)

## Dependent variable: Bribes to officials and law-enforcement officers (1 — Yes, 0 — No)

Age	0.039**
	(0.016)
$Age^{2}/100$	-0.054***
	(0.018)
$\ln(1 + \text{Income})$	0.038***
	(0.014)
Secondary school	0.113
	(0.217)
Initial vocational	0.280
education	(0.171)
Secondary vocational	0.356**
education	(0.173)
Higher education	0.654***
	(0.183)
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	0.626
	(0.404)
Female	-0.021
	(0.087)
City	0.476***
-	(0.098)

(continued)	
North &	0.373*
North–West	(0.195)
Central &	0.492***
Central Black Soil	(0.147)
Volga–Vyatka &	0.772***
Volga basin	(0.158)
North Caucasus	0.254
	(0.157)
Ural	0.437***
	(0.160)
West Siberia	0.253
	(0.175)
Eastern Siberia &	0.567***
Far East	(0.178)
Constant	0.289
	(0.343)
Observations	6655
Pseudo $R^2$	0.026
Log Likelihood	-2107
$\chi^2$	115

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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## Binary logit (RLMS-HSE 2001) (continued)

Dependent variable: Bribes to officials and law-enforcement officers (1 - Yes, 0 - No)

Sign	ificant
------	---------

Age	0.039**
$Age^{2}/100$	-0.054***
$\ln(1 + \text{Income})$	0.038***
Secondary vocational education	0.356**
Higher education	0.654***
City	0.476***
North & North–West	0.373*
Central & Central Black Soil	0.492***
Volga–Vyatka & Volga basin	0.772***
Ural	0.437***
Eastern Siberia &	0.567***

\*-10%, \*\*-5%, \*\*\*-1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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Ordered logit (RL	MS-HSE 2006	6)		

... how often have you personally had to pay in cash or gifts immediately to the staff of these organizations, but not officially in the cashier or bank?

Suppliers of Municipal Services, Housing Registration, Passport & Passport and Visa Services & Registry Offices, Police, Court, Road Police

y = 0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time

$$Pr(y_{i} = 0 | x'_{i}, \beta) = L(\gamma_{1} - x'_{i}\beta),$$
  

$$Pr(y_{i} = 1 | x'_{i}, \beta) = L(\gamma_{2} - x'_{i}\beta) - L(\gamma_{1} - x'_{i}\beta),$$
  

$$Pr(y_{i} = 2 | x'_{i}, \beta) = 1 - L(\gamma_{2} - x'_{i}\beta),$$
(2)

 $x_i$  is vector of explanatory & control variables  $\beta$  — vector of parameters  $\gamma_1, \gamma_2$  are parameters

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	Reference
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## Dependent variable: Bribes to Passport & Passport and Visa Services & Registry Offices (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

		(continued)	
Age	0.010	(continued)	
0	(0.030)	Central &	0.267
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.019	Central Black Soil	(0.250)
<b>o</b> ,	(0.036)	Volga–Vyatka &	0.596**
ln(1 + Income)	0.037	Volga basin	(0.242)
	(0.025)	North Caucasus	1.633***
Secondary school	0.763**		(0.254)
	(0.385)	Ural	-0.204
Initial vocational	-0.028		(0.277)
education	(0.354)	West Siberia	-0.272
Secondary vocational	0.310		(0.321)
education	(0.351)	Eastern Siberia &	0.829***
Higher education	0.481	Far East	(0.248)
	(0.352)		
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	0.921*	$\gamma_1$	2.203***
	(0.501)		(0.605)
Female	-0.035	$\gamma_2$	3.674***
	(0.143)		(0.613)
City	-0.004	Observations	1279
	(0.167)	Desude D <sup>2</sup>	0.054
North &	0.722**		0.054
North–West	(0.332)	2 Log Likelinood	-881
		$\chi^2$	101
		Standard err	ors in parentheses

\* — 10%, \*\* — 5%, \*\*\* — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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Dependent variable: Bribes to Passport & Passport and Visa Services & Registry Offices

(0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

## Significant

Secondary school	0.763**
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	0.921*
North &	0.722**
Volga–Vyatka & Volga basin	0.596**
North Caucasus	1.633***
Eastern Siberia & Far East	0.829***

\* — 10%, \*\* — 5%, \*\*\* — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	Refer
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## Dependent variable: Bribes to Courts (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Age	0.055
	(0.064)
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.066
	(0.073)
ln(1 + Income)	0.031
	(0.054)
Secondary school	-0.187
	(0.854)
Initial vocational	-0.473
education	(0.625)
Secondary vocational	-0.842
education	(0.645)
Higher education	-0.711
0	(0.638)
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	-0.502
	(1.105)
Female	-0.029
	(0.263)
City	0.846***
-	(0.303)
North &	0.350
North-West	(0.819)
	, /

(continued)	
Central &	0.787
Central Black Soil	(0.560)
Volga–Vyatka &	0.720
Volga basin	(0.555)
North Caucasus	2.065***
	(0.546)
Ural	-0.913
	(0.703)
West Siberia	0.123
	(0.629)
Eastern Siberia &	0.980*
Far East	(0.564)
$\gamma_1$	2.966**
	(1.428)
$\gamma_2$	4.446***
	(1.442)
Observations	353
Pseudo $R^2$	0.093
Log Likelihood	-247
$\chi^{\tilde{2}}$	51
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Standard errors	in parentneses
* — 10%, ** — 9	5%, *** — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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## Dependent variable: Bribes to Courts (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Significant

City	0.846***
North Caucasus	2.065***
Eastern Siberia & Far East	0.980*

\* — 10%, \*\* — 5%, \*\*\* — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	Refei
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# Dependent variable: Bribes to Housing Registration (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Age	0.068*
	(0.040)
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.085*
	(0.045)
ln(1 + Income)	-0.016
	(0.033)
Secondary school	0.210
	(0.668)
Initial vocational	0.542
education	(0.541)
Secondary vocational	0.178
education	(0.539)
Higher education	0.596
	(0.533)
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	1.464**
	(0.664)
Female	-0.028
	(0.167)
City	-0.008
	(0.196)
North &	0.338
North-West	(0.488)

(continued)	
Central &	0.919***
Central Black Soil	(0.327)
Volga–Vyatka &	0.994***
Volga basin	(0.325)
North Caucasus	1.594***
	(0.340)
Ural	0.312
	(0.342)
West Siberia	0.578
	(0.396)
Eastern Siberia &	1.454***
Far East	(0.361)
$\gamma_1$	3.136***
	(0.965)
$\gamma_2$	4.452***
	(0.972)
Observations	808
Pseudo $R^2$	0.046
Log Likelihood	-632
$\gamma^2$	61
Standard errors	in parentheses
* — 10%. ** — 5	5%. *** — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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Dependent variable: Bribes to Housing Registration (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Significant

Age	0.068*
$Age^{2}/100$	-0.085*
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	1.464**
Central & Central Black Soil	0.919***
Volga–Vyatka & Volga basin	0.994***
North Caucasus	1.594***
Eastern Siberia & Far East	1.454***

\*-10%, \*\*-5%, \*\*\*-1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	Refere
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## Dependent variable: Bribes to Police (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Age	0.068
2	(0.052)
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.073
	(0.062)
ln(1 + Income)	-0.025
	(0.038)
Secondary school	0.526
-	(0.769)
Initial vocational	0.741
education	(0.578)
Secondary vocational	0.517
education	(0.602)
Higher education	0.311
0	(0.595)
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	0.326
	(0.801)
Female	-0.686***
	(0.219)
City	0.178
-	(0.272)
North &	0.895*
North-West	(0.520)
	. ,

(continued)	
Central &	0.249
Central Black Soil	(0.376)
Volga–Vyatka &	0.241
Volga basin	(0.372)
North Caucasus	1.261***
	(0.384)
Ural	-0.376
	(0.363)
West Siberia	-1.500**
	(0.589)
Eastern Siberia &	-0.253
Far East	(0.435)
$\gamma_1$	2.231**
	(1.058)
$\gamma_2$	4.292***
	(1.075)
Observations	450
Pseudo $R^2$	0.088
Log Likelihood	-340
$\chi^{\tilde{2}}$	66
Otomological announce	
Standard errors	in parentneses
^ — 10%, ** — 5	»%, ^^^ — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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## Dependent variable: Bribes to Police (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Significant

Female	-0.686***
North & North–West	0.895*
North Caucasus	1.261***
West Siberia	-1.500**

\* — 10%, \*\* — 5%, \*\*\* — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	Reference
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# Dependent variable: Bribes to Suppliers of Municipal Services (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Age	0.008
	(0.021)
$Age^{2}/100$	-0.014
	(0.023)
ln(1 + Income)	-0.005
	(0.021)
Secondary school	-0.131
	(0.324)
Initial vocational	-0.093
education	(0.255)
Secondary vocational	-0.086
education	(0.252)
Higher education	0.181
	(0.250)
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	0.120
	(0.367)
Female	-0.010
	(0.102)
City	0.191
	(0.137)
North &	-0.086
North-West	(0.225)

(continued)	
Central &	0.240
Central Black Soil	(0.149)
Volga–Vyatka &	-0.145
Volga basin	(0.162)
North Caucasus	0.654***
	(0.189)
Ural	-0.208
	(0.163)
West Siberia	-0.189
	(0.199)
Eastern Siberia &	0.107
Far East	(0.174)
$\gamma_1$	0.704
	(0.526)
$\gamma_2$	2.186***
	(0.529)
Observations	2016
Pseudo $R^2$	0.011
Log Likelihood	-1811
$\chi^2$	40
Standard errors * — 10%, ** — 5	in parentheses

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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Dependent variable: Bribes to Suppliers of Municipal Services (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Significant

North Caucasus 0.654\*\*\*

\* — 10%, \*\* — 5%, \*\*\* — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion
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## Dependent variable: Bribes to Road Police (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Age	0.064*
	(0.035)
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.083**
	(0.042)
ln(1 + Income)	0.019
	(0.029)
Secondary school	0.589
	(0.852)
Initial vocational	0.326
education	(0.785)
Secondary vocational	0.317
education	(0.789)
Higher education	0.641
	(0.782)
Ph.D.(kandidat nauk)	0.783
	(0.901)
Female	-0.168
	(0.177)
City	0.554***
	(0.168)
North &	-0.423
North-West	(0.351)

(continued)	
Central &	-0.276
Central Black Soil	(0.237)
Volga–Vyatka &	-0.199
Volga basin	(0.229)
North Caucasus	0.568**
	(0.247)
Ural	-0.628**
	(0.253)
West Siberia	-1.559***
	(0.329)
Eastern Siberia &	-0.342
Far East	(0.270)
$\gamma_1$	1.507
	(0.995)
$\gamma_2$	3.527***
	(1.001)
Observations	854
Pseudo $R^2$	0.047
Log Likelihood	-846
$\chi^2$	84
<u></u>	
Standard errors	in parentheses
* — 10%, ** — <u></u>	5%, *** — 1%.

Introduction	Data	Empirical results	Conclusion	References
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Dependent variable: Bribes to Road Police (0 — Never, 1 — Sometimes, 2 — Every time)

Significant

Age	0.064*
$Age^{2}/100$	-0.083**
City	0.554***
North Caucasus	0.568**
Ural	-0.628**
West Siberia	-1.559***
* — 10%. ** — 5%. ***	— 1%.



Do you think, in comparison to the past, bribes are given more often now, less often, or at the same rate?

(-1 — Less often, 0 — At the same rate, 2 — More often)





2006: There is less corruption now than around 1989 There is less corruption now than around 4 years ago 2010:



(1 — Strongly disagree, ..., 5 — Strongly agree)

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1 Introduction







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Conclusion				

- Corruption perceptions depend on personal experience
  - Level of education and town habitation increase confidence in necessity of bribes
  - Concave dependence of corruption expectations on age with statistically significant plateau in ages of 25–55 years
- Supply side...
  - Confidence in necessity to give bribes grows wuth personal income
- What we expect?
  - The most of 25–55 years old respondents say about necessity to give bribes to officials and workers of law enforcement bodies
  - Retrospective questions confirm that corruption in Russia did not decrease during the last decades

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## Thank you !

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Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner. All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. *World Politics*, 58(1):41–72, 10 2005. URL http://search.proquest.com/docview/274362727? accountid=45451. Copyright - Copyright Johns Hopkins University Press Oct 2005; Document feature - Graphs; Tables; Last updated - 2012-02-25; CODEN - WOPOBI.