




# THE PARADOX OF DISTANCE:

- Paradox: A statement that is contradictory but could also be true
- All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others
- You shouldn't go in the water until you know how to swim



# THE PARADOX OF DISTANCE AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT:


- We distrust government except we trust government
- Circumstances under which this is true:

government generally = negative  
programs and officials = positive



# CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM:

Figure 1. China and the "Paradox of Distance" in other Countries (%)




## OUR CONTRIBUTION:





- To consider the paradox of distance at the individual level
- To explain Chinese exceptionalism to the paradox of distance
- How? 2005-2008 Asia Barometer data







# HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST



# OTHER ASIAN SOCIETIES:



# OTHER ASIAN SOCIETIES






# TRUST IN NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Table 1. Trust in National/Local Government across Asian Countries (%)\*

	Only National	Only Local	Completely Distrust	Completely Trust
<b>Mainland China</b>	<b>34.72</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>4.86</b>	<b>60.05</b>
Japan	4.83	26.45	50.05	18.66
Hong Kong	6.99	10.77	12.73	69.51
South Korea	6.7	17.44	67.4	8.46
Mongolia	18.52	18.1	23.87	39.51
Philippin	9.11	27.32	32.01	31.56
Taiwan	8.47	25.2	35.84	30.49
Thailand	8.61	18.76	15.16	57.47
Indonesia	8.11	15.11	16.62	60.16
Singapore	11.08	3.66	5.69	79.57
Vietnam	7.27	0.77	1.11	90.85
Cambodia	10.44	14.93	12.01	62.63
Malaysia	9.7	9.16	16.17	64.96

\* Data from Asian Barometer Survey, 2005-2008.



**WHY TRUST NATIONAL MORE THAN LOCAL?**



# THREE EXPLANATIONS OF CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM



Surveillance

Culture

Performance

## SURVEILLANCE:

- Afraid to express themselves on surveys
- Also high media censorship
- Expectations: increase trust in national relative to local government

## CULTURE:

- Chinese tradition of respect for hierarchy and authority
- This may not work for critical citizens
- Expectations: increase trust in national relative to local government

## PERFORMANCE:

- Strong Chinese economy and rapid economic development
- Expectations: increase trust in national relative to local government

# DATA AND METHODS



*DV: Trust National Government More (TNGM)*

“1=trust national government>trust local government”

“0=trust national government<=trust local government”



# DATA AND METHODS

Surveillance: fear and media

“people are free to speak what they think without fear”

“how often do you follow news about politics and gvt?”

Culture: traditional and critical values

“the relationship between the government and the people should be like that between the head and the family”

“open quarrels among politicians are harmful to society”

Performance: economic and political

“how would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today”

“how would you describe the present political situation in our country”

**Table 3. Logistic Regression on Trust National Government More (TNGM) †**

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
	Pooled Sample	Pooled Sample	Pooled Sample	Pooled Sample	Pooled Sample	China	Other Countries
Intercept	-1.476*** (0.069)	-1.585*** (0.118)	-1.340*** (0.132)	-2.132*** (0.107)	-1.952*** (0.171)	-0.171 (0.438)	-1.899*** (0.192)
China	1.933*** (0.048)	1.927*** (0.049)	1.935*** (0.048)	1.711*** (0.055)	1.700*** -0.056	...	...
<i>Surveillance</i>							
Political Fear		-0.002 (0.010)			-0.009 (0.01)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.011)
Media Exposure		0.036* (0.017)			0.033 (0.017)	0.101** (0.033)	0.009 (0.02)
<i>Culture</i>							
Traditionalism			0.002 (0.028)		-0.021 (0.028)	-0.071 (0.077)	-0.023 (0.03)
Critical Values			-0.064* (0.026)		-0.075** (0.026)	0.296*** (0.072)	-0.140*** (0.028)
<i>Performance</i>							
Economic				0.109*** (0.026)	0.109*** (0.026)	-0.01 (0.061)	0.135*** (0.029)
Political				0.098*** (0.025)	0.102*** (0.026)	-0.029 (0.064)	0.132*** (0.028)
<i>Controls</i>							
Female	-0.065 (0.041)	-0.058 (0.041)	-0.068 (0.041)	-0.052 (0.041)	-0.05 (0.041)	-0.124 (0.074)	-0.019 (0.049)
Urban	-0.116* (0.046)	-0.113* (0.046)	-0.117* (0.046)	-0.079 (0.046)	-0.083 (0.046)	0.096 (0.099)	-0.132* (0.054)
Education (Ref. Elementary)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Secondary	0.162*** (0.049)	0.148** (0.049)	0.161** (0.049)	0.168*** (0.049)	0.154** (0.05)	0.203* (0.084)	0.11 (0.062)
University	-0.044 (0.068)	-0.068 (0.069)	-0.042 (0.068)	0.006 (0.068)	-0.022 (0.07)	-0.367* (0.17)	0.034 (0.079)
Age (Ref.17-30)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
31-50	0.052 (0.053)	0.039 (0.053)	0.054 (0.053)	0.071 (0.053)	0.062 (0.053)	-0.076 (0.108)	0.121 (0.062)
51 and above	0.042 (0.060)	0.020 (0.061)	0.044 (0.060)	0.052 (0.060)	0.035 (0.061)	-0.158 (0.121)	0.159* (0.072)
pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.136	0.137	0.013	0.012
LR $\chi^2$	2284	2289	2391	2351	2364	56	132

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001

† N(pooled sample)=14423; N(China)=3270; N(other Asian countries)=11153

**Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression on Trust National More, Local More and Trust both Equally**

(Ref. Equal)	China <sup>†</sup>		Other Asian Countries <sup>††</sup>	
	National More	Local More	National More	Local More
Intercept	-0.002 (0.448)	-1.038 (1.460)	-1.119*** (0.199)	0.570** (0.183)
<i>Surveillance</i>				
Political Fear	0.004 (0.027)	-0.068 (0.091)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.033** (0.011)
Media Exposure	0.106** (0.034)	0.085 (0.117)	0.024 (0.020)	0.047* (0.019)
<i>Culture</i>				
Traditionalism	-0.082 (0.079)	-0.217 (0.267)	-0.020 (0.032)	0.009 (0.029)
Critical Value	0.319*** (0.074)	0.401 (0.246)	-0.150*** (0.029)	-0.036 (0.027)
<i>Performance</i>				
Economic	-0.020 (0.062)	-0.173 (0.202)	0.079** (0.030)	-0.197*** (0.027)
Political	-0.052 (0.065)	-0.371 (0.200)	0.022 (0.029)	-0.386*** (0.028)
<i>Controls</i>				
Female	-0.093 (0.076)	0.576* (0.269)	-0.050 (0.051)	-0.105* (0.047)
Urban	0.096 (0.101)	0.006 (0.357)	-0.168** (0.056)	-0.132* (0.053)
Education (Ref. Elementary)	...	...	...	...
Secondary	0.207* (0.085)	0.057 (0.297)	0.112 (0.064)	0.000 (0.061)
University	-0.409* (0.171)	-1.078 (0.778)	0.069 (0.082)	0.114 (0.074)
Age (Ref.17-30)	...	...	...	...
31-50	-0.077 (0.110)	-0.011 (0.372)	0.079 (0.065)	-0.147* (0.059)
51 and above	-0.166 (0.123)	-0.188 (0.433)	0.144 (0.075)	-0.055 (0.069)

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001

† N(China) = 3270, psedudo R2 = 0.016, LR  $\chi^2 = 77$ ;†† N(Others) = 11153, psedudo R2 = 0.029, LR  $\chi^2 = 641$ .

## SUMMARY OF KEY RESULTS:

- Surveillance: Media exposure leads to TNGM in China and has opposite effect in other Asian societies
- Culture: Critical citizens TNGM in China and opposite in other Asian societies
- Performance: Economic and political has little effect in China and helps national government in other Asian societies

Georg Simmel  
Secret et sociétés secrètes



Circé

## Simmel: Metaphysical faith

“This confidence in regard to another is mediated neither by experiences nor by hypotheses: it is a primary, fundamental attitudes toward the other” (1950:390)

# CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRUST SCHOLARS

- Measures of Trust: at the individual level – additive vs. hierarchical
- Theoretical models: Chinese exceptionalism, Western theoretical models do not hold.



Thank you

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