Microfoundations of Clientelism: Where and Why People Opt for Clientelistic Politics

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Catching clientelism…

- Clientelism as 'an invisible hand of political regime'

- How do we catch it? Unobservable phenomenon

Institutions and Clientelism
Gaps

a very few research paid due attention to the linkage of formal institutions and clientelism (Shefter 1974, 1994, Grzymala-Busse 2008, Earle&Derluguian 2010 vs Kitschelt&Wilkinson 2009)

'Good' rules are subverted by 'bad' practices (Helmke and Levitsky 2003; Merkel and Croissant 2004)

clientelism is closely associated with corruption or fraud that are clearly illegal in most of the modern legal frameworks (Keefer 2007), but clientelism is not necessarily something beyond the law

Thus, not only corrupt practices make the formal institutions erode, but institutions *per se* may reinforce or even make clientelistic practices emerge.

Key characteristics of clientelistic relationship:

personal and dyadic (or triadic if there are brokers)

reciprocal

enduring

hierarchical

contingent

Hicken 2011

RQ

- **What are the core microfoundations of clientelism in modern societies?**

- **Can we talk about elite clientelism (party patronage) and mass clientelistic attitudes (supply and demand)?**

- **What are the individual-level predictors of clientelistic attituted?**

- **How does inequality translate into clientelism? (in progress)**

Measurements of clientelism
Three basic approaches:

- ethnographic 'thick' description (Geertz 1973; Auyero 2001; Schmidt et al. 1977);

- proxies (Keefer 2007)

- expert or mass surveys (Kitschelt 2010; Kopecky et al. 2008; Brusco et al. 2004)

Variable 1:
Weighted Index of Elite Clientelism

- the Duke Democracy Project (Kitschelt 2010).
- data regarding the patterns of linkages between politicians and citizens in 88 countries (last wave):
  - Strength of the party linkages with different constituencies (urban/rural, labor unions, ethnic, religious, business organizations etc.)
  - Exchange mechanisms (consumer goods provision, preferential public benefits, employment opportunities, target voters)
  - Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
- Most of the variables are categorical or ordinal and are available at different levels of aggregation (expert, party or country).
- composite index as an aggregate measure of clientelistic efforts

# Dependent variable 2:
Index of Clientelistic Attitudes

- the data from the World Values Survey (6th wave)
- **three items** that reflect the values or attitudes resonating with the literature on patron-client relations:

- **a more operationalizable list of items (exploratory factor analysis)**:
  - Trust-distrust (in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination)
  - Cynicism (egoism)-altruism (cheating on taxes, bribes justified)
  - Passiveness-activism

# Table 1. Rotated factor loadings (confirmatory factor analysis)

Var	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
Most people can be trusted (V24)	**0.99**	0.01	-0.01	0.02
People you know personally (V104)	-0.33	-0.04	-0.13	0.87
How much you trust: People you meet for the first time (V105)	**0.99**	0.01	-0.01	0.02
Membership (environmental org)(V30)	0.00	**0.79**	-0.05	0.38
Membership charitable org (V32)	0.05	**0.80**	-0.01	0.36
Membership (self-aid or mutual aid groups)(V34)	-0.03	**0.76**	-0.04	0.41
Cheating on taxes (V201)	-0.01	-0.01	**0.89**	0.20
Accepting a bribe (V202)	0.00	-0.05	**0.88**	0.21

# Graph 1. People tend to agree with experts...
## Source: WVS 6th wave, the Duke Democracy Project

Scatter plot with x-axis "(mean)Perceived vote buying (standardized)" ranging from -1 to 1, and y-axis ranging from 5 to 20. Countries plotted: Philippines, Lebanon, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Taiwan, Pakistan, Ukraine, Romania, Peru, Malaysia, Chile, Estonia, Poland, Uruguay, Australia, Germany, Netherlands.

Legend: ● (mean) Elite clientelism — Fitted values

Graph 6. Index of Clientelistic Attitudes

Graph 7. Clientelistic Supply and Demand: Shortages and Surpluses? Heteroskedasticity

Clientelistic Attitudes Index

# Graph 2. Elite Clientelism by Out-Group Distrust (Discrimination)

Source: WVS 6th wave, the Duke Democracy Project

Table 2. General Distrust (Out-group Discrimination)

	General distrust - low	General distrust - moderate	General distrust - high
Elite clientelism - high	-	*Egypt, Taiwan*	Colombia, Ghana, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Turkey
Elite clientelism - moderate	-	Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, US	*Chile, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Romania, Uruguay*
Elite clientelism - low	Australia, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden	-	-

Graph 4. Elite Clientelism and Cheating on Taxes
Source: WVS 6th wave, the Duke Democracy Project

Graph 5. Elite Clientelism by Passiveness (Activism)
No connection! Is Putnam wrong?

Hobbesian Personality?

Preliminary Conclusions

- Clientelism strongly correlates with out-group discrimination (general distrust), but **doesn't** require high levels of in-group favoritism
- Opposite to the theoretical expectations civic passiveness and cynicism are not strongly related with electoral clientelism

Personal level determinants: The Usual suspects…

- Poorer voters are more often targeted as potential participants of clientelistic exchanges

- Clientelistic networks are more widespread in rural areas

- Men are more prone to engage in clientelistic exchanges (due to division of labor, gender organizations, bread winning)

- Less educated more often engage in clientelistic exchanges

- Less privileged social classes are more vulnerable to clientelism

- Sector of employment and employment statuses do also correlate with propensity to clientelism (unemployed, retirees and public employees are more exposed to clientelism)

- The effect of marital status is unclear, but we may speculate that respondents with larger families (married with children) are more exposed to clientelism.

# Next steps? Research crossroad...

- **Option 1**: deeper study of individual-level determinants?

- **Option 2:** connections with macro-phenomena? Inequality? (Robinson and Verdier 2002; Boix)

- **Option 3:** study within one country? Looking for a context-specific exogenous source of variation in clientelistic moods (Dasgupta)?

Clientelistic Attitudes index by Inequality

Thank you!

Graph 3. Elite Clientelism by In-Group Trust (Favoritism)
## Source: WVS 6th wave, the Duke Democracy Project

Table 2. In-Group Trust
Source: WVS 6th wave, the Duke Democracy Project

	In-group trust - low	In-group trust - moderate	In-group trust - high
Elite clientelism - high	Colombia, Ghana, Mexico	Lebanon, Philippines, Taiwan, Nigeria	Egypt, Turkey
Elite clientelism - moderate	Peru, Romania	Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Ukraine	Spain
Elite clientelism - low		Germany, Netherlands	Australia New Zealand, Sweden, US