### Perceptions of Inequality and Social Mobility

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#### Why high inequality can be a problem?

- Bad for economic growth (through redistributive pressures)?
- Destroys social cohesion?
- Threat to political stability and democracy?
- But the borderline between "needed" ("good") and "excessive" ("bad") inequality is fuzzy and exists in subjective perceptions only. Different groups have different borderlines.

### Main idea of the paper

 Is our perception of inequality (and then attitudes toward redistribution) affected by available opportunities of social mobility?

 Potential contribution to the literature: empirical analysis using large cross-country data sets

### Poor are usually for redistribution but this does not explain everything


- The median voter is expected to support redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)
- There are no convincing macro- or microarguments that inequality is perceived and interpreted by population non-ambigouosly
- Corneo and Gruner, 2002; Kenworthy, McCall, 2007; Kaufman, 2009; etc
- Statistical relationship between actual inequality and its public perception may not exist!
- Why? There are multiple reasons for that!


# What affects perceptions of inequality (and attitudes toward redistribution)?

- Very good survey: Alesina and Giuliano, 2013
- Ideology (Alesina, Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007)
- Shocks during formative years (Giuliano, Spilimbergo, 2011)
- Prospects of upward mobility «tunnel effect» (Hirschman, 1973; Benabou and Ok, 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Piketty, 2005)
- «Legitimacy» of acquired wealth(Sen, 2000; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Easterly, 2007)

Then the problem of inequality is not just in market outcomes but also a consequence of various structural factors limiting and rationing upward mobility (including poorly functioning social lifts), inherited anti-market ideology, etc.

# Actual inequality and its perception: cross-country picture shows no correlation





#### A.Hirschman's «tunnel effect»

"Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same direction, and run into a serious traffic jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I can see (which is not very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally my spirits lift considerably, for I know the jam has been broken and that my lane's turn to move will surely come at any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than before because of the expectation that I shall soon be on the move" (Hirschman, 1973).

### «Justified» inequality

- «People's attitudes towards, or reactions to, actual income distributions can be significantly influenced by the correspondence or the lack thereof between (1) their ideas of what is normatively tolerable, and (2) what they actually see in the society around them» (Sen, 2000).
  - Widespread social practices vs existing ethical norms.
- Market and structural inequality
   Structural inequality is caused by institutions generating and supporting elites through nonmarket mechanisms (Easterly, 2007).

#### Our hypothesis

- Perception of inequality is contingent upon experience of upward mobility.
- Well functioning social lifts increase tolerance to inequality
- «Legitimacy» (as perceived by people) of how wealth is acquired supports tolerance

#### **Data**

- ISSP-2009
- 36 countries, N=44 th respondents
- ISSP-1999
- 26 countries, N=24 th
- LiTS-2010
- 35 countries, N=39 th
- Countries in all samples are very different in economic and institutional dimensions


#### Main variables

- Perception of inequality and attitude toward redistribution
- Social mobility
- Ways to success: what leads people upward?
- Ideal and actual type of society («diamond»/«pyramid»)
- Individual characteristics
- Country dummy

### Social mobility is ...


- This term refers to the movement of individuals and groups between different socio-economic positions. Vertical mobility means movement up or down the socio-economic scale (A.Giddens).
- ISSP-2009:
  - a) compared with parents when respondents were 15-17 y old (mob\_1)
  - δ) compared with father's occup standing (mob\_2)
- ISSP-1999:
  - a) comparison with the position occupied 10 y earlier (mob\_3)
- LiTS-2010:
  - a) economic position of the family compared with that 4 y earlier (mob\_4)
  - b) the current income decile compared with that 4 y earlier (mob\_5)

# «Middle class effect»: mobility prospects



Ideal (IT) and actual (AT) type society: 5 different options that can be reduced either to "pyramid" (wide base and narrowing upward) or to "diamond" (wide middle with narrow base and narrow top)

#### % of those who absolutely agree that «income inequality is too large»



### **Empirical methodology**

$$Y = \beta X + vMOB + \gamma D + \varepsilon$$

$$Y = \beta X + vMOB + \mu INST + \gamma D + \varepsilon$$

$$Y = \beta X + vMOB + \lambda_1 IT + \lambda_2 AT + \gamma D + \varepsilon$$

$$Y = \beta X + vMOB + \lambda_1 IT + \lambda_2 AT + \lambda_3 AT * IT + \gamma D + \varepsilon$$

oprobit, Y – perception of inequality measured by the 5-score scale

### Endogeneity? As always...

- Mob\_1 is a difference between statuses parents and children. If unobservable individual effects correlate, they can partially offset each other
- Instruments and pyramid/diamond: endogeneity can be a problem
- In macroregressions different data sets
- Cautiousness in causal interpretation

### Regression coefficients, «Income differentiation is too large», ISSP-2009, oprobit, (5-score scale, 5 – absolutely agree)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1 income quintile (base group)	-	-	-	<u>-</u>	-	-
2	-	-0,01	-	-	-0,01	-0,01
3	-	-0,02	-	-	-0,02	-0,02
4	-	-0,12***	-	-	-0,12***	-0,12***
5	-	-0,34***	-	-	-0,32***	-0,34***
Mob_1	-	-	-0,03***	-	-0,025***	
Mob_2	-	-	-	-0,03**	-	-0,02
R2	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,07
Log pseudolikelihood	-45640.634	-37702.933	-44408.70	-45287.53	-37199,56	-37701,834
N	42647	35300	41858	42647	34876	35300

Robust SE; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* - 10%, 5% and 1% sign levels

### Regression coefficients, oprobit, (5-score scale, 5 – absolutely agree)

	ISSP-1999	ISSP-1999 LITS -2010	
Dep var	«Income	«Income differentiation	
	differentiation is too	between rich ar	nd poor should
	large»	be redu	uced»
Mob_3 (for 10 y)	-0,05***		
Mob_4 (for 4 y)		-0,03*	
Mob_5 (for 4 y,			-0,03***
between deciles)			
R2	0,10	0,02	0,02
Log pseudolikelihood	-24511,078	-46133,358	-45624,51
N	23662	36820	36477

Robust SE; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* - 10%, 5% and 1% sign levels

### **Effect of mobility**

- 1 additional mobility point increases tolerance by 0,03 scale points
- This effect is very robust in all specifications
- Coefficients for controls are also very stable

### Do upward mobility instruments affect inequality perceptions? ISSP-1999

	1	2	3	4	5
	-0,04***	-0,04***	-0,05***	-0,05***	
Mob_3					-0,04***
Ways upwards:					
- Wealthy family	0,06***				
- Hard work		-0,16***			
- High skills			-0,13***		
- Useful connections				0,09***	
- Corruption					0,13***
R2	0,10	0,11	0,11	0,10	0,11
N	22817	22708	22598	22874	22134
Lpseudolikelihood	-24010.06	-36876.527	-23686.37	-24064.345	-23280.9

Robust SE; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* - 10%, 5% and 1% sign levels

### Do upward mobility instruments affect inequality perceptions? ISSP-2009

Mobility	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,02***
Ways upwards:									
- Wealthy family	0,18***								
- Educated		0,07***							
parents		0,07							
- Hard work			0,01						
- Own education				0,08***					
- Having					0,08***				
ambitions					0,08				
- Useful						0,16***			
connections						0,10			
- Political							0,14***		
connections									
- Giving bribes								0,15**	
- Corruption									0,36***

Robust SE; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* - 10%, 5% and 1% sign levels

### Instruments of upward mobility: impact on perceptions

- Wide use of non-meritocratic instruments decreases tolerance to inequality
- Use of meritocratic instruments («hard work») statistically insignificant in 2009, but significant with expected sign in 1999
- Coefficients for mobility indicators and major control variables are very stable in all specifications

#### «Middle class» effect

- There is a strong tolerating effect of large middle class and of prospects of upward mobility associated with this (due to capacity to absorb those moving from below)
- Actual "pyramid-type" society (as it is seen by respondents) decreases tolerance, while "diamond-type" increases
- If the actual society is a "diamond-type" but the ideal one is also a "diamond-type", the tolerance increases significantly!

# Regression coefficients, oprobit, mobility and middle class variables, individual characteristics and incomes, and country dummies are controlled, 1999

	1	2	3
Mobility (mob_3)	-0,04***	-0,05***	-0,04***
Existing "diamond type" (AT)	-0,33***		-0,14**
Ideal "diamond type" (IT)		0,12***	0,23***
AT*IT (diam*diam=1)			-0,22***
R2	0,11	0,10	0,11
Log pseudolikelihood	-22577.5	-22311.0	-21915.5
N	21581	21224	21025

Robust SE; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* - 10%, 5% and 1% sign levels

### Regression coefficients, oprobit, mobility and middle class variables, individual characteristics, incomes, and country dummies are controlled, 2009

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Mobility (mob_1)	-0,02***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,02***	-0,03***
Existing "diamond type" (AT)	-0,31***	-0,31***			-0,05	-0,04
Ideal "diamond type" (IT)			0,12***	0,11***	0,19***	0,18***
AT*IT (diam*diam=1)					-0,33***	-0,35***
R2	0,08	0,07	0,08	0,07	0,08	0,07
Log pseudolikelihood	-35259,41	-41795.87	-34919,08	-41390.8	-34358,24	-40668.71
N	33280	39627	32891	39172	32578	38725

Robust SE; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* - 10%, 5% and 1% sign levels

### Empirical methodology - 2

Cross-country macro-regression (OLS):

$$INEQ = \beta *GINI + \delta *MOB + \mu Z + \varepsilon$$

INEQ - % of those who absolutely agree that «Differences in income in <Rs country> are too large»

GINI – country Gini coefficient


MOB - aggregated Mob\_1 for each country

Z – controls (InGDP/cap, country type, e.g.)


Two specifications without country control, one specification includes *InGDPcap*.

We expect  $\beta$ =0,  $\delta$ <0

### Perception of inequality (%) and mobility index, by countries



### Perception of inequality and mobility index, by country types



Типология стран: природа правовой системы (La Porta et al, 1999) и разнообразие капитализма (Hall and Soskice, 2001)

# Regression coefficients, cross-country regressions

Dep Var		% of absolutely agreed that  "income differentiation is too large"				% of absolutely agreed that "wage differentiation should be reduced"			
		SSP 2009	)		ISSP 199	9	<u> </u>	LITS 2010	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GINI	-0,07	0,29	0,2	0,25	0,21	0,68	0,13	0,23	0,09
Mob_1	-24,8***	-18,4***	-10,8*						
Ln GDPcap		-9,23			-5,4			3,31	
Mob_5 (for 4 y)							-0,40***	-0,35***	-0,30**
Mob_3 (for 10 y)				-18,9***	-15,6*	-15,6***			
ISSP country types	not	not	yes	not	not	yes			
LITS country types							not	not	yes
const	52,34	151,6	53,5	-30,4	84,5	2,79	41,8	5,55	41,8
R2	0,38	0,40	0,65	0,56	0,56	0,70	0,28	0,30	0,40
N	36	36	36	26	26	26	35	35	35

#### Conclusions

- There are many reasons why inequality can be a serious problem. One of them considers inequality as a source of political pressure for larger redistribution. This in its turn affects fiscal policy and growth.
- But what is the association between actual inequality and its perception that may lead to political pressure? We argue that there can be a long distance between them and the former can be a bad predictor for the latter
- If upward social mobility is high and unrestricted by structural reasons, people are more tolerant to observed income differentiation and are less likely to demand more redistribution
- If dominant ways leading upward are considered legitimate and just, people are more tolerant. On the contrary, structural reasons of inequality feed intolerance and redistributive pressure
- Societies with large middle class provide better mobility prospects and therefore are more tolerant

9 LiTS-2010
9

Perception of inequality	<ol> <li>«Differences in income in <rs country=""> are too large»</rs></li> <li>«It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes»</li> </ol>	«Differences in income in <rs country=""> are too large»</rs>	The gap between the rich and the poor in our country should be reduced
Social mobility	<ol> <li>«In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?»</li> <li>«Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don't have one now). If you compare this job to the job your father had when you were &lt;14/15/16&gt;, would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was) (please tick one box)»</li> </ol>	A) In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be toward the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale? (Top – 1 Bottom-10).  B) And ten years ago, where did you fit in then? (Top – 1 Bottom-10).	Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest 10% people in our country, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest 10% of people in our country. On which step of the ten is your household today?  Now, imagine the same ten-step ladder 4 years ago. On which step was your household at that time?  My household lives better nowadays than around 4 years ago
Instruments of upward mobility	Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting ahead in life (please tick one box on each line)		

#### Неравенство и институты!

Проблема социальной мобильности — это проблема институтов.

Если равные условия доступа к экономическим возможностям отсутствуют, а этот доступ рационируется с помощью разного рода частных привилегий (для одних) или ограничений (для других), то складывающееся неравенство несет на себе печать не только рыночной оценки, но и соответствующих структурных факторов.

Последние могут доминировать в формировании индивидуальных представлений о складывающемся неравенстве и желательности перераспределения