
New Project
Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (LCSR)
Higher School of Economics
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Clientelism: Oooold Debate

a relic of the past or unaccomplished modernization, a trait of ‘backward societies’

an omnipresent phenomenon that can be found even in developed and democratized societies (De Sousa 2008; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984)
Modernisation, Institutions, and Clientelism Gaps

- A very few research paid due attention to the linkage of formal institutions and clientelism.

- ‘Good’ rules are subverted by ‘bad’ practices or ‘misuse’ of institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2003; Merkel and Croissant 2004).

- Clientelism is closely associated with corruption or fraud that is clearly illegal actions in most of the modern legal frameworks (Keefer 2007).

- Clientelism is not necessarily something beyond the law.

- Formal institutional arrangements do also vary across societies and they affect social and political behavior and practices.

Thus, not only corrupt practices make the formal institutions erode, but institutions per se may reinforce or even make clientelistic practices emerge.
Key characteristics of clientelistic relationship:

- personal and dyadic (or triadic if there are brokers)
- asymmetrical
- enduring
- reciprocal
- voluntary

**NB!** Not necessarily that every instance of clientelistic relations must possess these features.
Clientenlism and repression

*Stick & Carrot*

- clientelism as a glue of a society and ‘greasing the wheels of a system’,
- it replaces a more direct and repressive use of political power (Huntington 1968)
- clientelism is a substitute for political coercion and repression.
- clientelism represents a *second face* of power when actors are already aware of how they are expected to behave (1962)
RQ

• what account for the emergence and persistence of clientelism: gradual modernization, democratization and shifts in values or political institutions? Perhaps, there is no trade-off but rather complimentary links? If so, are so mutually reinforcing or additive?

• what makes everyday clientelism in modern societies emerge and persist? Is clientelism an evil that destroys formal institutions or institutions in their turn *per se* can bring clientelism to life?
A threefold contribution to the current research:

• to bring a more detailed institutionalist perspective into the theories that explain the emergence of informal practices

• to test different measures of clientelism using different survey data (Duke Democracy Project and World Values Survey) for their internal and external validity (mass and elit clientelism)

• to extend the study of political patronage and clientelism from the exclusively electoral viewpoint into a more everyday life perspective using the survey data
Measurements of clientelism
Three basic approaches:

• ethnographic ‘thick’ description (Geertz 1973; Auyero 2001; Schmidt et al. 1977);
• proxies (Keefer 2007)
• expert or mass surveys (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kopecky et al. 2008; Brusco et al. 2004)
Dependent variable 1: Weighted Index of Elite Clientelism

- the Duke Democracy Project (Kitschelt 2010).
- data regarding the patterns of linkages between politicians and citizens in 88 countries (2008-2009):
  - Strength of the party linkages with different constituencies (urban/rural, labor unions, ethnic, religious, business organizations etc.)
  - Exchange mechanisms (consumer goods provision, preferential public benefits, employment opportunities, target voters)
  - Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
- Most of the variables are categorical or ordinal and are available at different levels of aggregation (expert, party or country).
- composite indicator as an aggregate measure of clientelistic efforts
Dependent variable 2: Index of Mass Clientelism or Clientelistic Attitudes

- the data from the World Values Survey (5th and 6th waves)
- **five items** that reflect the values or attitudes resonating with the classic definition of patron-client relations:
  - Reciprocity, mutually beneficial relationship
  - Asymmetry or hierarchy
  - Enduring character
  - Contingency
  - Personal or dyadic relationship
- a more operationalizable list of items:
  - Trust-distrust (V4,5,7,24,56,102-1-5,213)
  - Obedience-independence (voluntarism) (V12-21,69,77, 55,59)
  - Cynicism (egoism)-altruism (V14,17,30,32,34,66,71,202,201)
Independent Variables 1

INSTITUTIONS

• electoral formula (plural vs proportional representation) (nominal VAR)
• different modes of president-assembly relations by using **two dimensions**:
  1) separate survival of president and legislature
  2) the type of cabinet (presidential power over the executive and legislative powers)

At the individual level:
- Trust in institutions?
Independent Variables 2

MODERNIZATION

• Index of Modernization by Teorell (2010)
• aggregate indicators from the World Bank (WDI)
• At the individual level:
  – Use of Internet
  – Spread of self-expression (emancipative) values
  – Economic situation and type of employment
Independent Variables 3
REPRESSION

• political repression
  – Global Dataset of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT)
  – CIRI Physical Integrity Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) which, however, does not account for the type of repression and target groups.
  – At the individual level repression can be measured though the item V228H of WVS ‘Voters are threatened with violence at the polls’
Hypotheses

• H1: Modernization and cultural explanations vs institutionalist explanations: complimentary relations or trade-off?
• H2: More presidential power increases the spread of clientelism;
• H3: Less proportional systems increase the spread of clientelism;
• H4: Too much and too little repression weakens clientelism.
## Trust, Obedience, Bribes

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2 factors: ‘Hobbesian’ personality and cynicism

Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

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Some basic bivariate models

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Preliminary Conclusions

- Distrust, elite clientelism and presidentialism are closely related (*Hobbesian* personality?)
- Cynicism and obedience are not connected
- Mass Clientelistic values and elitist clientelism are not the same
Further steps

• Develop a new index based on the WVS data

• Include measures of modernization

• MLM?