

# Civic Political Involvement: Values and Protest Behavior in Ukraine and Post-Socialist Societies

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
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
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
World Map of Protest Activity, 2013 (GDELT protest data)






*The aggregate relationship between GNP/capita and protest*

All GDELT: GNP/capita (ppp) from World Bank for same year as World Values Survey

Mean level of protest activity is lower in transition countries vs. post-industrial 'old democracies' and some non-industrialized Africa/Asia countries:





Series5  
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# Contradictory Puzzle

Developed (post)industrial highly-income societies: “Silent Revolution” (Inglehart, 1973), institutional-value shift (Occupy, Indignados, Anti-Globalists etc.). ‘Old democracies’: civic engagement & protests are remarkably higher (Norris 2002; Teorell, Torcal & Montero 2007; Gallup 2011).

Poor, low-income societies: “Grievance theory” (Ted Gurr, 1970): poverty, economic deprivation, negative living conditions, inequality & ☹ with public policy = increase of political awareness and protests (Barnes & Kaase et al, 1979; Muller 1979; Muller & Jukam 1983).

What about partially de-industrialized (after 1991) post-socialist countries with low official GDP and mostly secular-rational values along with low level of post-materialist, self-expression values ? I.e., Ukraine: comparative level of protest activity is low, but doubled in 2013-2014 vs. 2012-2013 vs. 2010-2011. And biggest protests are not about economics in the first hand.



Society strives for well-functioning democratic institutions?

Political awareness - a “must have”: it pushes the ruled & the rulers watch on one another. Socialist democratic experience [USSR Constitution was democratic] = overwhelming level of all-age associational membership before 1989-1992, shouldn't that support civic political involvement?


Post-socialist transition outcomes:

democratization process had not met the expectations; institutions perform quite poor: anomia, distrust, doubled institutionalization, negative tendencies of macro-social changes (temporary de-industrialization), rise of inequality, oligarch economy; in politics: 'new feudalism' (nepotism, specific elites' recruitment process), 'democratic deficit' (non-transparent political process, endangered national interests and human rights) .

BUT. Mean level of protest activity is much lower among transition industrial countries (ESS).

Post-socialist democratization + liberal capitalism did not lead to higher human emancipation, 'national well-being accounts' , and mass political participation .


# Research questions

An aerial photograph of a massive protest in a city square. The square is completely filled with a dense crowd of people, many holding flags. In the background, there are several large, modern buildings and a prominent archway. The sky is hazy, suggesting an overcast day.

**What boost protests & social movements in post-socialist societies via contribution into the protest readiness?**

**Quality of life? Government effectiveness?  
Values? Nationalism? Economic development? Political orientations? ...**

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK and HYPOTHESES



# Empowerment of Citizens



'Silent Revolution' (by Ron Inglehart, 1977) : Theory of Modernization = changes in the labor force structure and personal values: professional (middle) class increases; intergenerational shift from survival to self-expression and from traditional to secular values.



+ Evolutionary Human Development Model (Welzel, Inglehart 2010, Welzel et al. 2003, Inglehart et al. 2008), Human development perspective of sustainable well-being (Sen 1998; Pritchett, Viarengo 2010; Seaford et al. 2011):



= New model of claims that did not correspond to what is provided by existing state order and authorities. Post-materialists will try to effectuate their political demands by way of new political parties and in particular by organizing themselves in one issue movements, such as new social movements and political action groups (Inglehart, 1977; Thomassen & van der Kolk.2000).



Freedom and autonomy are important for SWB; economic development, democratic institutions, human capital, action resources and emancipative self-expression values are important for human empowerment: human rights satisfaction, non-elite decisive voice in politics + quality of life, which in turn influence political and economic institutions .



# “Individual Modernization” Structure of opportunities and transitional values’ inversion

Empowerment + modernization = “individual modernization”: a change in values, an increase of the human capital, cognitive mobilization.

Personal values (self-expression, post-materialist) are highly related with institutional indicators (level of corruption, governing efficiency, GDP, gender equality, level of democracy) (Inglehart, Welzel 2010).

Transition: unstable institutions + controversial cultural context (socialist post-materialist ideology inflated after liberal economy introduction) do not support collective actions for public good vs. materialistic individualism (consumerism). Reasons of majority of last decade protests - mainly economic, later converted in human rights defence. And largest protests not for economics.

Gender differences in associational\organizational life (Almond, Verba, 1975; Norris, Inglehart (2002, 2011\12): Norris, Inglehart, 2002; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Moore)

# Social capital/trust theory + Individual rationality

Social capital = trust + social networks (Putnam 2000). Although it is unclear whether trust is a preamble to social networks and social participation or vice versa, protest activity is higher in societies with high social capital resources (Benson & Rochon 2004).

Individual value orientations correlate with transparency of political institutions functioning (Dahl 1999; Schwartz 2004). Higher trust = greater SWB in communities, workplaces, nations; higher openness of Gov. majorities & opposition to constructive debate and agreement on ground rules (Putnam, 2000).

INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY: costs and benefits approach

# Governance quality & institutional trust



Functional / dysfunctional government (Gov.) institutions contribute enormously to world's most pressing economic and social problems/achievements (Teorell, 2009; Kaufman, 2010; Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011; Bauhr and Grimes, 2012). The Gov. effectiveness (via regulations, policies, law) conditions life quality.

Modernization theory (Inglehart 2009; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Welzel 2006): societal economic and political development have an influence on the attitudes (trust) toward institutions and authorities.

Gov. quality has an effect on well-being and trust (Knack 2000): the attitude to that functioning is reflected by satisfaction and confidence in authority institutions. Functioning of governments and public institutions might be transformed via political and civic activities of citizens (Kahenemann et al 2003, Kahenemann, 2010).



'Political Opportunity Structure' (Kurt Schock, 1999); Individual Resources (Verba, Schlozman and Brady)

# Delegitimization and revolution prerequisites (by David Lane, 2006) - “Real Revolution CHEcklist” (©)



Long-run economic decline. Incongruence of the government promises and people expectations. Life satisfaction decline.



Internal problems = change in foreign policy. Foreign Policy: integration prerequisites - political rhetoric and economic policies.



Problems with loyalty, solidarity, commitment



The crisis of legitimacy. Dissatisfaction and distrust with regard to politics and the economy



Modernizational changes in the labor force structure




Technical infrastructure for communication



Shift in personal values. Individual rationality: real protests occur when the potential payoff dominates the potential loss. Potential losses: property, jobs, access to resources (= children's future, family importance).



Changes in the structure of the elite: counter-elite = new “political force” with integrative alternatives, history of “otherness in action” vs. ideological vacuum at the ‘political market “



# Hypotheses

H1: Higher level of CPAR is determined by higher level of self-expression values, SWB, conditions of sustainable well-being

H2: CPAR in transition countries is mediated by gender and is better explained by economic, structural and political individual differences, it is less a question of self-expression and post-materialist values.


H3: On cultural map post-socialist countries are placed as more rational-secular than traditional, therefore nationalism along with traditional values (especially patriotism) is less notable predictor of CPAR.

H4: Transition experience decreases correlation of civic political involvement and post-materialist values.

H5: Relationship of Governance quality (GQ) and civic political involvement (CPAR) is mediated by SWB and trust: the better governing is and more people satisfied and trust to the one – the less CPAR as feedback is needed.

Low institutional trust has negative effect on CPAR .


# Data and Methods



Main sample: 3d and 5th waves of World Values Survey, 47 countries (list A), around 67 000 respondents.

(WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005 OFFICIAL DATA FILE v.20090901, 2009. )

Set of post-socialist transition countries (same questionnaire on the protest activity in the same period) [WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009]: Ukraine, Slovenia, Russia, Moldova, Poland, Georgia, Bulgaria.



Additional data sources: European Values Survey, European Social Survey, UNDP statistics, World Bank Reports, other relevant databases of country-level indices.



Methods of analyses:

EFA, CFA,

Regression analysis (OLS –GLM, with dummy)

# Concepts and Measurements


## Declared Civic Protest Activity Readiness (dependent variable) =

3-point scale indicators based on the following items: “Whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it: Signing a Petition; Joining in Boycotts; Attending lawful demonstrations?”

**Table: Index of the Protest Activism:**

**Factor Loadings, single factor, unrotated solution.**

|          | 3 <sup>rd</sup> wave                 |                                       |   |                         | 5 <sup>th</sup> wave                 |                                       |   |                         |
|----------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|
|          | Political action: signing a petition | Political action: joining in boycotts | Political action: attending lawful or peaceful demonstrations | % of variance explained | Political action: signing a petition | Political action: joining in boycotts | Political action: attending lawful or peaceful demonstrations | % of variance explained |
| Ukraine  | ,841                                 | ,785                                  | ,782  | <b>64,5</b>             | ,822                                 | ,844                                  | ,813  | <b>68,3</b>             |
| Slovenia | ,803                                 | ,858                                  | ,843  | <b>70</b>               | ,807                                 | ,852                                  | ,845  | <b>70</b>               |
| Russia   | ,830                                 | ,763                                  | ,736  | <b>60,4</b>             | ,820                                 | ,810                                  | ,777  | <b>64,4</b>             |
| Poland   | ,767                                 | ,841                                  | ,849  | <b>67,2</b>             | ,825                                 | ,809                                  | ,837  | <b>68</b>               |
| Moldova  | ,802                                 | ,707                                  | ,737  | <b>56,2</b>             | ,829                                 | ,795                                  | ,764  | <b>63,4</b>             |
| Georgia  | ,837                                 | ,812                                  | ,781  | <b>66</b>               | ,873                                 | ,861                                  | ,776  | <b>70,2</b>             |
| Bulgaria | ,869                                 | ,855                                  | ,863  | <b>74,4</b>             | ,867                                 | ,833                                  | ,838  | <b>72</b>               |





# Determinants (independent variables)

## Individual Level:

- Subjective Well-being: Life Satisfaction and Subjective health (factor index)
- Freedom of choice and control
- Values: Traditional vs. Secular-rational, Survival vs. Self-expression (with Gender Equality)
- Political Awareness: Interest to Politics, Ideological views (self-positioning on the left-right scale), Importance of democracy, Government Democraticness, Gov. Responsibility
- Type of Nationalism: primordial (origin, 'right of the blood', cultural, civic)
- Patriotism: Willingness to fight for home country. Feeling of the local community belonging. Feeling of the nation/country belonging.
- Anomia (benefits, bribes, taxes, transport, beating)
- Family/friends/work importance in life. Distrust (Gen., Personal Particularized, Personal Generalized)
- Confidence in Political Institutions.
- **Mass-media effect** = Information source: daily newspaper, news broadcasts on radio/TV, printed magazines, in depth reports on radio or TV, books, internet/e-mail, talk with friends or colleagues].
- Socio-structural control variables: employment (dummy: full-time, part-time, or self-employed - 1, other - 0); education "What is the highest educational level that you have ever attained?" - coded on a nine-point scale from no formal education (1) to university level with degree (9); income; age - coded by date of birth in continuous years; gender (dummy: 1=male), quantity of children (dummy: 0=no, 1=at least one), Subjective Social Class (ordinal, 5/6 categories, from low to high), Satisfaction with Financial Situation of Household (10 points, from 0 to 10), Religiosity (1=not religious person) (V187).

## Country level:


- Governance quality indicators (World Bank Group, Kaufmann 2012) – GDP, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption.
- HDI (inequality adjusted)

# Civic Protest Activity Readiness: Multi-level model (random intercepts, fixed slopes), WVS 5<sup>th</sup> wave, 47 countries

|   | Model 1  | Model 1  | Model 2  |
|---|----------|----------|----------|
| <b>Individual level</b>                                 |          |          |          |
| Subjective Well-being (=Life Satisfaction*Subj. Health) | -.026*** | -.022*** | -.019*** |
| Traditional/Secular rational Values                     | .451***  | .328***  | .327***  |
| Survival/self-expression values                         | -.022*** | -.027*** | -.029*** |
| Nationalism_a: citizenship = ancestors from country     | -.043*** | .08***   | .078***  |
| Nationalism_b: citizenship = born on country's soil     | -.032*** | -.001    | .001     |
| Nationalism_c: citizenship = adopting country's customs | -.027*** | .01      | .005     |
| Nationalism_d: citizenship = abiding by country's laws  | .066***  | .09***   | .076***  |
| Traditional* Secular Values                             |          | .159***  | .16***   |
| Nationalism_a * Nationalism_b                           |          | -.005    | -.006    |
| Nationalism_a * Nationalism_c                           |          | -.012*** | -.011*   |
| Nationalism_a * Nationalism_d                           |          | -.009    | -.009    |
| <b>Contextual country-level</b>                         |          |          |          |
| GDP   |          | .24*     | .136***  |
| Voice and Accountability                                |          |          | .07***   |
| Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism   |          |          | -.098*** |
| Government Effectiveness                                |          |          | -.436*** |
| Rule of Law   |          |          | .327***  |
| Control of Corruption                                   |          |          | -.029*** |
| VA*GDP*GEf  |          |          | .001     |
| RL*CC*GEf   |          |          | -.123    |
| Intercept   | 1.97***  | 1.51***  | 1.479*** |

\*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

# Post-Socialist Transition Countries: Macro-Level Profile



**POLGCB 05** - Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2005: “In your view does corruption affect POLITICAL LIFE”, **BUSGCB05** - “ In your view does corruption affect: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT”, **PERGCB05** – “In your view does corruption affect PERSONAL AND FAMILY LIFE”  
**imp2000** - Imports of goods and services as % GDP, 2000, from World Bank, World Development Indicators  
**TC2005** - Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005. **CCI2005** - World Bank control of corruption index 2005. **BE2000s** - World Business Environment Survey 2000. **fuel00** - % of mineral fuels in manufacturing exports, 2000, World Bank, World Development Indicators . **yearopen** - year country opened to trade, according to Sachs and Warner . **urb2002** - Urban population (% of total) 2002 (UNDP, Human Development Report, 2004), downloaded from STM103 Global Indicators Shared Dataset, Updated Fall 2005)

# Civic Protest Activity Readiness: Multi-level model, WVS 3, 5<sup>th</sup> wave, post-socialist countries (interactions excluded )

|  |         | Final Model (nationalism excluded)              | W 3       | W5        |
|--|---------|---|-----------|-----------|
| Correlation of Civic Protest Activity Readiness with Governance Quality Indicators |         | Freedom of choice and control                   | -0.056*   | 0.052*    |
|  |         | Subj. Well-being                                | -0.099*** | -0.338*** |
|  |         | Secular Rational Values                         | 0.630***  | 0.943***  |
|  |         | Materialistic Values                            | -0.334*** | -0.342*** |
|  |         | Sexual (reproductive) non-freedom               | -0.338*** | -0.580*** |
| HDI  | 0.15*** | Gender Equality Support                         | -0.004    | 0.056*    |
| Ineq. adj. HDI   | 0.17*** | Anomia  | 0.008     | -0.022    |
| GDP  | 0.16*** | Important in life: Family                       | 0.036     | 0.034     |
| Voice Accountability Governance Effectiveness                                      | 0.07*** | Low Interest in Politics                        | -0.098*** | -0.166*** |
|  | 0.03**  | Most people can be trusted                      | 0.237***  | 0.162***  |
| Rule of Law  | 0.02*   | Non-Confidence: Political Institutions          | 0.084***  | 0.046*    |
|  |         | Voice Accountability                            | 0.154***  | 0.829***  |
| Corruption Control   | -0.03*  | Government Effectiveness                        | -0.209*** | 0.336***  |
|  |         | Rule of Law                                     | -0.153*** | -0.845*** |
|  |         | Inequality adj. HDI (Health, Education, Income) | -0.16***  | -0.214*** |
|  |         | Adj. R squar.                                   | .44       | .32       |

Declared Civic Protest Activity Readiness – Post-socialist Countries:  
WVS 3: 1994-1999 (individual-level OLS (GLM); stand. regression coeff.,  $\beta$ )

|                                       | Bulgaria   | Georgia   | Moldova   | Russia    | Ukraine   |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| (Intercept)                           | 0.608      | 0.816     | 0.071     | 0.848     | 1.649     |
| Freedom of choice and control         | -0.158(**) | -0.079*   | 0.109*    | -0.023    | -0.088(*) |
| Subj. Well-being (with health)        | -0.233*    | -0.076(*) | -0.025    | -0.162**  | -0.161**  |
| Traditional/Secular rat Values        | 0.363*     | 0.587***  | 0.634***  | 0.641***  | 0.673***  |
| Post-Materialist index 4-item         | -0.220*    | -0.330*** | -0.361*** | -0.207*** | -0.436*** |
| Sexual reproductive non-freedom       | -0.044     | -0.349*** | -0.321*** | -0.393*** | -0.361*** |
| Gender Equality Scale                 | -0.001     | -0.032    | -0.019    | -0.09     | 0.123*    |
| Anomia                                | 0.032      | 0.073*    | -0.067    | -0.113*   | 0.010     |
| Family not Important in life          | 0.150(*)   | 0.000     | 0.116*    | 0.008     | 0.068     |
| Low Interest in Politics              | -0.342***  | -0.133*** | -0.192*** | -0.124*   | -0.074    |
| Most people can be trusted            | 0.056      | 0.243***  | 0.312***  | 0.143**   | 0.296***  |
| Non-confidence_Political Institutions | -0.003     | 0.067(*)  | 0.132**   | 0.176***  | -0.005    |
| Self positioning in political scale   | -0.031     | -0.115*** | -0.085(*) | -0.038    | -0.116**  |
| R squar. / adj. R squar.              | .48 (.34)  | .34 (.31) | .42 (.36) | .30 (.24) | .39(.33)  |

Control variables: sex, edu, age, children, income, religious person, satisfaction with financial situation, employment.

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05; (\*\*) p < .1; (\*) .12 < p < .2

# Declared Civic Protest Activity Readiness – Post-socialist Countries: WVS: 2002-2008 (individual-level OLS (GLM); stand. regression coeff., $\beta$ )

|                                 | Bulgaria        | Georgia          | Moldova         | Poland           | Russia           | Slovenia         | Ukraine          |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| (Intercept)                     | -0.754          | 0.159            | -0.002          | -0.628           | -0.485           | 2.373***         | 0.013            |
| Freedom of choice and control   | -0.051          | 0.067*           | -0.047          | 0.037            | 0.079            | -0.052           | -0.004           |
| Subj. Well-being (with health)  | -0.527***       | -0.412***        | -0.341***       | -0.306***        | -0.359***        | -0.240***        | -0.274***        |
| Secular Rational Values         | 1.112***        | 0.759***         | 0.720***        | 0.923***         | 0.707***         | 1.129***         | 0.683***         |
| Materialistic Values            | -0.403***       | -0.405***        | -0.191***       | -0.358***        | -0.341***        | -0.380***        | -0.328***        |
| Sexual (reprod.) non-freedom    | -0.596***       | -0.323***        | -0.394***       | -0.526***        | -0.409***        | -0.613***        | -0.483***        |
| Gender Equality Support         | -0.001          | 0.019            | -0.029          | 0.032            | -0.002           | 0.006            | 0.135**          |
| Anomia                          | 0.142*          | -0.014           | 0.037           | 0.011            | -0.051           | -0.189**         | -0.039           |
| Family non-importance           | 0.119*          | -0.034           | 0.002           | 0.036            | 0.084*           | 0.079            | 0.164***         |
| Importance of democracy         | 0.116*          | 0.156***         | 0.164***        | 0.073*           | 0.027            | -0.029           | 0.252***         |
| Low Interest in Politics        | -0.181**        | -0.202***        | -0.185***       | -0.131***        | -0.206***        | -0.178**         | -0.208***        |
| Most people can be trusted      | 0.251***        | 0.254***         | 0.138***        | 0.215            | 0.258***         | 0.093            | 0.173***         |
| Non-Confidence in polit. Inst.  | 0.116           | 0.127***         | 0.014           | 0.022            | 0.055            | -0.012           | -0.089           |
| IS: Daily newspaper             | 0.024           | -0.036           | 0.045           | -0.016           | 0.152**          | -0.013           | 0.041            |
| IS: Printed magazines           | -0.116(*)       | -0.012           | 0.066           | 0.141***         | -0.056           | -0.025           | -0.105(**)       |
| IS: radio or TV                 | 0.013           | -0.021           | -0.090*         | -0.007           | 0.034            | 0.086(**)        | 0.203***         |
| IS: Books                       | 0.127(*)        | -0.009           | -0.079(**)      | -0.097**         | 0.023            | 0.006            | 0.011            |
| ISe: Internet, Email            | 0.041           | 0.066*           | 0.085*          | 0.122**          | 0.116*           | -0.083           | 0.241***         |
| <i>R squar. / adj. R squar.</i> | <i>.60(.48)</i> | <i>.44 (.40)</i> | <i>.41(.35)</i> | <i>.52 (.48)</i> | <i>.38 (.30)</i> | <i>.57 (.48)</i> | <i>.54 (.46)</i> |

Control variables: sex, edu, age, children, income, religious person, satisfaction with financial situation, employment.

\*\*\*P < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05; (\*\*) p < .1; (\*) .12 < p < .2

Variables excluded from model: Nationalism , Willingness to fight for the country, Self-positioning at political scale, attitude to government responsibility, ind.-level evaluation of democraticness of state, opinions about democracy, non-confidence in non-political institutions, personal distrust (generalized and particularized).

# Declared Civic Protest Activity Readiness – Post-socialist Countries: WVS 6: 2010-2014 (individual-level OLS (GLM); stand. regression coeff., $\beta$ )

|  | Estonia          | Poland           | Romania          | Slovenia         | Russia           | Ukraine          | Armenia          | Azerbaij.        | Kazakh           | Kyrgyz           |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Freedom of choice and control          | -0.010           | -0.076*          | -0.007           | 0.062            | 0.012            | 0.052*           | -0.033           | -0.022           | -0.011           | 0.027            |
| Subj. Well-being                       | -0.001           | 0.041            | 0.038            | -0.011           | 0.022            | -0.089***        | -0.064(*)        | -0.009           | 0.059**          | -0.075**         |
| Secular Rational Values                | 0.014            | 0.040            | 0.034            | -0.063           | -0.034           | -0.018           | -0.024           | 0.000            | -0.023           | -0.011           |
| Materialistic Values                   | 0.010            | 0.007            | -0.020           | -0.037           | 0.023            | 0.012            | -0.028           | -0.038           | 0.044*           | -0.002           |
| Sexual (reproductive) non-freedom      | -0.034           | -0.08(**)        | -0.029           | -0.048           | -0.067*          | 0.005            | -0.047           | -0.016           | 0.032            | -0.055(*)        |
| Gender Equality Support                | -0.089***        | -0.098**         | -0.023           | -0.079(*)        | -0.011           | -0.047(*)        | 0.024            | 0.055(*)         | -0.029           | 0.052(**)        |
| Anomia                                 | 0.007            | -0.002           | -0.021           | -0.069(*)        | 0.065(*)         | -0.043(*)        | -0.027           | -0.083**         | -0.083***        | -0.06(**)        |
| Important in life: Family              | 0.013            | -0.054           | -0.029           | 0.048            | 0.039            | -0.038(*)        | -0.058(*)        | 0.052(*)         | 0.006            | -0.012           |
| Interest in Politics                   | 0.205***         | 0.128***         | 0.269***         | 0.136***         | 0.170***         | 0.145***         | 0.178***         | 0.189***         | 0.077***         | 0.078**          |
| Most people can be trusted             | 0.053(*)         | 0.041            | 0.027            | 0.047            | 0.058(*)         | 0.029            | 0.118***         | 0.005            | 0.020            | 0.085***         |
| Non-Confidence: Political Institutions | -0.099***        | -0.031           | 0.047(**)        | 0.016            | -0.064           | -0.085***        | -0.171***        | -0.167***        | -0.125***        | -0.04(**)        |
| Importance of democracy                | -0.137***        | -0.048           | -0.029           | -0.040           | -0.006           | -0.026           | -0.132***        | -0.050(*)        | -0.034(*)        | 0.026            |
| Information source: Daily newspaper    | 0.068*           | 0.048            | 0.101**          | 0.077(*)         | -0.042           | 0.040            | 0.222***         | -0.058           | 0.079**          | 0.027            |
| Information source: Printed magazines  | -0.008           | 0.070(**)        | 0.012            | 0.096*           | -0.024           | -0.077**         | -0.123**         | 0.041            | 0.064*           | 0.070*           |
| Information source: TV news            | -0.038           | -0.099**         | -0.088***        | -0.032           | 0.006            | -0.016           | -0.005           | -0.050(*)        | -0.014           | 0.056*           |
| Information source: Radio news         | 0.002            | 0.066(**)        | -0.063*          | -0.045           | 0.069*           | 0.029            | 0.071*           | -0.015           | -0.076***        | 0.014            |
| Information source: Email              | -0.057           | 0.023            | 0.026            | -0.169**         | 0.011            | 0.007            | 0.110*           | 0.053            | -0.108**         | -0.07(**)        |
| Information source: Internet           | 0.202***         | 0.071            | 0.069            | 0.206            | 0.018            | 0.106**          | 0.055            | 0.013            | 0.161***         | 0.175***         |
| Information source: Talk               | -0.040           | -0.002           | 0.099***         | 0.040            | 0.106***         | -0.038(*)        | -0.019           | -0.016           | -0.055**         | -0.019           |
| Education                              | -0.140***        | -0.163***        | -0.129***        | -0.055           | -0.029           | -0.11***         | -0.049           | -0.011           | 0.009            | 0.010            |
| Incomes                                | 0.019            | 0.157***         | 0.037            | 0.041            | 0.054            | -0.013           | 0.074(*)         | -0.007           | 0.036            | -0.026           |
| Satisfaction with financial situation  | 0.016            | 0.079(*)         | -0.024           | 0.025            | 0.003            | 0.044            | 0.063            | 0.069*           | -0.022           | 0.093***         |
| <i>R squar. / adj. R squar.</i>        | <i>.19 (.17)</i> | <i>.19 (.15)</i> | <i>.23 (.20)</i> | <i>.21 (.16)</i> | <i>.10 (.04)</i> | <i>.10 (.06)</i> | <i>.21 (.16)</i> | <i>.10 (.05)</i> | <i>.10 (.05)</i> | <i>.10 (.05)</i> |

# Conclusions I

- In general - even along with higher GDP and rule of law - low governance quality (GQ) has positive effect on Civic Protest Activity Readiness (CPAR) - political instability, ineffective governance, poor corruption control – promote the higher declared readiness to mass rallies and non-violent protests.
- H1, H3-H5 in general confirmed.
- CPAR in transition countries is mediated by gender (but normally not by perception of gender equality; exc. - Ukraine). Nationalism, willingness to fight for the country, and self-positioning at political scale do not contribute significantly to CPAR prediction. Media effect of internet is important.
- H2 not confirmed: CPAR is better explained not by economic, structural and political differences (with respect to low inter-country differences). It is more a question of self-expression and post-materialist values.
- Research demonstrates a strong relationship between CPAR, political awareness, importance of democracy, values. Higher CPAR in post-socialist countries is significantly determined by higher level of non-traditionality (secular rational values), negative SWB (*grievance theory confirmed*), and such domains of self-expression values as post-materialism and sexual freedom (*Inglehart-Welzel-Norris approach: partially confirmed*).



# Conclusions II

After 1991 (till 2001): de-modernization (economy de-industrialization); ruined socialist variant of welfare state, institutionalization of capitalist economy: rise of inequality, decrease of equal opportunities, endangered human rights & privileges – and almost zero experience of fight for the life quality betterment.



Welcome  
to Capitalism!

# THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN



## Conclusions III

Stable pattern of significant determinants (WVS 3, 5): Subj. well-being (with health), Traditional/Secular Rational Values, Post-Materialism, Sexual freedom, Importance of democracy, Interest in Politics, Generalized trust.

Contrary to Dalton (Dalton et al, 2009). Post-socialist countries protest because of increasing dissatisfaction with government, and because economic and political development provide the resources for those who have political demands; protest becomes part of the repertoire of political action for a nation or an individual.


Institutionalization of the political protest culture in the capitalist world economy. With self-organized mass participation (90 % of participants of Ukrainian MAIDAN in Kyiv DID NOT belong to any political party or organization; KIIS, 2013-2014).

Conflation of determinants: materialistic and post-materialist, deprivation, emancipation.


# Further Steps: Agent-Based Modeling, model “Rebellion”

Models the rebellion of a subjugated population against a central authority. (via adaptation of Joshua Epstein's model of civil violence (2002).


| Initial cop density, %   | 5    | 5   | .5  | 1   | ... | 48  |
|--------------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Initial agent density, % | 60   | 5   | 5   | 30  | ... | 52  |
| Vision (7)               |      |     |     |     |     |     |
| Government legitimacy    | 0.35 | .70 | .48 | .25 | ... | .50 |
| Max jail term (turns)    | 45   | 30  | 30  | 50  | ... | 30  |



Simulation of system behaviour with different levels of “cop vs. protesters” proportion under changing government legitimacy and jail term



More cops vs. more protesters; low legitim.= long-term jail\protest iterates  
 More cops, more protesters; high legitim.= splash of jailed, and later activity (if decrease of legit. – higher protest level, controlled with jail terms, but not forever – till radicalization of all society).





Thank you for your attention. Stop keep calm,  
take into account mistakes, and make revolution...

Svitlana Khutka  
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