

Predictors of Public Political Euro-scepticism in the EU in 2003-11


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Research motivation

Forecasting the future of the EU



For example, in case of common immigration policy: European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in 2008 elaborated after the consent reached its peak

Research questions

- **Research questions:** *what does the unwillingness to transfer powers to the supranational level depend on?*
- *If the unwillingness is driven by the same causes regardless of the policy area, in which powers are to be taken away from national government?*
Is the character of the relationship different for different policies? “National difficulty” hypothesis of Dalton and Eichenberg (1998)

Defining this “consent”

- Definition from studies of party-based, not public Euroscepticism
- “**political Euroscepticism**” defined as “public refusals to provide more legitimate power to supranational institutions to deal with policy issues” (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005: 224)

Previous studies of Euroscepticism and specific contribution

- Political (attitude to EU involvement in policy) addressed less often than instrumental (assessment of membership to the EU)
- Public addressed less often than party-based
- Explored on country level, rarely EU-wide
“Desired speed of integration” (dependent variable in famous EU-wide study by De Vries and Edwards 2009) – unsuitable for us (imprecise about one policy area)

Theoretical framework

- **Trust in institutions**
- **Nationalistic feelings**
- **Type of community** (a predictor of political trust - van der Veld and Saris 2011)
manual workers (De Vries and Edwards 2009)
- **Demographic**

(usual, in detail in previous presentations)

Theoretical framework (2)

- **Securitization theory** (Buzan, Wæver):

threat → people urge governments
to seek for a solution

Unemployment, immigrant inflow,
situation in European and national
economies, household financial
expectations, satisfaction with life

Theoretical framework (3)

- **Risk of betrayal** (Baier 1986; Hardin 1998):
 - current command of power by the EU (unbeneficial /bad membership, transfers from EU budget)
 - overall image of the EU
 - information about the EU (Luhmann, Giddens, Lengyel), “cognitive mobilization” (Inglehart 1970): frequency of political discussions, education level, awareness of the European Commission
 - crime rate
 - satisfaction with democracy in country/EU

Dependent variable

Question: «For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) Government, or made jointly within the European Union?»

Answer: “Should be decided by the (national) Government”

Dependent factors: “policy types”

	Trans- national		Competi tiveness
Defence and foreign affairs	.704	Agriculture and fisheries	.583
Fight terrorism	.574	Environmental protection	.603
Immigrati on policy	.583	Regional support	.601
		Scientific research	.587

	Socio- economic
Health and welfare	.739
Unemploy ment	.631
Education	.673

Hypothesis (beginning)

- level of political Euroscepticism about any policy is higher:
- the worse they assess situation in European economy in comparison to situation in national economy;
- the worse economic situation in the EU they expect in the year to come;
- the better the financial situation of their household is expected to be in the year to come;
- the less transfers from the EU budget their country gets;
- the less they trust in the EU;
- the less they are satisfied with democracy in the EU;

Hypothesis (continuation)

- the worse and the less beneficial they assess the membership of their country in the EU;
- the more negative overall image of the EU they have;
- the less frequently they discuss politics with others;
- the less they are aware of the European Commission;
- the longer they studied full-time (that in the majority of cases means better education);
- the older they are;
- the higher is crime rate in their country;
- the more migrants enter their country

Method

Grouping 12 DVs into
3 dependent factors

Correlation matrix

Factor analysis of IVs

Multilevel regression
analysis

CFA of “Caution
about the EU

Eurobarometer 2003-11, 27 countries,
14 waves, 283191 observations

Choosing between separate and “delta” variables [EU minus national]

	Trans-national	Competitiveness	Socio-economic
Economic situation delta	,093	,018	,097
Bad situation in the national economy	-,014	,059	,048
Bad situation in the European economy	,089	,089	,054
Economic expectations delta	,060	,026	,056
Bad expectations about national economy	,052	,062	,038
Bad expectations about EU economy	,105	,081	,088
Pride delta	-,166	-,156	-,125
National pride	,051	,023	,014
European pride	-,134	-,145	-,120
Trust delta	,166	,123	,132
Distrust in national government	,020	,067	,010
Distrust in the EU	,215	,213	,164
Satisfaction with democracy delta	,164	,097	,162
Dissatisfaction with democracy in the country	-,006	,074	-,021
Dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU	,187	,191	,150


All the correlations are significant

Other correlations with 3 factors

	Trans- national	Competi- tiveness	Socio- economy c
Membership of the EU – bad thing	,250	,266	,161
Unbeneficial membership of the EU	,223	,242	,158
Negative overall image of the EU	,247	,253	,203
Crime rate this year	,143	,032	,189
Net transfers from EU budget	-,094	-,037	-,161
Aware of the European Commission	-,062	-,092	-,021
Term of education	-,064	-,082	-,029
Gender	insig.	,034	,012
Age	,080	,062	,089

Same direction of relationships with 3 types of policy –
not radical difference

Factor analysis of independent variables



	Membership of the EU – bad thing	Unbeneficial EU membership	Negative overall image of the EU	Trust in the EU
Factor loading	.824	.764	.769	.649
Extracted commonality	.678	.583	.592	.421

Factor “Caution about the EU”

CFA model


RMSEA=.006

CFI=.993


TLI=.959

SRMR= (w) .012 ; (b).066


Country level:
between



Respondent level:
within



Multilevel regression analysis



Crossing borders

$$PE_{\text{transnational}} = 1.788 - 2.092 * \text{CrimeRate} - 0.215 * \text{EU caution}$$

Competitiveness

$$PE_{\text{competitiveness}} = 1.506 + 2.479 * \text{CrimeRate} + 0.033 * \text{EU budget balance} - 0.003 * \text{GDPgrowth} - (0.266 + 0.003 * \text{GDPgrowth}) * \text{EU caution}$$

Needy

$$PE_{\text{well-being}} = 1.171 - 5.459 * \text{CrimeRate} + (0.62 * \text{CrimeRate} - 0.006 * \text{GDPgrowth} - 0.222) * \text{EUcaution}$$

Conclusion (1)

Hypothesis confirmed:

- Men are slightly more likely to run risk of transferring powers to supranational level than women (“Transnational” policies)
- Married people are more likely to support communitarization of “Transnational” and “Competitiveness” policies (but opposite for “Socioeconomic” policies)

Conclusion (2)

- Less satisfied with life are more likely to support communitarization of “Transnational” and “Socioeconomic” policies (but opposite for “Competitiveness”)
- Link with ideology remains unclear (indeed, opposition to European integration is expressed both by right and left parties, although on different grounds).

Conclusion (3)

- Public political Euroscepticism about different policies has different predictors: e.g. different influence of increasing crime rate on political Euroscepticism: makes less willing to communitarize “Competitiveness” policies, but more willing - “Socioeconomic” and “Transnational” ones.
- “Caution about the EU” more important for “competitiveness” policies than for “transnational” ones? But four slopes of six are modified by country-level variables

Conclusion (4)

Convenient factor “Caution about the EU”
(not new, but simplifying further research):

- good/bad membership of the EU;
- beneficial/unbeneficial membership of the EU;
- Overall image of the EU;
- trust in the EU;

(satisfaction with democracy in the EU – if available)

Conclusion (5)

Difference in **country-level** predictors of attitude to communitarization between 3 sets of policies:

- defence and foreign affairs, fighting terrorism, immigration (“transnational”);
- environmental protection, regional support, agriculture and fisheries, scientific research (“competitiveness”);
- health and welfare, unemployment, education (“socioeconomic”).

Partial confirmation of the “**national difficulty**” hypothesis (Dalton and Eichenberg): “Transnational” policy areas seem to be difficult to manage unilaterally

Thank you for your
attention and comments!

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