

Propensity for Corruption in Police: comparative study of Russia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria and Latvia

Tatiana Karabchuk , Ruslan Almuhametov
National Research University Higher School of Economics
tkarabchuk@hse.ru ralmukhametov@hse.ru

1. Problem and motivation

- Great number of empirical and theoretical publications cover police corruption Andvig, J. C., & Fjeldstad, O. H. (2008), Newburn, T., & Webb, B. (1999), Sherman, L. W. (1978), Knapp Commission. (1972),
- Almost all are based on western police data. Which brings us to our research question **What are police corruption determinants in post communist societies?**

2. Goals and tasks


The **aim** of the research is to develop corruption propensity index and disclose the corruption determinants for 4 post communist countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria and Latvia

3. Literature review

CORRUPTION AND MOONLIGHTING BEHAVIOR IN POLICE

1. Sherman, L. W. (1978). *Scandal and reform: Controlling police corruption*
2. Knapp Commission. (1972). *The Knapp Commission report on police corruption*
3. Bayley, 1996 (The Police and Political Development in Europe)
4. Newburn, T., & Webb, B. (1999). *Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature*
5. Kane, R. J. (2002). THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF POLICE MISCONDUCT
6. Beck & Ruth ,2002 (Attitudes to Corruption Amongst Russian PoliceOfficers and Trainees)
7. Tymoty Frye, 2002 (Police as an obstacle for business)
8. Robertson, 2004 (Police reform in Russia)
9. Andvig, J. C., & Fjeldstad, O. H. (2008). Crime, poverty and police corruption in developing countries.
10. Ayling and Shearing, 2008 (Australia case of police corruption)
11. Gerber, Mendelson, 2008 (Russian case of public abuse by police)
12. Bayley, D. H., & Perito, R. (2011). *Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges*
13. Lee, H., Lim, H., Moore, D. D., & Kim, J. (2013). How police organizational structure correlates with frontline officers' attitudes toward corruption

Explanatory model



Hypotheses

1. We suppose that greater difference between ideal wage at position occupied and real wage would increase propensity for corruption. (A. Mas 2006)
2. We suppose that higher group approval of corruption and higher group solidarity would increase propensity for corruption. (Sherman 1978 Code of silence)
3. Institutional precondition would increase propensity for corruption. (Sherman 1978) "... political environment is probably the leading explanation of why police departments become corrupt"

4. Data

Data

Surveys of policemen conducted in 2011-2012 in Bulgaria, Russia, Kazakhstan and Latvia (each country sample consists of 450-500 respondents)
Total sample size 1854 police respondents.

Sample descriptives

	Russia	Kazakhstan	Bulgaria	Latvia
% of females employed	23.1	28.7	13.1	39.1
Average working hours per day	9.9	11.9	9.7	9.6
% with tertiary education	25.1	84.7	20.5	20.05
% of high-rank positioned	20.0	28.5	11.1	25.3
Average tenure in police	7.9	8.9	13.7	12.4
% of those working in the capital city of the country	8.9	22.1	20.3	42.2

4. Methodology

Methodology

1. corruption index development
2. SEM for propensity for corruption

4. Methodology

Dependent variable – corruption index:

- Attitude towards corruption
- Attitude towards system where corruption is im-/possible

Main Tested Independent variables:


1. Believes/understanding/opinion on the situation about corruption in police measured by latent variable:
 - Presence of set pricelist for police services
 - Opinion on department approval of corruption
 - Opinion on department approval of additional income
2. Difference between ideal and real wage
3. Within group relations (code of silence)

4. Methodology

Control variables:

- Tenure
- Department
- Rank
- Gender
- City size
- Education
- Institutional precondition (business without personal relations with authorities)
- Level of safety in the area
- Duration of residence in the area

Preliminary results: Family well-being during the last year



Descriptives:

	Do you approve your colleague who declared corruption in your department?
Yes	76.4 % (max 93.8 Bul)
No	23.6 % (max 47,4% Kaz)

Descriptives:

System preference (%)

	Russia	Kazakhstan	Bulgaria	Latvia
Negotiate with police and authorities	0,2	0,2	2,7	0
2	0,7	1	0,5	0,2
3	1,4	2	4,1	2,3
4	2,8	1,7	7	2,7
5	12,9	13,4	17,9	9
6	9,7	6,2	7,3	3,5
7	17,2	12,6	9,7	9,6
8	17	9,2	11,1	15
9	7,8	9,2	8,2	14,2
Strict enforcement of law compliance	30,3	43,3	30,3	43,5

Descriptives:

	Is majority of your department consider acceptable that policemen take bribery	Negative attitude towards additional (informal) payments in police in your department	How the price for informal help from police is defined in the city?
Yes	16.9 % (max 32,5% Kaz)	26.1% (max 40.8% Lat)	41% (max 63.6% Rus)
No	83.% (max 94,9% Bul)	73.9% (max 85% Rus)	59% (max 76.8% Bul)

Descriptives

Relationship with colleagues (group solidarity) %

	Good, friendly relationship	Normal working relationship	Tensions, but we can work together	Bad, conflicting, it disturbs work
Russia	26,0	69,2	4,3	0,5
Kazakhstan	29,8	54,7	11,3	4,2
Bulgaria	22,4	67,7	8,3	1,6
Latvia	32,7	57,2	7,8	2,2

Descriptives

Difference between ideal and real wage

	Average difference in PPP(\$)	Policemen with positive delta (%)
Russia	1441,3	99
Kazakhstan	740,7	98,2
Bolgaria	1105,2	99
Latvia	883,2	100

Descriptives

Is it possible to conduct business without having personal connections with local authorities in your area (Institutional precondition) (%)

	can conduct business without connections	possible but only in some regions	impossible to conduct business
Russia	31,5	38,3	30,2
Kazakhstan	30	27,1	42,9
Bulgaria	32,1	38,5	29,4
Latvia	56,3	27,1	16,6

Descriptives

Safety in the area (%)

	High	Medium	Low
Russia	14,4	70	15,6
Kazakhstan	21,1	67,7	11,2
Bulgaria	19,4	74,1	6,4
Latvia	10,8	77	12,2

Thank you for your attention

Additional slide of questions

Ideas about corruption in police as whole – independent variable

- 30. Как относятся к дополнительным заработкам сотрудники Вашего подразделения?
- 38. Насколько приемлемой большинство Ваших коллег в подразделении сочтет следующую деятельность (позицию)? Полицейский получил взятку
- 41. Дополнительные подработки сотрудников полиции - это часто оказание неформального содействия населению и бизнесменам. Существуют ли в Вашем городе какая-то устоявшаяся плата за такое содействие, или «цены» на него назначаются от случая к случаю?

Attitudes – index of corruption – dependent variable:

- 39. Предположим, Вы узнаете, что один из Ваших коллег сообщил в службу внутренней безопасности о коррупции в вашем подразделении, как Вы к этому отнесетесь?
- 23. В некоторых странах полиция и другие официальные органы согласны идти навстречу тем, кто нарушает правила, и люди могут решать свои проблемы быстро, если у них есть личные связи. В других, наоборот, органы власти жестко следят за выполнением всех правил. Какую систему предпочли бы вы?