

# 2011 Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis




*Andrey Korotayev, Julia Zinkina*  
(Russian Academy of Sciences)


# Causes of revolution

- Economic stagnation?
- Poverty?
- Inequality?
- Corruption?
- Unemployment?




# GDP dynamics in Egypt, 1980-2010, billions of 2005 dollars, PPP







# Population dynamics of Egypt, 1980-2010 , millions



# Relative population growth rates in Egypt, (% per year)



**GDP per capita dynamics in Egypt, 1980-2010,  
in 2005 dollars, PPP**







Corruption?



# Transparency International Corruption Index, 2010




# Transparency International Corruption Index, 2010






Unemployment?

# Unemployment levels (%) in some countries of the world



# Dynamics of unemployment in Egypt, 1990-2010 (%)







Inequality?



# Inequality (Gini Index) dynamics in Egypt, 1991-2005



# Level of inequality (Gini Index), 2000-2010









Poverty?

مركز انسترا سات  
توزيعات العرش والكمبيوتر  
جميع اقسامه متوفرة بكميات كبيرة


# Poverty: per cent of population below \$1 a day income poverty line




# Population below \$1.25 a day income poverty line (%), dynamics in Egypt, 1991-2005




# Population below \$1.25 a day income poverty line (%)



# Poverty: per cent of population below \$2 a day income poverty line



# Population below \$2 a day income poverty line (%)





مركز انسترا سات  
تجهيزات الكمبيوتر والالكترونيات  
جميع انواع خدمات الانترنت

# How the real Third World poverty looks like: Kibera (Nairobi, Kenya)

















**ТЕМ НЕ МЕНЕЕ, КАКОЕ-ТО  
ВЛИЯНИЕ ДИНАМИКА  
БЕДНОСТИ ВСЁ-ТАКИ  
ОКАЗАЛА**

**ПАРАДОКС Гамала Сиама и  
Ханади Мустафы Абд ар-  
Ради**



# Dynamics of the world wheat prices, \$/ton, 2005-2011







شباب 6 اے ایف پی




**ОТНОС!**





**శాసనసభ!**


# FAO Global Cooking Oil Price Index (2002-2004=100, deflated)




# FAO Global General Food Price Index (2002-2004=100, deflated)



# Population below \$2 a day income poverty line (%), dynamics in Egypt, 1991-2005




**Динамика мировых цен на продовольствие (общий индекс цен на продовольствие ФАО, 2002–2004 = 100, с учетом инфляции), январь 2003 – май 2011 г.**






Процент россиян, ответивших «**Испытываю**» на вопрос «Вы лично испытываете или не испытываете недовольство, готовность участвовать в **акциях протеста?**», данные в % от всех опрошенных, ноябрь 2009 – июль 2011 г.




Процент россиян, ответивших «**Выросли**» на вопрос «По Вашему мнению, за последний месяц **цены на основные продукты, товары и услуги в целом выросли, снизились или почти не изменились**», данные в % от всех опрошенных, ноябрь 2009 – июль 2011 г.




# **SUBSIDIES**


# Dynamics of per capita daily calorie intake in Egypt, 1961–2007, kcal/capita/day




# Dynamics of life expectancy at birth in Egypt, 1970-1990, years




# Dynamics of crude death rate (per 1000) in Egypt, 1970-2009



# Dynamics of crude death and birth rates (per 1000) in Egypt, 1970-1990, log scale




# Population of Egypt, thousands, 10 000 BCE – 2005 CE







# Population of Egypt, thousands, 1836-1990



# Dynamics of absolute population growth rates, Egypt, 1960-1993 (thousands of people per year)



# Dynamics of infant (per 1000 live births) and under-5 child mortality, Egypt, 1960-2009



# Dynamics of youth cohort (aged 20-24) proportion in the Egyptian population, 1990- 2010 (with forecast till 2020)



For example, Goldstone maintains that “the rapid growth of youth can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large youth cohorts are often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities for families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a “youth bulge” (an unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24 relative to the total adult population) has historically been associated with times of political crisis. Most major revolutions ... [including] most twentieth-century revolutions in developing countries—have occurred where exceptionally large youth bulges were present” (Goldstone 2002: 10–11; see also Goldstone 1991; Moller 1968; Mesquida, Weiner 1999; Heinsohn 2003; Fuller 2004).

# Dynamics of young (20-24 years old) population in Egypt, thousands

