

# Ressentiment and growth of anti-Americanism in Russia: changes in elite and mass attitudes during 1993 – 2009

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
# Syllabus

- Anti-Americanism in Russia: the most popular explanations
- Relations between elite and mass attitudes towards the USA
- Ressentiment: conceptual framework
- Hypotheses
- Data and variables
- Analysis and Results
- Dynamic Model of anti-Americanism in Russia

# Anti-Americanism in Russia: the most popular explanations

- Issue-oriented anti-Americanism [Rubinstein & Smith, 1988] – anti-Americanism as a reaction to US international politics (Kosovo, Iraq, southern Ossetia) [Gudkov, 2002; Batalov 2003; Andreev, 2008]
- Instrumental anti-Americanism [Rubinstein & Smith, 1988] – anti-American sentiment as a result of elite propaganda [Shlapentokh, 2011]

# Attitudes of Russians towards the USA: 1997 – 2008 (Levada-Center national polls)




# Attitudes to the USA: comparison of elites and masses (1993-2009)



# Puzzles

- Why did the radical change in mass attitudes occurred in the end of 1990s?
- What is the source of growth of anti-Americanism among the elites in the mid-90s?

# Ressentiment: The Essence



# Framing Ressentiment

## ***The concept of Ressentiment*** [Greenfield, 1992]:

- Foreign institutions and practices as a political ideal
- Unsuccessful attempts to adopt experience of another state
- Transformation of attitudes – from love to hate

## ***Ressentiment in Russia:***

- USA as a model for Russian reforms [Levada, 1990; Kagarlitsky, 2002; Shlapentokh, 2011]
- Hopes for US assistance in reforming Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union
- Disappointment in the outcomes of the reforms [Batalov, 2003; Shlapentokh, 1998: 201-202]
- Growth of anti-American sentiment



# Hypotheses

- (H1) Individual disappointment in the outcomes of the economic and political reforms is positively associated with anti-American sentiment.
- (H2) There is a non-linear relationship between confidence in current governmental policy and individual anti-American attitudes over time; this relationship is negative under Yeltsin's rule and positive under Putin's and Medvedev's rule

# Data

- William Zimmerman's survey of Russian elites: **six waves** (1993, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008, 2012) **N = 1.420**
- Nationwide surveys «New Russian Barometer» (by Richard Rose and Levada-Center): **twelve waves** (*1993, 1994, January 1996, July-August 1996, 1998, January 2000, April 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009*).  
**N = 23.700**

# Variables I

- Anti-Americanism: ***Do you think that the US poses a big threat, some threat, a little threat or no threat to peace and security in this society*** (recoded into a binary variable)
- ***Epast, Ppast*** – evaluations of the economic and political systems before perestroika on the scale from -100 to 100
- ***Epres, Ppres*** – evaluations of the current economic and political systems on the scale from -100 to 100
- ***Efut, Pfut*** – evaluations of the economic and political systems in five years on the scale from -100 to 100

# Variables II

- Disappointment Index:

$$(1.1) Dis_{econ} = \frac{E_{past} - E_{pres}}{(E_{past} - E_{pres})/2 + 0.1} + (E_{past} - E_{pres})/2 ;$$

$$(1.2) Dis_{polit} = \frac{P_{past} - P_{pres}}{(P_{past} - P_{pres})/2 + 0.1} + (P_{past} - P_{pres})/2 ;$$

$$(1.3) Disappointment = Dis_{econ} + Dis_{polit}$$

- Confidence Index:

$$(2.1) Conf_{econ} = \frac{E_{fut} - E_{pres}}{(E_{fut} - E_{pres})/2 + 0.1} + (E_{fut} - E_{pres})/2 ;$$

$$(2.2) Dis_{polit} = \frac{P_{fut} - P_{pres}}{(P_{fut} - P_{pres})/2 + 0.1} + (P_{fut} - P_{pres})/2 ;$$

$$(2.3) Confidence = Conf_{econ} + Conf_{polit} .$$


# Variables III

- **Year:** New Russian Barometer waves (categorical)
- **Cohort:** born before 1940, born in 1941-1950, 1951-1960, 1961-1970, born after 1970
- **Higher Education.** Dichotomous (Reference category – no higher education).
- **Social Status:** *“In our society there are people of high social position and people of low social position. What position in your opinion do you have now on a scale if 1 to 10 where 1 is the highest and 10 is the lowest?”* (omitted in the 1993 and 1994 waves)
- **Place of Living:** rural/urban
- **Employment Status:** dichotomous variable – whether respondent has a full-time employment
- **Gender** (reference category – male)


# Results

- Disappointment in the outcomes of the reforms increases the level of individual anti-Americanism
- Ressentiment effect decreases over time
- Confidence in the current government policy positively affects attitudes toward America (this effect is relatively stable over time)
- Social status negatively affects individual anti-Americanism (however, there is a non-linear effect: middle and upper-middle class are less anti-American than higher class)
- Higher education is positively associated with anti-American sentiment
- Men are more anti-American than women. Full-time employment also has a positive impact on individual anti-Americanism (p-value = 0.07)
- Younger cohorts are generally less anti-American. However, this has changed during the 2000s.

# Interaction Between Disappointment and Wave




# Interaction Between Disappointment and Wave






# Interaction Between Confidence and Wave



# Interaction Between Confidence and Wave

## AntiAmericanism



# Limitations of the Analysis

- Low R-squared – no more than 0.1
- Some control variables are omitted in the first two waves – we could not check robustness of our results

# The Dynamic Model of anti-Americanism in Russia

- The first period: the effect of resentment – disappointment in reforms provoke growth of elite anti-Americanism
- The second period: non-systematic influence of elites on public opinion - resentment as a latent prerequisite of the radical transformation of public opinion – the first examples of issue-oriented mass anti-Americanism in Russia
- The third period: anti-Americanism as a state policy

Thank you very much  
for your attention!

# Appendix A

## Regression Tables

	Model 1a	Model 1b
(Intercept)	-0.81***	-2.01***
	(0.08)	(0.31)
disappointment	1.74***	3.13***
	(0.08)	(0.35)
confidence	-0.96***	-1.92***
	(0.12)	(0.38)
YearY94		0.31
		(0.37)
YearJ96		0.39
		(0.38)
YearJA96		1.27***
		(0.42)
YearMA98		0.89**
		(0.42)
YearJ00		1.49***
		(0.40)
YearA00		1.56***
		(0.45)
YearJ01		1.89***
		(0.41)
YearJ03		2.72***
		(0.52)
YearJ05		1.83***
		(0.46)
YearA07		2.19***
		(0.66)
YearJun 09		1.34*
		(0.75)
disappointment:YearY94		-0.69*
		(0.41)
disappointment:YearJ96		-0.75*
		(0.43)
disappointment:YearJA96		-1.81***
		(0.44)
disappointment:YearMA98		-0.91**

disappointment:YearJ00		-1.83***
		(0.45)
disappointment:YearA00		-1.49***
		(0.48)
disappointment:YearJ01		-1.76***
		(0.44)
disappointment:YearJ03		-2.36***
		(0.47)
disappointment:YearJ05		-1.50***
		(0.47)
disappointment:YearA07		-1.71***
		(0.59)
disappointment:YearJun 09		-2.15***
		(0.61)
YearY94:confidence		1.68***
		(0.47)
YearJ96:confidence		0.98*
		(0.52)
YearJA96:confidence		0.87
		(0.55)
YearMA98:confidence		0.63
		(0.53)
YearJ00:confidence		1.41***
		(0.54)
YearA00:confidence		0.77
		(0.63)
YearJ01:confidence		0.52
		(0.55)
YearJ03:confidence		-0.51
		(0.73)
YearJ05:confidence		0.49
		(0.61)
YearA07:confidence		0.51
		(0.90)
YearJun 09:confidence		2.48**
		(1.04)
AIC	26273.21	25668.14
BIC	26296.88	25952.11
Log Likelihood	-13133.61	-12798.07
Deviance	26267.21	25596.14
Num. obs.	19693	19693
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1		

	Model 2a	Model 2b
(Intercept)	-1.22***	-1.12***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
disappointment	1.62***	1.62***
	(0.10)	(0.10)
confidence	-1.04***	-1.04***
	(0.14)	(0.14)
YearJA96	0.22***	0.23***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
YearMA98	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
YearJ00	0.71***	0.71***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
YearA00	0.65***	0.65***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
YearJ01	0.66***	0.66***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
YearJ03	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
YearJ05	0.75***	0.76***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
YearA07	1.02***	1.02***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
YearJun 09	1.03***	1.03***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Status	0.03***	
	(0.01)	


Education: Higher	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
cohort1941-1950	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)
cohort1951-1960	-0.14**	-0.13**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
cohort1961-1970	-0.14**	-0.13**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
cohort>1971	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Sexfemale	-0.17***	-0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
empstatfull-time	0.07*	0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
urban	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)
status2lowest		0.17***
		(0.05)
status2lower middle		0.11***
		(0.04)
status2higher		0.03
		(0.06)
status2elite		-0.02
		(0.11)
AIC	19899.75	19900.80
BIC	20059.62	20083.52
Log Likelihood	-9928.87	-9926.40
Deviance	19857.75	19852.80
Num. obs.	14960	14960



# Appendix B

Cohort differences

# USA as a threat to security and order in Russia (change over six waves of Zimmerman's elites survey)



# Anti-American Sentiment: Cohort Differences (New Russian Barometer Data)

