

Commitment to Nationalism: Predictors of Popular Political Euroscepticism about EU Common Immigration Policy

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Research question

- Need to deepen European integration
- Decisions depend on popular attitudes: people's consent to confer powers to the EU (to communitarize a policy area)
- Immigration policy: Euroscepticism decreased
→ Immigration Pact elaborated since 2007
- *Why did the level of political Euroscepticism about common immigration policy change that way in the EU?*

What is popular political Euroscepticism

- Public opinion, not party-based Euroscepticism
- Political – attitude to policy:
“public refusals to provide more legitimate power to supranational institutions to deal with policy issues” (Lubbers, Scheepers 2005: 224)
Not to let the EU interfere with domestic affairs

Important: manifestation of nationalism

- EU opposed to nation-states (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999)
- nationalism - common denominator of Eurosceptic positions (Halikiopoulou et al., 2010).
- opposition to immigration policy: caused by nationalism (no powers to supranational entity) or not (fight migration together)

Gap in research of Euroscepticism

- Political addressed rarer than instrumental (membership of the EU unbeneficial or bad)
- Popular addressed rarer than party-based
- Didn't find EU-wide generalizations: mostly on country level

Theoretical framework

- Trust in institutions (Tönnis, Luhmann, Giddens, Sztompka, Fukuyama, Coleman...)
Condition for cooperation (Coleman, Deutsch, Gambetta)
Quéré: trustworthiness and “entrustment” (i.e., cognitive and active component of trust) – threshold
- Securitization theory (Buzan, Wæver):
threat → pressure on gvt to change (seek for solution)
- Attachment to nation-state (link with nationalism, above)

Theoretical framework (2)

- Risk of betrayal (Baier, 1986; Hardin, 1998):

”Present dimension”:


- EU role in policy area
- command of power by the EU (unbeneficial/bad membership)
- Overall image of the EU
- Awareness of the EU (Luhmann, Giddens, Lengyel)

”Future dimension”:

- Democratic character (Norris, Hooghe, Scharpf).

Dependent variable (initial)

- “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) Government, or made jointly within the European Union? - Immigration” – National government



Hypothesis to confirm in two forms

Political Euroscepticism about immigration policy is determined negatively by:

- importance of immigration issues for the country;
 - assessment of economic situation in the EU;
 - awareness of the European Commission;
 - benefits from membership of the EU;
 - assessment of membership of the EU as bad;
- assessment of current EU's role in immigration policy area;
 - satisfaction with democracy in the EU;
 - overall general image of the EU;
 - trust in the EU;

Positively by:

- attachment to the nation-state.

Method, two phases

- 1) Individual level to ascertain predictors:
correlation analysis, Eurobarometer, fall 2007
- 2) EU-level, as country level explored by others:
regression analysis, Eurobarometer, 2004-2010

Eurobarometer sample: 1000 per country (500 in Luxembourg, 2000 in Germany, 1000 in Great Britain, 300 in Northern Ireland)

Poll frequency: twice a year


Hypothesis 1: in pursuit of confirmation on individual level

~~Predicted:~~

- ~~•Trust in the EU (-,257**)~~
- ~~•Attachment to the EU (-,171**)~~
- Overall EU image (-,264**)
- Heard about the European Commission (EC) (,105*)

Partially predicted factors:

- Trust in the EC (-,241**)
 - Trust in the UN (-,121*)
 - EU present policy direction (-,214**):
- components of trust in institutions?
component of the predicted “risk of betrayal – present dimension”?



Note:

- More predictors if we measure abstract consent to communitarization
I.e., if dependent variable is «For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the national Government, or made jointly within the European Union? – Immigration», than broader range of predictors, but weaker correlation ($< ,2$)

Additional factors besides those discovered by previous analysis


Life satisfaction (,012*)	more power for country within the EU in the future (-,095**)
Situation in the country: economy, employment, environment (,021-,03*)	attachment to country ,028**
Situation in European economy (-,06*)	satisfaction with the democracy in the EU - ,133**
Expectations: life, economy, finance, job, EU economy ~(-,02)	country interests respected in the EU - ,102**
Immigration – one of 2 important issues for the country (-,021**)	EU role in policies: e.g. immigration - ,122**
Satisfaction with EU present direction - ,076**	good/bad EU membership -,183**
trust in nat. gvt (,017**), the EC (-,175**), the UN (-,097**)	benefits from membership -,161**
understand how the EU works -,043**	left/right placement -,033** (but doubtful distinction)
preferred EU decision making power (QB2) - ,036**	

In bold – factors in the hypothesis

Problems

- Theoretical background needed to substantiate unpredicted factors
- Explanation for difference between abstract consent for EU countries and the specific one for the country: threshold between “trustworthiness” and “entrustment” (cognitive and active component of trust)?
- Include aggregate “objective variables” (GDP etc.) in individual level analysis?

Hypothesis: longitudinal



Hypothesis 2: disputable confirmation by multiple linear regression (longitudinal)

Independent variable, 2004-2010	Coefficient <i>b</i> of multiple linear regression	Sig.
Assessment of the EU economy	-,344	,074
Attachment to nation-state	1,096	,114
Satisfaction with democracy in the EU	,179	,645
EU role in immigration policy	,411	,193
Unbeneficial membership of the EU	-,552	,075
Membership of the EU is a bad thing	,170	,840
Negative image of the EU	,609	,376
Heard of the European Commission	,129	,746
Tend not to trust the EU	,813	,101
Immigration – one of 2 most important issues for the country	-,199	,414

No “objective” ind. variables: Eurobarometer conducted twice a year, but no such frequent measurement of GDP etc.

In bold – acceptable significance

Questions without answers

- Problem of bad aggregate level significance regardless of significance on individual level. Understandable: only 13 timepoints available. But were significant on individual level, have appealing R-square (more than 0.7) and DW (2,23). Best solution: drop aggregate level? Factor analysis?
- Country-specific analysis? (explored by others)
- Include “objective” independent variables?

Further steps

- Account for multicollinearity and endogeneity: factor analysis? Index?
- A non-linear regression needed?
- Country-specific individual level analysis?
- Take EU legitimacy explanation? (confer powers if consider the EU legitimate)

Thanks for your attention!

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