



Protests under non-democratic regimes: 'contingent' democrats versus 'genuine' democrats

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27th April 2013, Saint Petersburg

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Progress Report



Previous Findings and the gap

If citizens widely share emancipative values, authoritarian survival is seriously challenged

Emancipative values suggest peaceful forms of protest

However, I focused only on post-electoral protests



The GAP

- 1) the potential “ecological fallacy” trap
- 2) there is no clear evidence regarding the individual values-profile and protest activities, since the level of economic development is lower and, thus, average values of emancipative values are lower in autocracies



Research Question

- who are the protesters in authoritarian regimes – “true believers” in democratic ideals or “contingent democrats”, primarily preoccupied by their material interests?





Hypotheses

- *H0: emancipative values are significantly associated with participation in lawful/peaceful demonstrations;*
- *H1: higher rates of emancipative values are associated with higher propensity of participation in lawful/peaceful demonstrations;*
- *H2: emancipative values are not expected to have any link with violent forms of protest.*



Main Dependent Variables

the respondent's approval of three forms of protest behavior:

- signing petitions,
- participation in peaceful demonstrations and
- illegal occupation of buildings or factories.



Main independent variable:

Individual score on emancipative values

This is done by averaging item scores, after having recoded all items into the same polarity and having standardized their coding schemes into the same scale range between minimum 0 and maximum 1.



Sample Description


N = 21 authoritarian countries for which the survey data are available.
5th wave, WVS

The time-span is from 2000 to 2008, thus, I do not account for the impact of the “great recession” and take into account the prosperous 2000s.

Selection rule: Higher threshold: Political Rights (FH) \leq 2 OR Polity IV \geq 6 for t-1



Frequency of protests in authoritarian regimes by year




Source: CNTS; author's dataset



Graphs by country - year




Distribution of emancipative values by countries






Average number of potential protesters by emancipative values





Average number of potential protesters by GDP ppp pc





Signing petitions by emancipative values: comparing the models ^[1]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects
EVstan	0.0139***	0.0143***	0.0128***	0.0136***
Sex (female)		-0.387***	-0.402***	-0.384***
age		-0.00332**	0.000131	0.00183*
Secondary edulevel		0.207***	0.369***	0.401***
Higher edulevel		0.584***	0.767***	0.827***
medium_incomelevel		0.0550		
High incomelevel		0.135***		
Repression				0.235**
Log (internet users per 100)				-0.160***
Log GDP t-1				0.285***
Inequality				-0.643*
Inflation				-0.521***
Unemployment				0.0136
N	32107	12693	31880	22317
df_m	21	16	25	27
ll	-27784	-11501	-27142	-18722

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Approval of demonstrations

	(1)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bivariate with				
	clustered se	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects
EVstan	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
Sex (female)			-0.5***	-0.6***	-0.6***
age			-0.003*	-0.001	0.001
Secondaryedu			0.3***	0.4***	0.4***
Higheredu			0.7***	0.8***	0.9***
Medium income			0.2***		
Highincome			0.2***		
Repression					-0.2*
Internet users per 100					-0.1***
GDP t-1					0.2***
Inequality					0.5
Inflation					0.4**
Unemployment					-0.04
N	30750	30750	12895	30542	20805
df_m	1	20	16	24	26
ll	-27870	-24909	-10252	-24183	-16680

Standard errors in parentheses



Approval of illegal buildings and factories occupation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	bivariate	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects	Fixed-effects
EV	-0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sex (female)			-0.3***	-0.3***	-0.3**
age			-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01*
2.Edulevel			0.1	0.2**	0.1
3.Edulevel			0.2**	0.3***	0.5***
2.Income			0.1		
3income			0.2***		
Repression					1.6
Internet					0.6
GDP t-1					2.2
Inequality					
N	13201	13201	11386	13131	7308
df_m	1	9	15	13	13
ll	-4948	-4053	-3635	-3979	-2220



The effect of emancipative values by countries

- are significant only **in 50%** of the cases: Algeria, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Egypt, Burkina Faso and Tanzania
- in all countries where emancipative values have some effect, the direction of linkage **is positive**: one unit increase in emancipative values induces higher log-odds of making transition from the category with lesser support for demonstrations to the one with more enthusiastic approval of demonstrations **by around 0.02**.
- Outlier: the b-coefficient for Tanzania turns out to be negative (?)
- **The most pronounced effect** of emancipative values is observed in Jordan and Morocco, when the weakest positive effect is in Kyrgyzstan.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	albania	russia	egypt 2000	algeria	ethiopia	iraq	jordan 2001	jordan 2007	kyrgyzs tan 2003	Malaysi a	morocc o 2001	morocc o 2007	nigeria	rwanda	zambia	singapo re	zimbab we
EV	0.01	0.001	-0.001	0.02***	-0.01	0.001	0.03***	0.03**	0.01**	0.01*	0.04***	0.04***	0.003	0.01	-0.001	-0.001	0.003
Sex	-1.02***	-0.04	0.01	-0.9***	-0.2**	-1.7***	-0.9***	-1.5***	-0.3***	-0.3**	-0.8***	-0.7***	-0.8***	-0.2**	-0.5***	-0.5***	-0.6***
Age	-0.00669	0.0180**	2.51e-06	0.00955*	0.000492	0.0108**	0.0226*	-0.0122	0.0164**	-0.00827	0.0110*	0.000157	-0.00210	-0.00546	0.00139	0.00139	-0.00639
2.Edu	0.304**	0.208	-0.0771	0.475**	-0.153	0.126	0.415	0.174	0.963**	0.0836	0.790**	0.988**	0.442**	0.763**	0.442**	0.442**	0.122
3.Edu	0.515**	0.470**	-0.128	0.933**	0.0773	0.0589	0.974**	1.171**	1.819**	0.543**	1.271**	1.867**	1.094**	0.832**	1.113**	1.113**	1.906**
N	786	1903	2996	1183	1093	2312	1200	1185	1030	1200	2045	1063	1936	1420	1404	1404	958
Ll	-774.1	-1827	-1605	-1177	-1169	-2141	-423.7	-464.0	-929.1	-809.5	-1740	-971.3	-1885	-1171	-1447	-1447	-780.4

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Why in some countries emancipative values are more important, when in others they reveal zero-effect?

- One explanation would be that in authoritarian countries with relatively high per capita income (Singapore, Russia and Malaysia) the effect of emancipative values is dampened by economic benefits.
- However, there is no clear correlation between middle and low income autocracies and significance of emancipative values.
- Probably the answer can be found in interaction effects of economic development and country's religious profile, e.g. in middle income Muslim countries the effect is more pronounced.
- This might be an artifact of nonrandom sample of countries.



Summary

- Emancipative values have revealed in average positive effect on the probability of peaceful forms of political protest even in authoritarian countries;
- This effect seems **robust**, though, not **big** in magnitude;
- Emancipative values have nothing to do with intentionally violent and illegal protest actions;
- There is significant **intra-country variation** in ways how values may translate into political action.



Next steps

- additional control variables
- divide each protest variable up into two dummies and analyze them separately (“nested analysis”)
- a country-level correlation between the self-reported protest data from the WVS and some observational measures
- New measure of protest and repression (GDELT)
- MLM?



Thank you for Your Attention!
Questions and comments ?