

Value Change and Extreme Right Voting in Europe: 1990-2010

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What's News?

Main finding of my November presentation:

- Counterintuitively, an average level of postmaterialism in a given country increases percentage of votes for extreme rights

Improvements in my analysis:

- Effect of value polarization is considered
- Some new explanatory variables were added and sample of RRPs was reduced
- Another method of analysis is used: tobit fixed effects regression model instead simple OLS

The Question

- “According to most scholarship on the populist radical Right, radicalism in general and extremism in particular are based upon values fundamentally opposed to those of (western) democracy” (Mudde, 2010: 2)
- Why radical right parties which exploit anti-modernization appeals still persist in Western Europe, most modernized region of the world?

Causes of Extreme Right Voting

Economic factors:

- Country-level: unemployment, inflation, slow growth (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Swank and Betz, 2003);
- Individual level: low socio-economic status, personal unemployment [Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005; Rydgren, 2008]

Immigration:

- Ethnic competition [Olzak, 1992; Knigge, 1998; Kriesi 1999; Lubbers & Scheepers 2000; Swank and Betz, 2003; Golder, 2003; Fennema 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005];
- Crime (Smith, 2010)
- Cultural threat (Oesh, 2008)

Political opportunity structure:

- Electoral design (Kitschelt, 1995; Jackman and Volpert, 1996)
- District size [Kitschelt, 1995; Veugelers & Magnan, 2005],
- Ideological position of mainstream parties [Kitschelt, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006]

(!) There are empirical evidences both in favour of and against each of these explanations

Values and Extreme Right Voting: different causal paths

- Growth of postmaterialism – spread of tolerance and trust - decline of RRPs (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005)
- Modernization – polarization of value attitudes – spread of *ressentiment*, xenophobia and intolerance, and anti-modernization attitudes among the “losers of modernization” – RRP success (Swank & Betz, 2003; Inglehart, 1990; Betz, 1994; Dalton, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Minkenberg, 1993; Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007, Rydgren, 2008).

Hypotheses

(H1) Average level of postmaterialism (or, emancipative values, or trust) negatively influences RRPs' performance in a given countries.

(H2) Value polarization increases a probability of success for RRPs

(H3) General level of xenophobia is positively related to RRPs' electoral outcomes.

(H4) Growth of unemployment leads to increase in percentage of votes for RRP

(H5) An effect of unemployment on RRP voting is less when an average level of emancipative values in a country is relatively high

(H6) Percentage of immigrant population affect RRP' electoral fortunes less when the average level of emancipative values in a country is relatively high

(H7) The higher percentage of migrants in a given country the less effect of trust on RRPs' performance

Data and Sample

- 29 countries (all EU members + Switzerland and Norway); 1990-2010, 162 observations
- Selection of RRPs: Van Spanje's (2009) meta-analysis and Comparative Manifesto Project classification: 56 parties for 27 countries. There were no RRPs in Cyprus and Luxembourg
- Value indicators from five waves of World Value Survey (second to six)
- Second wave: 1990-1993; third wave: 1994-1998; fourth wave: 1999-2004; fifth wave: 2005-2007; six wave: 2008-2010
- Missing values were imputed with Amelia II software [Honacker et al., 2012]

Variables

- **RPV:** percentage of votes for all RRP in a given election (*European Election Database*)
- **Postmaterialism:** Average level of postmaterialism in a given country
- **Evalues:** an Emancipative Values Index
- **Trust:** Average level of generalized trust for a given country (WVS data)
- **Tolerance:** Index which includes four WVS items
- **PostmatPolar:** Polarization index for materialism/postmaterialism dimension (Modified RQ Index with zero weight for a central category)
- **Polarvalues:** Gini Index for emancipative values for a given country
- **Unemployment:** Unemployment rate in an year of elections
- **Immigrants:** percentage of foreign-born population in a given country in a given year (OECD data)
- **Effnumb:** Effective number of parties on the votes level calculated according to formula by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). (*from Comparative Political Data Set*)
- **Gallaher:** Index of disproportionality according to the formula proposed by Gallagher (1991). (*CPDS data*)
- **ArCa:** an average salience of “radical right” ideas in party manifestos for all parties in a given election. Following Arzheimer and Carter (2006), the index includes four Comparative Manifesto Project indicators: internationalism, law and order, national way of life, and multiculturalism.
- **Ssfunds:** Tax revenue of social security funds as a percentage of GDP (CPDS data)

Modeling

- Dependent variable is left-censored (almost 25% of zeros)
- Electoral data are clustered within countries
- Serial correlated errors are possible within each country

Tobit Model with Fixed Effects (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003a,b; Swank and Betz, 2003; Smith, 2010)

Important limitation:

- The homogeneity of slope coefficients might be an unreasonable assumption in cross-national comparison

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
(Intercept)	14.69*** (2.39)	15.41*** (2.51)	13.83*** (2.76)	14.06*** (2.42)	15.41*** (2.40)	15.16*** (2.35)
Evalues	0.62 (1.05)					
Polarvalues		-0.68 (0.82)				
Postmaterialism			0.81 (1.23)			
PostmatPolar				-1.43 (0.97)		
Tolerance					-1.73 (1.13)	
Trust						-3.77** (1.59)
Unemployment	-2.16*** (0.72)	-2.03*** (0.74)	-2.13*** (0.72)	-1.94*** (0.74)	-1.99*** (0.72)	-2.28*** (0.71)
Effnumb	0.42 (0.76)	0.45 (0.76)	0.38 (0.76)	0.45 (0.76)	0.40 (0.75)	0.70 (0.76)
Gallaher	-0.50 (0.96)	-0.48 (0.95)	-0.50 (0.95)	-0.52 (0.95)	-0.38 (0.95)	-0.70 (0.94)
Migrants	-0.97 (1.22)	-1.20 (1.25)	-0.72 (1.28)	-0.66 (1.24)	-1.23 (1.22)	-1.20 (1.21)
Ssfunds	1.00 (1.16)	0.95 (1.16)	1.35 (1.26)	1.69 (1.24)	0.75 (1.16)	0.34 (1.17)
ArCa	-0.67 (0.70)	-0.63 (0.70)	-0.69 (0.69)	-0.71 (0.69)	-0.84 (0.69)	-0.76 (0.68)
Log(scale)	1.65*** (0.06)	1.65*** (0.06)	1.65*** (0.06)	1.64*** (0.06)	1.64*** (0.06)	1.63*** (0.06)
AIC	876.39	876.06	876.31	874.56	874.40	871.15
BIC	990.63	990.30	990.55	988.80	988.65	985.39
Log Likelihood	-401.20	-401.03	-401.15	-400.28	-400.20	-398.58


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	13.82*** (2.36)	15.02*** (2.24)
evalues	0.64 (1.03)	
evalues:Migrants	2.64** (1.12)	
Trust		-2.94* (1.57)
Trust:Migrants		5.77*** (1.58)
Migrants	0.11 (1.27)	1.61 (1.37)
Unemployment	-2.22*** (0.71)	-1.97*** (0.68)
Effnumb	0.39 (0.75)	0.94 (0.73)
Gallaher	-0.64 (0.94)	-0.75 (0.90)
ssfunds	0.77 (1.13)	0.17 (1.11)
ArCa	-0.86 (0.69)	-0.70 (0.65)
Log(scale)	1.62*** (0.06)	1.58*** (0.06)
AIC	872.86	859.75
BIC	990.19	977.08
Log Likelihood	-398.43	-391.87

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1


Interaction Between Trust and Migration

(sample splitted into four groups by quartiles of Immigration distribution)



Interaction Between Emancipative Values and Migration

(sample splitted into four groups by quartiles of Immigration distribution)



Findings

- There are no effects of values on right voting on the country level in Europe during the last twenty years
- Growth of unemployment leads to the worse results of RRPs: in line with evidences of Arzheimer & Carter (2006), and Knigge (1998)
- Trust negatively affects right voting. There is also a weak evidence that the average country level of tolerance also reduces support for radical Rights.
- There are very strong and POSITIVE interactive effects between trust and emancipative values and percentage of immigrant population. *(The first effect remains significant in random effects random slopes specification)*

Discussion

- Absence of the effect of values on RRP voting on the country level does not mean that there is no such effect in the individual level
- Strong negative impact of unemployment: in hard times European voters in general follow economic reasons rather than cultural ones. In other words, when their own well-being is at stake, their voting is driven by materialist reasons rather than cultural ones (Hofstadter, 2002; Rydgren, 2008).
- What is the source of strange interactions between trust and immigration and emancipative values and immigration?

Thank You Very Much for Your Attention!

Appendices

Right Parties I

- **Austria:** Freedom Party of Austria
- **Belgium:** Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour, Flemish Bloc / Flemish Interest, Belgium National Front
- **Bulgaria:** ATAKA, People's Union
- **Cyprus:** None
- **Czech:** Republican Party / Republicans of Miroslav Sládek
- **Denmark:** Danish People's Party, Progress Party
- **Estonia:** Estonian Independence Party (in 1995 – within *Bloc Fatherland and ENIP Union*)
- **Finland:** True Finns
- **France:** National Republican Movement, France National Front, Movement for France
- **Germany:** German People's Union, National Democratic Party of Germany, Republicans
- **Greece:** Greek Front
- **Hungary:** Jobbik, Justice and Life Party (MIEP)
- **Ireland:** National Party of Ireland
- **Italy:** Northern League, Italian Social Movement / National Alliance, Social Movement-Threecoloured Flame

Right Parties II

- **Latvia:** National Alliance, For the Fatherland and Freedom
- **Lithuania:** National Union List
- **Luxembourg:** None
- **Malta:** National Action, Imperium Europe
- **Netherlands:** Centre Democrats, List Pim Fortuyn / List Five Fortuyn, Political Reformed Political Party, Party for Freedom
- **Norway:** Progress Party, Fatherland Party
- **Poland:** Confederation for Independent Poland, Party X, Law and Justice
- **Portugal:** Party of the Christian Democracy, Party of National Solidarity
- **Romania:** Party of Romanian National Unity, Greater Romania Party
- **Slovakia:** National Party
- **Slovenia:** National Party
- **Spain:** Aragonese Regionalist Party
- **Sweden:** New Democracy, Sweden Swedish Democrats
- **Switzerland:** Car Party / Freedom Party of Switzerland, Federal Democratic Union, Swiss Democrats, Swiss People's Party
- **United Kingdom:** British National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party

Tolerance Index (four-item WVS)

- V37 – Neighbours: different race
- V39 – Neighbours: foreign workers
- V40 – Neighbours: homosexuals
- V46 – Job scarce: employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants

Tolerance Index: factor loadings

	Estimate	S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Value
• V37	0.709	0.006	115.096	0.000
• V39	0.694	0.006	118.816	0.000
• V40	0.734	0.006	127.398	0.000
• V46	0.468	0.005	100.337	0.000

Materialism/Postmaterialism Polarization Index (*Modified RQ Index*)

(1)

;

- – share of respondents fallen in a given category
- – highest category of a scale (that is, *postmaterialists*);
- – lowest category of a scale (*materialist*);

(!) Central category (*mixed*) has a zero weight