



How and when values translate into political protest under non-democratic conditions?

Establishing the causal direction

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7th November 2012, Moscow

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New Project



Outline

- Previous findings
- New RQ
- Argument and hypotheses
 - Dependent and independent variables
 - Sample
 - Methods



I. Why bother?

- Emancipative values are conducive to electoral failure, possibly thanks to pre-electoral mobilization and civic campaigning
- Survival values are associated with post-electoral protests as well, otherwise, not only romantic heroes drive the protests ,but also consumer-oriented citizens (ideological gap?)
- Unaddressed issues:
 - 1) Causal mechanism and microfoundations
 - 2) Cross-sectional comparison with country-level unit of analysis often suppresses significant intra-case variation (ecological fallacy)
 - 3) Authoritarian countries function at different levels of government (‘sub-national authoritarianism’ literature) and often changes start from lower levels
 - 4) The role of information under non-democratic conditions (Rozenas 2012; Wintrobe 1998; Magaloni and Kricheli 2009; Hyde and Marinov 2012)




Further directions?

- 1) to expand of the sample+democracies+referendums or
- 2) to go deeper into the causal mechanism, that is cross-regional time-series analysis



Distribution of the Types of referendums in autocracies 1990-2011



Source: Center for Research on Direct Democracy; C2D dataset // <http://www.c2d.ch/>



I. Research Question

- Do patterns of values distribution within a country matter for political mobilization?
- If so, how exactly are they transmitted into the observable political outcome?



One example: Russian protests

- Dmitriev and Treisman (Foreign Affairs 2012):

‘the urban activists who have appeared on the front pages of newspapers around the world constitute at most a tiny fraction of the Russian population -- a few hundred thousand people in a country of 143 million. The big question that will determine Russia's political future is how much support this politicized vanguard can hope for from the quiet majority that lives outside Moscow and St. Petersburg. (...) The stereotype of the provincial Russian is of a politically apathetic conformist who is resentful of pampered Muscovites, socially conservative, generally pro-Putin, suspicious of the West, and nostalgic for Soviet order’.




Arguments

- Emancipative and secular-rational values are mobilized differently
- Internet communication is not a ‘democratizing’ or ‘mobilizing’ tool per se, rather a channel, facilitating mechanism and highly depends on the dominating value profile
- Repression and concessions undertaken by political incumbent are triggers for political action or reasons for its absence
- Citizens learn about incumbent’s actions through mass media, including internet: the more the media network, the more information they get
- Citizens with emancipative values will get mobilized easier, those with mostly secular-rational and survival values may be ‘bought off’ by ‘concessions’ or frightened



Causal Model to be tested





Dependent variable

Frequency and scale of protest actions aggregated at a monthly basis in a cross-regional perspective.

Data are to be automatically extracted from the news reports (Reuters or any other regional trustworthy online resource), by using iMacros and R scripts, then, stored in a csv format (Gandhi and Bhasin 2012) and to be aggregated at the monthly level.

Unit of analysis – a ‘region-month’



Independent variables

1. Emancipative vs survival and Sacred vs secular-rational values **aggregated by regions** in a country (WVS)
2. Spread of communication technologies (e.g. Internet users per 100 people) (WB, national sources)
3. *Repression and concessions (dataset to be generated):*

Following Gandhi and Bhasin (2012) framework each repression event should contain information on the type of action taken; the target of the action ; and the identity of the perpetrator (which enables us to isolate actions committed by the state as opposed to opposition or private actors). Repressive events include the threat of force or the actual use of force by state. Dependent variable will be disaggregated the variable *into Civilian repression and Opposition repression.*



Controls

- Election month t , 1 month before elections $t-1$ etc (dummy)
- Regional per capita income
- Inflation rate in consumer prices
- Unemployment rate
- Diffusion effects (proximity to the nearest ‘rebellious’ region)
- Type of elections (federal, executive, legislative)
- Incumbent won, lose
- Regional incumbent’s affiliation with the ruling party or authoritarian leader



Cases

- Ideally federal and regime with the regional elections
- E.g. Mexico (1990-2000), Peru (1990-2000), Russia (2007 onwards)




How to establish causal relationship?

- Poisson or negative binomial regression
- experimental design (see Morton, Williams 2010; Kirk 2009; David and Krueger 1994; Bechtel and Hainmueller 2009; Sekhon and Titunik 2012)
- Random assignment variable: e.g. abrupt spread and proliferation of the internet technologies???
- There data on the number of internet users both cross-nationally and cross-regionally (e.g. Rosstat in Russia, Select-IDC in Mexico etc.)



Internet proliferation dynamics (number of users per 100; World Bank)





Questions:

- Does WVS contain the information on respondent's region? (waves and countries?)
- Is any kind of experiment-like design applicable to estimate the effects of interest (DifinDif; Regression Discontinuity, Interrupted time-series)? What could be an 'assignment' variable?



Thank you for Your Attention!
Questions and comments ?