



Separating the bright from the dark side

Association Membership and Individuals' Attitudes towards Corrupt Activities

Nicolas Griebhaber, Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS),
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


Outline

- 1. Background and Motivation**
- 2. Theory and Hypotheses**
- 3. Data and Methods**
- 4. Empirical Findings**
- 5. Implications and Limitations**



2. Background and Motivation



2. Background and Motivation

- **Focus of the current paper**





1. Background and Motivation

- **Contributions**

- Current research takes a micro perspective
- Accounts for potential type specific effects (inclusive vs. exclusive associations)
- Accounts for the type of individuals' involvement (active vs. passive)
- Addresses possibility that the connection between membership and civic attitudes may be conditional on the environment in which associations operate (i.e. the existing corruption regime)



2. Theory and Hypotheses

- **Membership and Corruption Attitudes (Tocqueville view)**
 - Associations provide platform for intense and repeated horizontal interactions (see e.g. Putnam 1993; Freitag et al. 2009; Grieshaber and Geys 2012)
 - ➔ Valuable experience regarding benefits of cooperation and trust
 - Structures of such organizations help to internalise social values and rules concerning mutual cooperation (see e.g. Paxton 2007)
 - ➔ Members develop values of solidarity and civicness, social responsibility for collective endeavours, civic skills and social trust

Hypothesis

- ***Members of voluntary associations are more opposed to corrupt activities than non-members.***



2. Theory and Hypotheses

- **Membership and Corruption Attitudes (Olson view)**

- Distinct groups are unlikely to have homogenous preferences

➔ Civic engagement may become possibility or tool to lobby policymakers

(Knack and Keefer 1997)

- Specialized interest groups have a much stronger incentive to engage in costly and inefficient rent-seeking compared to their incentive to work toward the 'common good' (Olson 1982)

Hypothesis

- ***Members of voluntary associations are less opposed to corrupt activities than non-members***



2. Theory and Hypotheses

- **Inclusive vs. Exclusive networks** (Zmerli 2003; Griesshaber and Geys 2012)
 - Inclusive groups: outward oriented, broader focus that reaches across associational boundaries
 - ➔ Generate civic virtues, broader identities and reciprocity
 - Exclusive groups: inward oriented, based on strong ingroup identity
 - ➔ Enforce exclusive identities, in-group cohesion and outgroup antagonisms

Hypotheses

- ***Members of inclusive networks are more opposed to corruption than people that are not involved in such networks.***
- ***Members of exclusive networks are less opposed to corruption than people that are not involved in such networks.***



2. Theory and Hypotheses

- **Active vs. Passive Engagement**

- Implicit in much of the reasoning thus far is that the effect of social networks on their members' trust, norms and values derives from face-to-face interactions

Hypotheses

- ***Active modes of civic engagement lead to stronger effects than passive ones.***



2. Theory and Hypotheses

- **Membership and Attitudes – Does the environment matter?**
 - The role of associations may depend on the societal and institutional environment in which these networks operate (Maloney et al 2008: 263)
 - Ill-functioning system with High corruption:
Social networks may become part of the corrupt system
 - Clean country with Low Corruption:
Common civic attitudes and objection against activities that threaten efficient functioning of the system

Hypotheses

- ***Members of voluntary associations are more opposed to corruption in countries where the level of corruption is low, while membership in countries with higher corruption is connected to attitudes more favourable towards corruption***



3. Data and Methods

Data

- Pooled individual-level data for 47 countries
- 5th round of the World Values Survey (WVS) 2004 – 2008
- Includes information on attitudes towards corruption as well as detailed information on civic involvement in associations

Estimation

- Linear hierarchical random-intercept estimations across 66,841 individuals from 47 countries

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CorrAcceptance}_{ij} = & \beta_{00} + \beta_{10} \cdot \text{Membership}_{ij} + \sum_{k=2}^{K+1} \beta_{k0} \cdot \text{Control}_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{01} \cdot \text{GDP per capita (logged)}_j + \beta_{02} \cdot \text{Democracy}_j \\ & + \beta_{03} \cdot \text{Fractionalization}_j + \delta_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$



3. Data and Methods

Dependent Variable – Attitudes towards corruption

- V201 (WVS): asks respondents whether it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between when someone is accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
- Scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable)

Independent Variables – Associational Involvement

- V24-V33 (WVS): asks respondents for 10 different association types whether they are an active, an inactive or not a member of that type of organization
- Dichotomous variables separately for active and inactive (i.e. passive) membership as well as for membership in general (i.e. active or inactive)

3. Data and Methods

- **Exclusive vs. Inclusive Associations**

Organization	Constitutive Good
Exclusive	
Labor Union	Individual Material
Professional association	Individual Material
Consumer organization	Individual Material
Inclusive	
Church or religious organization	Interpersonal Identity/ Inclusive Social
Sport or recreational organization	Interpersonal Identity
Art, music or educational organization	Interpersonal Identity/ Inclusive Social
Political Party	Public Material
Environmental organization	Public Material/ Inclusive Social
Humanitarian or charitable organization	Inclusive Social

Voluntary organizations covered in the WVS 2004-2008. The assignment of constitutive goods and the distinction between exclusive and inclusive organizations follow Zmerli (2003). Any other organization is excluded as category.




3. Data and Methods

• Control Factors

- Gender
- Age
- Education
- Household income
- Religious affiliation

- GDP per capita (logged)
- Average Freedom House/Polity measure
- Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (from Alesina et al. 2003)
- Control of Corruption index (World Bank)



4. Empirical Findings I – Membership in general

Hierarchical Random-Intercept Estimations

Individuals acceptance of bribe taking as dependent variable

- Estimations across 66,841 individuals from 47 countries
- All control variables included in models 1 and 2 but not reported
- Significance levels:
*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$
- ^a Reference category is no membership

	(0)	(1)	(2)
Membership ^a		0.0132 (0.0172)	
Exclusive Association			0.0655*** (0.0176)
Inclusive Association			0.00558 (0.0175)
Number of respondents	66,841	66,841	66,841
Number of countries	47	47	47
Intra-Class Correlation	0.082	0.053	0.053

4. Empirical Findings II – Active vs. Passive

Hierarchical Random-Intercept Estimations


Individuals acceptance of bribe taking as dependent variable

- Estimations across 66,841 individuals from 47 countries
- All control variables included but not reported
- Significance levels:
*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$
- ^{a, b} Reference category is no membership

	(3)	(4)
Active Membership ^a	-0.0163 (0.0157)	
Passive Membership ^b	0.0798*** (0.0155)	
Active in exclusive assoc.		0.0175 (0.0227)
Active in inclusive assoc.		-0.0218 (0.0163)
Passive in exclusive assoc.		0.0693*** (0.0201)
Passive in exclusive assoc.		0.0715*** (0.0164)
Number of observations	66,841	66,841
Number of countries	47	47
Intra-Class Correlation	0.053	0.052

4. Empirical Findings III – Interaction Effect


- **Effect of Membership with changing Corruption Level**



- Dependent Variable: Attitudes towards corruption
- Marginal effect of membership given certain level of corruption in 2004 reported
- 95% confidence intervals shown
- Observed values for Corruption index within sample range between -1.00 and 2.31
- Illustration based on Brambor et al. (2006)

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5. Conclusion - Implications and Limitations

Main Results

- Rather than particular type of association it seems to be the type of membership (active/passive) that is important
- Role of associations with respect to civic attitudes seems to depend on the existing level of corruption

Implications for further research

- Measurement of corruption attitudes – using single item may be problematic
- Connection between acceptance of corrupt activities and actual behaviour still needs to be tested empirically



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