


Eduard Ponarin

Islam and modernization

The case of Tatarstan for the
post-Soviet context and
hypotheses for wider settings

Islamism and Nationalism

- Trying to emulate the West in 1850-1950
- A series of setbacks for Muslim countries in the mid-20th century
- Post-nationalist Islamism in the second half of the 20th century



Common functions

Gellner: *Nationalism is a civic religion*

- Mass mobilization
- Legitimation
- Group prestige

There is also a significant difference:
whereas religion is universalist,
nationalism tends to be particularist.

This difference has serious implications.

Ressentiment

Greenfeld: *Copycat nationalism results in resentment towards the model society*

- her chapter on Russia shows that the alternative model was found in the pre-petrine Russia and hence Slavophilism
- post-nationalist Islamism may be compared with the Russian Slavophilism

Preliminary conclusion

Nationalism in the Muslim societies has been declining since the 1950s because it failed

- to achieve a single geopolitical victory vis-à-vis the West and Israel and
- to deliver better life to people within their countries

Consequently, its place is being taken by post-nationalist Islamism

Hypotheses

- failure of nationalism in the Muslim society will generally lead to its (partial) replacement with the Islamist ideology
- post-nationalist Islamism will cross ethnic and national boundaries

Tatarstan 1989-2009

is not just another region but

- a thoroughly secularized post-Soviet society
- somewhat later in terms of historical period
- somewhat shorter time-span

If the hypothesis holds under these quite different conditions, it will provide a strong support for my model.

1989-1994: Nationalist Victory

Tatar nationalist movement

- wins various concessions from the Kremlin
- picks up on the neighbouring Bashkortostan
- uses Islam instrumentally to back up claims on authenticity, win over Tatar-language Bashkorts, and get support from the richer Muslim nations

1995-2000: Nationalist Monarchy

- Tatar nationalist movement is suppressed by the Tatar strongman Shaimiyev who becomes an absolute prince in Tatarstan.
- Tatarstan continues to enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the Kremlin in the context of a weak Russian Federation.
- Tatarstan's autonomy and relatively high living standards legitimate Shaimiyev's regime locally; the nationalist agenda is still on.

2000-2005: The defeat

- revision of tax status for Tatarstan
 - revision of Tatarstan's constitution and other laws
 - cancellation of gubernatorial elections
 - ability of the Federal President to disband provincial legislatures
- No second round of the nationalist game because of
- the political void created by Shaimiyev
 - the experience of the Chechen wars

2003-2009: Post-nationalist Islamism

- a sharp rise in the number of believers even as the number of mosques stopped growing
- Islamization of the nationalist opposition
- some militancy
- positive correlation of nationalism and Islamism with respect to Moscow and Russians
- negative correlation with respect to other Muslim peoples (such as Bashkorts)

Back to the world historic level

Nationalism is a civic religion...

...and religion is a ... nationalism?

- obituaries to fundamentalism are premature
- possible melting of (some) national boundaries in the future
- will Islamic societies modernize?

Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Volga- Urals Region of Russia

Kirill Zhirkov

Notes on the Analysis

- The data were collected in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan
- Ordinal and multinomial variables recoded into dummies
- Method – factor analysis in *Mplus* using polychoric correlations
- Groups: Tatars in Tatarstan, Tatars in Bashkortostan, Bashkirs in Bashkortostan, Russians in both republics ($N \approx 400$ for each group)

Two Types of Nationalism

- Factor analysis revealed a strong distinction between “political” and “ethnic” nationalism
- This distinction is valid for all ethnic groups included in the analysis
- Political nationalism is tied to the republic, so it’s perceived differently by titular group and others
- Two types of nationalism are differently related to socio-economic characteristics of the respondents

Ethnic Nationalism

Indicators of ethnic nationalism (importance of particular items differ among groups):

- Self-identification with ethnic group (and not with civic community)
- Ethnic identity is important
- Feeling of pride for own ethnic group
- Negative attitude to mixed marriage (in own family)
- Perception that people of other ethnic groups can't understand respondent's one

Looks like rather conventional ethnocentrism

Political Nationalism

Indicators of political nationalism (importance of particular items differ among groups):

- Republic has a right to secede from Russia
- Republic has a right for own constitution
- Republic has a right for own laws different from federal ones
- Republic should be given back sovereign status
- Willingness to fight for the republic (and not for Russia as a whole)

Seems to be rather close to separatism

Religiosity

- Different groups have different indicators of religiosity
- Tatars in Tatarstan:
 - Regular praying
 - Positive attitude to women wearing hijab
 - Negative attitude to apostasy
 - Perception that Russian Church is too close to the authorities
- Tatars in Bashkortostan: only praying
- Bashkirs: only attitude to hijab

Relationship of Nationalisms

- Titular groups: political and ethnic nationalism are positively connected ($\rho \approx .5$)
- Tatars in Bashkortostan: the relationship is lower but still positive ($\rho \approx .3$)
- Russians: the relationship is negative ($\rho \approx -.5$)
- Data say that there are Russians who support republican separatism. Who are they?
 - Rational choice: they are integrated in republican elites and expect certain benefits
 - Mere “tolerance”: pro-separatist Russians score low on ethnocentrism

Other Findings

- Ethnic nationalism is negatively related to the level of education
 - Not really surprising
- Religiosity is positively related to age and negatively to education
 - Rather common finding in studies of religiosity
- Political nationalism has nothing to do with socio-economic variables
 - Indicates of its instrumental character

The End

Thank you for your
attention